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Part I
P R E FA C E

P R E FA C E
The emergence of behavioral economics in the 1950s has sparked a debate
whether agents are best represented by the "classical" – rational and selfish –
homo economicus or by "behavioral" decision-makers subject to various biases.
This debate has been long-standing and behavioral economics shifted from
being a niche towards an important field within economics, documenting sys-
tematic evidence for behavioral biases and "mistakes" in decision making. This
increasing importance is also mirrored in three Nobel Prizes awarded to influ-
ential behavioral researchers, Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith (2002), Al
Roth (2012) and most recently, Richard Thaler (2017). With increasing acknowl-
edgement of behavioral phenomena and their importance for economics, the
debate has shifted from arguing in favor of either the classical or the behavioral
view towards accepting the co-existence of the two. Nowadays, economists
rather focus on understanding in which situations behavioral biases are eco-
nomically relevant: When and where should agents be understood as behav-
ioral and in which circumstances do neoclassical assumptions suffice to predict
empirical observations?
Development economics is an especially relevant field in which to investi-
gate this question for two main reasons. First, given generally lower levels of
income and available resources, the same biases or mistakes have relatively
more serve consequences. Second, recent evidence suggests that scarcity im-
pairs decision making by limiting cognitive function or focusing attention on
one issue while ignoring others (Mani et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2012). This could
imply more severe or additional biases for poor decision-makers.
Within development economics, microfinance offers exciting opportunities
for reducing poverty, advancing social change and enlarging markets. The pro-
vision of financial services (credit, saving and insurance) to the poor was cele-
brated as a first step toward financial inclusion. In particular, microcredit was
thought to provide a new tool to overcome market failures related to inter alia
3
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high transaction costs and problems in contract enforcement and was even
termed "revolutionary" by e.g. M. S. Robinson (2001). The concept was widely
embraced, which led to annual growth rates in terms of clients of on average
30 percent between 1997 and 2007 (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) and cul-
minated in the Nobel Peace Prize for Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen
Bank in 2006 for their pioneering work. Only more recently, the impact of mi-
crofinance products was rigorously evaluated via randomized controlled trials
(RCTs). These RCTs, however, revealed rather modest effects: Microcredit ap-
pears to have a somewhat positive but no transformative impact (Banerjee
et al., 2015a).1 Microsavings, on the other hand, seem to have more promis-
ing effects (Karlan et al., 2014). However, it is still not fully understood why
savings rates in developing countries remain low. While several of the con-
straints to saving are "classical" in nature, such as transaction costs or liquidity
constraints, more recent studies have found that behavioral biases play an im-
portant role as well.
This dissertation investigates both aspects, microsavings and microcredit.
Chapter 1 contributes to understanding "undersaving", exploring a widely ob-
served behavioral bias in this new setting. To this end, I study how partic-
ipants make an individual savings decision. Chapter 2 implements a credit
repayment game to examine specific design features of microcredit products
as a first step to developing innovative and more effective products. Although
choices are also taken individually in this study, the contractual structures we
test include a group component. Some repayment decisions can impose ex-
ternalities on others’ payoffs and participants can punish each other for their
(non-)repayment choices. For both credit repayment and sanctioning decisions
we provide evidence that norms guide behavior. As unwritten codes of con-
duct, norms are an essential determinant of behavior, not only in developing
countries, where typically weaker institutions require more informal guidance
on behavior. Given the multitude of situations in which decisions are not taken
by one individual but teams or groups, the interaction of groups and norms
is an important line of research, especially since groups allow learning about
1 Initially, microcredit was thought to enable poor individuals to become successful self-
entrepreneurs, creating jobs for others and ultimately lifting themselves out of poverty, which
would "transform" their lives.
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(and eventually changing) a norm. While Chapter 2 has a group component
but no interaction of groups, Chapter 3 explicitly studies the norm of honesty
and how it relates to group and individual decision making. It focuses on
different mechanisms and incentive structures within groups by investigating
communication and how group interaction shapes the perceived strength of
the honesty norm. In contrast to Chapter 2, norms can be expressed in the
group interaction, but cannot be enforced or punished. Studying questions in
microfinance and norms, this dissertation thus gradually increases the focus
on group decision making, ranging from a purely individual decision in Chap-
ter 1 to studying processes inherent to group interactions in Chapter 3.
All chapters rely on the same methodology: experimental economics. To-
gether with behavioral economics, experiments have become increasingly pop-
ular. Their main advantage is the exogenous assignment of treatments that
creates a valid counterfactual. This, in turn, allows identifying causal relation-
ships. In general, experiments range from abstract settings in the lab with stu-
dent participants to field settings in which participants take natural decisions
and are not aware of the ongoing experiment (for a classification see Harrison
and List, 2004). This span is mirrored in this dissertation. It consists of i) a lab
experiment conducted with students who make abstract choices that do not
have a direct real-life equivalent (Chapter 3), ii) a framed field experiment in
which microcredit clients play a loan repayment game (Chapter 2) and iii) a
field experiment in which microfinance clients make a real-life savings deci-
sion (Chapter 1). In the lab and the framed field experiment, choices do not
have consequences for real life (beyond affecting payoffs) and participants are
aware of being part of an experiment. Both studies need a certain level of ab-
straction and control to measure otherwise hard to identify concepts such as
norms and beliefs that in turn help uncover mechanisms. In comparison to
the abstract lab experiment, decisions in the framed field experiment are pre-
sented using familiar terms (e.g. repayment, installment, loan term), but, as
discussed in Chapter 2, not all features of the experimental choices represent
actual loan repayment. The level of abstraction is further reduced in the field
experiment in which participants make a familiar choice and are unaware of
any treatment manipulation. Both field experiments study behavior of a sam-
6 preface
ple of interest, namely microfinance clients, while the lab experiment uses a
convenience sample of university students to examine a more general mecha-
nism. This dissertation thus provides causal evidence of individual and group
behavior in the lab and in the field, studying microfinance and norms.
the endowment effect and savings decisions of the poor In
Chapter 1, I study formal savings that have been shown to be a promising tool
to reduce poverty, increase investment and empower women. However, sav-
ings rates of the poor are usually puzzlingly low (Karlan et al., 2014). Recent
explanations for this phenomenon have focused on behavioral biases, most
prominently time-inconsistent decision making and inattention. Interventions
to increase savings have ranged from providing commitment devices to send-
ing reminders, but take-up and usage rates have remained mostly modest.
One potentially important but so far neglected explanation is one of the best
known behavioral biases, the endowment effect. The relative reluctance of in-
dividuals to give up things they have been endowed with has been shown to
cause market inefficiencies and can have important implications for the design
of contracts and institutions. In many developing countries, poor households
receive their income in cash. Being "endowed" with cash that needs to be phys-
ically deposited into a savings account might increase the psychological costs
of saving.
I experimentally study the causal effect of cash endowments on savings de-
posits of microfinance clients, using a simple, high-stakes natural decision with
external validity. In addition, I control for potential confounds such as trans-
action costs and time preferences. Participants are invited to take part in paid
individual interviews. During the interview, participants are asked whether
they want to save (some of) their earnings for participation in their existing
savings account. The main treatment is designed according to endowment ef-
fect experiments in the lab and varies between-subjects when earnings are
handed over. Endowed individuals receive the cash at the very beginning of
the interview and thus make the savings decision after holding on to cash and
by handing back the amount they want to save. Individuals who only know
preface 7
about their earnings but have not yet received the cash, verbally state their
savings decision and receive the (remainder of) cash afterwards.
Cash endowments make individuals feel richer. This is reflected in higher
reports of how much cash participants think they will have at the end of the
day. Given a balanced sample and in particular similar wealth levels across
treatments, this provides evidence that the widely used endowment manipu-
lation from the lab also works in field settings. The feeling of being endowed,
however, does not translate into lower savings, neither in absolute nor in rel-
ative terms. In this setting, cash appears to be fully fungible. This stands in
stark contrast to the literature in marketing, finding lower spending levels in
the presence of cash as opposed to e.g. debit cards. I provide several robust-
ness checks that confirm the null result and discuss potential explanations for
the absence of the endowment effect in this setting.
Despite studying a poor population that is often more prone to biased be-
havior, I do not find any differences in savings with and without the physical
presence of cash. In the context of depositing the cash to be saved, the classical
model seems to be sufficient to describe decisions.2
high loan repayment and low peer pressure? repayment flex-
ibility in microfinance group lending Chapter 2 is joint work
with Kristina Czura and Anett John. We examine two critical features of mi-
crocredit: joint-liability and rigid repayment schedules. Joint-liability, holding
a group of borrowers responsible for repayment of all loans held by group
members, has been praised for leading to high repayment rates. Rigid repay-
ment schedules, i.e. same-sized, small and frequent repayment installments,
have been thought to further induce repayment disciple by establishing a re-
payment habit and making the repayment process less cognitively demanding.
However, both features come at a cost. Rigid repayment schedules interfere
with fluctuating incomes and joint-liability can induce excessive peer pressure.
With these downsides in mind, flexible repayments and individual-liability
have been proposed, but the two features also exhibit drawbacks. Both might
2 It should be kept in mind, however, that savings decisions more generally have been shown to
be affected by other biases such as time-inconsistent decision making or inattention.
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lead to lower repayment rates, flexibility via a reduction in repayment morale
and individual-liability by via the lack of mutual insurance and the absence of
group pressure. Microcredit design thus poses two trade-offs: one between mu-
tual insurance and low peer pressure in the liability structure and one between
shock coping capacity and repayment morale in the repayment schedule.
We study whether the interaction of flexible repayment features and joint-
liability allows reaping the benefits of joint-liability and flexibility – high re-
payment and shock coping capacity – while keeping their downsides – low
repayment morale and excessive peer pressure – at bay. We implement a ver-
sion of flexibility that allows deferring one repayment installment to the future.
This grants self-insurance in case of an idiosyncratic shock. To keep the bur-
den and costs of implementation low, clients decide themselves when to use
flexibility. This, however, leaves room for misuse, i.e. using flexibility absent a
shock and increasing immediate consumption at the cost of future insurance.
We implement framed field experiments with microcredit borrowers in the
Philippines and analyze individual repayment choices over several periods.
Using a 2× 2 design, we observe individual choices under both liability struc-
tures, with and without flexibility. In the joint-liability treatments, we elicit
punishment choices and beliefs about others’ choices, which both can serve as
proxies for the prevailing norm.
Although the experiment has been set up such that non-repayment would
be rational in terms of payoff maximization, repayment rates are high in all
treatments. This strong repayment norm is also reflected in high punishment
of non-repayment absent a shock. In addition to the norm, we document ex-
cessive peer pressure in the form of punishment for an observable shock. In-
teracting joint-liability with repayment flexibility can halve this punishment
when flexibility is used to self-insure. Moreover, joint-liability enhances the
responsible use of flexibility. However, repayment rates are lower with flexi-
bility, independent of the liability scheme. When simulating default rates by
adding shock realizations and partner matching to individual decisions, we
confirm that flexibility has an insurance value, especially in early periods.
However, joint-liability without flexibility yields the lowest default rates in
preface 9
our setting. This is not due to behavioral differences in individual-liability and
joint-liability, but automatic enforcement of joint-liability.
This study is the first one to examine the liability and flexibility trade-offs in
microcredit and points towards interesting avenues for future research, for in-
stance relaxing some of our assumptions or testing other versions of flexibility.
Further, this study nicely illustrates the benefits of framed field experiments.
While field experiments are generally unable to cleanly measure punishment
and disentangle repayment choices from shocks and decisions of the borrow-
ing group, a pure lab experiment with students who are mostly inexperienced
with borrowing might have yielded vastly different results.
i lie? we lie! why? experimental evidence on a dishonesty shift
in groups Chapter 3 is joint work with Martin G. Kocher and Simeon
Schudy and builds on the observation that unethical behavior such as dis-
honesty, cheating and corruption occurs frequently in organizations or groups.
Recent experimental evidence suggests that there is a stronger inclination to
behave immorally in groups than individually. We ask if this is the case, and
if so, why.
Using a parsimonious lab setup, we study how individual behavior changes
when deciding as a group member. We focus on the incentive structure within
the group and the deliberation process taking place via exchanging arguments
and learning about the strength of a norm. By design, we exclude better un-
derstanding and diffusion of responsibility as explanations for increased dis-
honesty in groups. To achieve individual observability of lying, we modify the
widely used die rolling task (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). We show
participants a randomly selected video of a die roll and ask them to report the
number they have seen. Payoffs depend on the reported number, not the num-
ber seen. A "classical" payoff maximizing agent would thus simply report the
number associated with the highest payoff. In contrast, participants who follow
the honesty norm would report the number they have seen. Our experimental
design allows us to observe behavioral change (within-subjects) across differ-
ent (between-subjects) individual and group treatments. Groups are allowed
to communicate via an anonymous chat before all group members individu-
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ally report a number. Two kinds of groups exist: with payoff commonality (i.e.
other group members benefit from one’s lie) or without. Lastly, we elicit beliefs
about others’ reporting behavior before and after the group communication to
assess the prevailing norm.
Even without norm enforcement and despite the abstract setting, the hon-
esty norm is clearly reflected in individual choices. However, we observe a
strong dishonesty shift in groups. This shift is mainly driven by communica-
tion within groups and turns out to be independent of whether group mem-
bers face payoff commonality or not. Group members come up with and ex-
change more arguments for being dishonest than for complying with the norm
of honesty. Thereby, group membership shifts the perception of the validity of
the honesty norm and of its distribution in the population.
While many studies, including Chapter 2, point to beneficial aspects of
groups, we find that in the presence of a weak norm (unframed setting and
no consequences of misreporting), communication in groups can lead to large
shifts in undesirable behavior. How to counteract these shifts, e.g. by strength-
ening the norm or introducing sanctioning mechanisms as in Chapter 2 are
fruitful avenues for future research. Likewise, given the importance of commu-
nication in groups, it would be interesting to include the possibility to discuss
repayment and the use of flexibility in the setting of Chapter 2. Given the
strong repayment norm, communication might further enhance "responsible"
behavior as opposed to the dishonesty shift that we observe in Chapter 3.
All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained, they have their own
introductions and can be read independently. Each chapter has its own ap-
pendix and all appendices are added after Chapter 3. The bibliography con-
taining all references can be found at the end of this dissertation.
Part II
M I C R O F I N A N C E A N D N O R M S : I N D I V I D U A L A N D
G R O U P B E H AV I O R I N T H E L A B A N D I N T H E F I E L D

1
T H E E N D O W M E N T E F F E C T A N D S AV I N G S D E C I S I O N S O F
T H E P O O R
1.1 introduction
Recent field experiments support that improvements in access to and usage of
formal savings can reduce poverty (Burgess and Pande, 2005) and debt (Kast
and Pomeranz, 2014). Savings can also increase investment and income (Brune
et al., 2016; Dupas and J. Robinson, 2013a; Prina, 2015) and even lead to higher
female empowerment (Ashraf et al., 2010). In general, impacts of microsavings
seem to be very promising for improving the lives of the poor, especially when
compared to the modest effects of microcredit (cf. Banerjee et al., 2015b). How-
ever, savings levels among the poor remain very low and reasons for this are
still not sufficiently understood (Karlan et al., 2014). In many cases, low for-
mal savings do not seem to be exclusively driven by liquidity constraints and
being too poor to save (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). In addition to direct costs
such as transaction costs, regulatory barriers and social constraints, explana-
tions have focused on behavioral biases. Time-inconsistent decision making
and inattention have received substantial consideration (Ashraf et al., 2006a,b,
2010; Brune et al., 2016; Dupas and J. Robinson, 2013b; Karlan et al., 2017),
while other biases have been neglected so far.
One of the best known findings in behavioral economics is the endowment
effect, the relative reluctance of individuals to give up things they have been en-
dowed with (for recent surveys see e.g. Ericson and Fuster, 2014; Morewedge
and Giblin, 2015; Zeiler, 2018). The endowment effect can have severe conse-
quences for the design of contracts and institutions. It has inter alia been shown
to cause market inefficiencies by influencing trading and investment behavior,
both in a wide range of lab studies and in field settings (e.g. Giné and Gold-
berg, 2016; List, 2003). In the context of formal savings, the endowment effect
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can play an important role if it imposes an additional cost on depositing cash
into an account.
As compared to savings at home that can be subject to social demand or
theft, savings accounts provide a safe place, often coupled with interest pay-
ments or even commitment devices. In many situations, however, poor indi-
viduals need to hold on to their cash income until they have an opportunity
to deposit it. The deposit itself usually entails handing the cash to someone
else, e.g. a staff member of a microfinance organization who visits the village
once a week or maybe only once a month. While this seems to be a very nat-
ural choice environment, holding onto cash can create a sense of endowment.
For instance, consumer research shows that cash is salient with respect to its
physical form (Soman, 2003), such that parting money is vividly felt (Prelec
and Simester, 2001; Thaler, 1999). This results in lower spending when cash is
used (Feinberg, 1986; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Prelec and Simester, 2001;
Runnemark et al., 2015; Soman, 2003). If this also holds true in the context of
savings deposits, the endowment effect can be an important factor contribut-
ing to undersavings.
I study the effect of cash endowments on savings deposits in a field experi-
ment with 300 microfinance clients in the Philippines. This setting is ideal since
it provides a relevant sample in which nearly everyone receives at least some
of their income in cash and everyone already has a savings account, which
takes care of several potentially confounding factors such as hassle costs of
opening an account. The overall design of this study is straightforward: I em-
bed a savings decision in paid individual interviews in which participants can
save (some of) the earnings in their existing savings account. Participants are
endowed with about two daily incomes, implying a high-stakes decision. The
main treatment variation alters the timing of receiving the cash endowment:
Either participants receive the cash upfront and thus hold on to the cash for
on average 15 minutes before making the savings decision (cash in hand, CiH),
or clients decide without having the cash in hand, but knowing that they will
receive the remainder of the endowment not saved just after the decision (cash
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announced, CA).1 Participants with CiH thus need to physically hand over the
amount they want to save whereas individuals in CA simply state the amount
they want to save. This design provides a powerful test for the endowment
effect of cash that only varies the physical presence of cash. Throughout this
chapter, I use the term endowment effect because my treatment manipulation
is closely related to this particular literature.2 The main difference to the exist-
ing endowment studies is that I do not investigate trading of goods (vs. money)
but "trading" of cash now vs. cash in the future.
This chapter relates to two strands of literature by combining behavioral
insights with an application to development economics. Advancing the under-
standing of savings behavior, two recent field experiments compare defaulting
payments into a savings account to handing out payments in cash and find
higher savings with defaults (Brune et al., 2017; Somville and Vandewalle,
2018).3 These effects are in line with the effect proposed in this study but
could also be due to status quo bias or inertia in decision making. The afore-
mentioned authors do not relate their findings to the endowment effect. Giné
and Goldberg (2016), however, interpret lower switching rates of old customers
to cheaper savings accounts as evidence for the endowment effect (although
the results could also be explained by status quo bias or inertia in decision-
making). In contrast to these three studies, I explicitly investigate the effect of
1 The time with CiH is the upper bound of time that participants spend with their endowment
in the lab and since cash is held physically and participants possess it at the time of decision
making, the endowment effect should be stronger in CiH (Bushong et al., 2010; Knetsch and
Wong, 2009; Peck and Shu, 2009; Reb and Connolly, 2007; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998).
2 It should be acknowledged, however, that other, inter-related concepts such as fungibility/tangi-
bility and mental accounting exist. So far, there exists no agreement regarding the relationship
of these concepts. For instance, McGraw et al. (2003) treat the endowment effect and mental
accounting as similar concepts (both resulting into lower fungibility), while Ericson and Fuster
(2014) point out two potential influences of mental accounting on the endowment effect and
Thaler (1985) equates the endowment effect with loss aversion and uses it to develop a theory
of mental accounting. Abeler and Marklein (2017) and Thaler (1985) discuss mental accounting
as a mechanism for violations of fungibility. A similar disagreement still exists regarding the
cause of the endowment effect (Zeiler, 2018), ranging from inter alia loss aversion (Bateman
et al., 1997; Kahneman et al., 1991), trade aversion (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010), biased infor-
mation processing (Carmon and Ariely, 2000) to psychological ownership (Morewedge et al.,
2009; Reb and Connolly, 2007) and assignment (Heffetz and List, 2014).
3 Relatedly, and similar to Thaler and Benartzi (2004) in the US, Blumenstock et al. (2017) default
Afghan employees into payroll deductions which increases savings. These default interventions
combine several behavioral biases such as time preferences, inertia, status quo bias as well as the
endowment effect, and appear to be a powerful tool to increase savings. However, they cannot
be applied in settings that mostly rely on cash transactions and these settings still abound: In
2014, 66 percent of the worldwide population aged 15 and above did not make or receive a
digital financial payment (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015).
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cash endowment on savings decisions and I am able to disentangle the endow-
ment effect from inertia since all participants make an active choice regrading
the savings deposit.
Harigaya (2017) provides evidence that the way in which deposits are made
matters. He assesses the effects of a transition to mobile banking which leads
to a decline in both savings balances and deposit frequency, mainly driven by
lower peer pressure and increased salience of transaction fees. It is therefore
important to understand how the need to physically deposit cash, a feature
that has not been changed in the study, impacts savings decisions.4
Most of the experimental research on the endowment effect is conducted
in the lab with students who are endowed with e.g. mugs and pens for a
short period of time (usually around 0-15 minutes) before the endowment ef-
fect is measured. The measurement relies on either the exchange paradigm,
in which trading rates for different initial endowments are observed, or the
valuation paradigm with an elicitation of willingness-to-pay (WTP) for non-
endowed and willingness-to-accept (WTA) for endowed participants. Results
are presented in terms of trading rate differences or a WTA/WTP "gap". The
exchange paradigm is valued for its easy procedures but cannot measure the
monetary size of the gap, whereas monetarily quantifying the gap is the advan-
tage of the valuation paradigm that comes at the cost of complex procedures
(usually using a version of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM),
Becker et al., 1964). The valuation paradigm has sparked an inconclusive de-
bate whether the endowment effect is (uniquely) due to the misunderstanding
of the complex WTP/WTA elicitation (Bartling et al., 2015; Brebner and Sonne-
mans, 2018; Isoni et al., 2011; Plott and Zeiler, 2005, 2011). In contrast to most
studies, my task is a natural decision that combines the advantages of the two
measurements: It avoids misconception and allows monetarily quantifying the
endowment effect.
More importantly, this study is the first one to test the endowment effect for
cash in a field setting. In addition, the design permits assessing external valid-
4 In treated villages, savings can flexibly be deposited with designated store owners who will
send the money to the bank via phone. This flexibility can also be a reason for this change
in behavior. For a more detailed discussion of flexibility and how it can affect (repayment)
behavior, see Chapter 2.
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ity, a long standing criticism of lab experiments in general. So far, endowment
effects for cash or fungible goods have only been examined in the lab and the
studies have found mixed results, often depending on the uncertainty of the
value of the exchange good.5 Despite the certain value of cash, the two studies
that explore the endowment effect for cash have found mixed results. Both
studies physically endow student participants and start the elicitation of the
endowment effect directly afterwards. Bateman et al. (2005) endow some sub-
jects with cash (chocolate vouchers) and subsequently elicit WTP and WTA for
chocolate vouchers (cash) with 25 multiple dichotomous choices one of which
was randomly determined for payment. The authors replicate the WTA/WTP
gap for chocolate and also find an endowment effect for cash, albeit weaker
than for chocolate. Svirsky (2014) endows participants with US$ 8 in cash or
chocolate coins and offers them to exchange their endowment for a given bas-
ket of goods, including cash and chocolate coins. A baseline group is told
that they are endowed with 80 experimental tokens worth US$ 0.1 each that
can buy the same set of goods. Only when chocolate coins are not framed as
currency but rather as chocolate, a difference in the chosen consumption bun-
dle emerges as compared to the baseline group. Subjects endowed with cash
end up choosing a similar amount of goods and cash as those with the ex-
perimental tokens. However, the robustness of these result is unclear since the
study achieves low statistical power ex-post. These conflicting results could
also be due to differences in the elicitation procedure and the comparison
group that are used to assess the endowment effect for cash. Moreover, some
participants in Bateman et al. (2005) are required to use their own cash to buy
chocolate which might result in lower WTP and thus a larger WTA/WTP gap.
The present study uses simple elicitation and compares the physical endow-
ment with cash to the absence of cash, abstracting from effects of artificial
currencies, exchange rates and de facto differences in endowment. Moreover,
the endowment is earned (by survey participation) in all treatments and the
time with CiH is the upper bound of time that participants usually spend with
their endowment in the lab before making a decision. My setting thus repre-
5 While e.g Kahneman et al. (1990) and Van Dijk and Van Knippenberg (1996) do not find an en-
dowment effect for induced value tokens, Yechiam et al. (2017) detect differences in valuations
for lottery tickets in a meta-analysis of 35 articles.
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sents relevant decision environments in which cash endowment effects can be
present.
More generally, in light of the recent policy debate in developing countries
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of transitioning (faster) to a
cashless economy, it is worthwhile to further understand which role cash plays
in economic decisions. Theoretically, cash should be fully fungible, yet it has
been shown in various contexts that fungibility can be reduced by labeling
(e.g. Abeler and Marklein, 2017; Hastings and Shapiro, 2013; Kooreman, 2000).
Beyond labeling, surprisingly little is known about whether and how cash it-
self influences decision making. For policy design, however, it is important
to understand in which instances fungibility is reduced due to "behavioral"
responses. For instance, if holding on to cash reduces savings deposits, more
frequent deposit collections, a quicker transition to mobile money or at least
an early adoption of these technologies by microfinance institutions (MFIs)
could potentially help increase savings of more than 116 million microfinance
clients (mixmarket, 2015).6 More importantly, if cash endowments impact sav-
ings, they possibly also affect decisions in other economic domains overlooked
in previous research.
My results show that subjects with CiH do feel "endowed", i.e. they expect
to take home more money than the CA group. Given balance on all non-cash
related observables, this provides evidence that the standard lab treatment ma-
nipulation also works in my field setting. This sense of endowment, however,
does not alter savings decisions of individuals with CiH: Both the mean share
of endowment saved and its distribution are identical across treatments. The
null effect is robust to different estimation techniques and is quite tightly es-
timated: Under conventional power and significance thresholds, the minimal
detectable effect size is 0.3 standard deviations. This effect size is comparable
to related studies and the experimental task is externally valid as the savings
decision correlates with the savings balance in the account. To test for treat-
ment effect heterogeneity, I classify the 300 participants into different saver
types based on administrative data on weekly savings deposits of more than
6 These effects would have to be analyzed carefully since they might be counterbalanced by e.g.
lower peer pressure in the collection process, as indicated by Harigaya (2017).
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4700 microfinance clients. Using a model selection algorithm that also controls
for multiple testing, I do neither detect a treatment effect nor treatment effect
heterogeneity for the different types. In this high-stakes decision, the endow-
ment effect does not appear to play a role. The physical deposit of cash into
a savings account does not seem to be an obstacle to savings. Instead, cash
appears to be fungible in this setting.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the research
design including data sources, setting, sampling and procedures. Section 1.3
presents results and Section 1.4 addresses potential confounds such trust and
time preferences. Section 1.5 discusses design choices and other applications
of the endowment effect to savings and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 research design
1.2.1 Data
I use a mixture of a controlled environment and a field setting, in which I
observe actual savings decisions of a relevant population and randomly assign
cash holdings at the time of decision making. Embedding the savings decision
in an interview, I have a rich set of background characteristics. All these data
are collected on tablets during the sessions. I am able to link these interview
data to administrative data of weekly savings deposits and withdrawals as
well as some basic demographics, including a poverty measure collected at
the time of the last loan application. The administrative data allow assessing
how the experimental savings decision relates to savings behavior outside the
experiment. An explanation of variables can be found in Appendix A.7.
1.2.2 Setting and Sampling
To ensure that I sample from a relevant population (who receive their income
in cash), I work with clients from the Filipino microfinance organization Ahon
Sa Hirap (ASHI) who provides financial services to poor women. Clients join
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the partner MFI to borrow for productive purposes, but when joining, the MFI
also automatically opens a savings account for them.7 The account offers an
interest rate of four percent p.a. if the balance is at least 500 Philippine peso
( P ) over the duration of twelve months.8 While the combination of saving and
borrowing might seem counter-intuitive, it is a widespread practice in micro-
finance settings Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) and in this particular case,
the two are complements rather than substitutes: Early down-payments of the
loan are not possible, so savings can serve as an insurance against potential
future shocks and resulting repayment problems. Moreover, loans are usually
taken to invest into the own business, whereas participants state emergencies
(58 percent) and education (38 percent; up to three answers possible) as the
main savings goals.
Clients usually self-select into groups of five and apply together to become
members of the MFI. Two to eight borrower groups form a "center" and meet
weekly in a designated place to publicly conduct all transactions in cash. At-
tending the weekly center meetings is mandatory and non-excused absence
results in lower credit ratings. The marginal transaction cost of using the sav-
ings account is thus zero as clients are already at the meeting and can just
deposit (or withdraw) savings. In addition, since all clients have an account by
default, hassle costs of opening an account do not matter in this setting.
The majority of participants is self-employed (73 percent own a business)
and 80 percent receive at least half and 59 percent receive all their income in
cash. While mobile banking has progressed significantly in other countries, its
coverage in the Philippines remains quite low with only eleven out of 467 rural
banks offering electronic banking facilities (one rural bank offers mobile bank-
ing) in the first half of 2017 and this is unlikely to change soon (Central Bank
of the Philippines, 2017). The Philippines thus constitute a relevant setting to
conduct such a test since a transition to cashlessness will take time.
Three branches of the partner MFI were selected based on their geographical
proximity to minimize travel times for the research team. Within each branch,
7 This is not necessarily true for all microfinance clients. Yet, since clients do not join the MFI to
save, my sample is still comparable to clients of other MFIs.
8 P 500 correspond to about 2.5 average daily wages of the sample population and were worth
€9.38 (US$ 9.96) at the time of the experiments. The inflation rate in the Philippines was about
2.5 percent.
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centers have been selected based on meeting times and distance to each other,
such that two centers could be visited per day. Section 1.3.5 provides evidence
that this procedure did not result in a selected representative sample and Fig-
ure A.7 shows the location of the centers. The selection of participants in sam-
ple centers is closely linked to the experimental procedures and is therefore
described in Section 1.2.4.
1.2.3 Experimental Design
The experiment is embedded in a paid individual interview that consists of
three parts. The first part of the interview comprises questions regarding per-
sonal characteristics, the composition of the household, its financial situation
and personal business activities. Part 2 contains an incentivized elicitation of
risk and time preferences as well as loss aversion and is described in more
detail in Appendix A.3. Part 3 includes survey questions regarding savings be-
havior, financial literacy and hypothetical questions on narrow bracketing and
attention to finances.
The experiment consists of the savings decision and a cash payment for
participation in the interview. At the end of Part 1, participants are asked
whether they want to save (some of) their endowment in their existing savings
account. Before making the decision, it is explained that if the amount saved
is still in the account after one month, it will be matched with 20 percent.
This match is added to the savings account by the researcher and has been
employed to reduce potential influences of time preferences.
Two treatments are implemented in a 2×2 between-subject design. The main
dimension of interest varies "cash-in-hand": Participants receive the cash pay-
ment for participation either at the beginning of the interview or after the
savings decision. Table 1.1 illustrates how much cash participants in CiH and
CA hold during each part of the interview. Participants in CiH hold on to the
cash during the first part. Treated participants thus make the savings decision
by handing over (parts of) their cash endowment to the interviewer. In contrast,
participants in CA make the savings decision without holding the money in
22 the endowment effect and savings decisions of the poor
their hands, but knowing that they will receive the remainder of their earnings
just after making the savings decision. They simply state the amount they want
to save. The second dimension varies the size of the endowment, amounting
to either P 300 or P 500. One week in advance, participants are informed that
the interviews will take place and that they will pay at least P 300 (see also
Section 1.2.4). While the announced earnings of P 300 might already have es-
tablished a reference point, entering participants’ budget plans, the additional
P 200 should be treated as a true windfall gain.9
The structure of the interview serves two main purposes: First, it provides
the possibility to control for potential spillover effects from the treatment onto
the preference elicitation (i.e. subjects in CiH save less and thus are richer in
Part 2 which in turn might alter their decisions). Cassidy (2017) for instances
shows experimentally that liquidity constraints can result into higher elicited
present bias. Giving everyone the remainder of their earnings before the elici-
tation reduces this concern. Still, all questions, even those in Part 2 and 3, can
potentially be influenced by the cash-in-hand treatment manipulation. On the
one hand, I make use of this feature as a manipulation check comparing an-
swers from Part 1 in CiH and CA, as explained in Section 1.3.1. On the other
hand, I show that answers in Part 3 are the same in the two groups (see Ta-
ble A.1) and use administrative data where possible to show that respondents’
answers are reliable and not influenced by the treatment (see Appendix A.6).
Second, asking savings-related questions only in Part 3 prevents priming par-
ticipants before the experimental savings decision. The decision is the first time
savings are mentioned to the participants.
1.2.4 Procedural Details
announcement of interviews One week before the session takes
place in a selected center, all clients in the center receive an announcement
letter (see Appendix A.9.1), informing them about the possibility to take part
9 Note that I cannot disentangle income effect (participants with P 500 are richer) and the surprise
effect. The treatment necessary to disentangle the two would have been an announcement of
P 500, which in turn might have induced selection effects. To rule out this selection, I opted for
the present design.
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in paid individual interviews that will earn at least P 300.10 This announce-
ment serves two main purposes. First, it creates a reference point of P 300 for
participation and second, it establishes trust as the sessions will take part as
described in the announcement.
recruitment of participants Each session takes place at the
announced day during the weekly center meeting and starts at the beginning
of the meeting to make sure the interviews finish within the typical duration
of the meeting (1.5-2 hours). At the beginning of each session, the research
team is briefly introduced and the expected duration of an interview (40 min-
utes) is stated before clients can volunteer to participate. From the pool of all
volunteers, ten participants are selected by a publicly drawn lottery. In all ses-
sions, all present clients volunteered to take part, such that selection of present
clients into the sample is not a concern. The number drawn in the lottery not
only determines participation but also treatment assignment - CiH or CA - and
the interviewer.11
randomization of treatments The two treatments are randomized
on two different levels: CiH is randomized at the individual level and all in-
terviewers conduct interviews in both treatments. The advantage of within-
interviewer randomization is balance on interviewer-specific effects. To rule
out confusion of treatments, the computer program of the questionnaire pro-
vides detailed scripts and requires treatment-specific entries (e.g. where cash
in CiH is kept during Part 1). Relying on individual level randomization of
CiH, in combination with this particular setting, I can rule out other potential
explanations for undersaving (see also Section 1.4) and cleanly estimate the
cash-in-hand effect on savings decisions. The endowment amount is random-
10 To increase trust, the announcement letter was read out and distributed by the MFI, a trusted
institution (96 percent of participants think their savings are safe with this MFI). A question
during the interview checked whether participants received the letter. While eight percent (7.3
percent) of participants in CiH (CA) stated not having received it and these shares do not differ
across treatments (χ2, p=0.828). The vast majority of participants can read and write (92 percent
have at least completed elementary school) and is used to receiving written documents from
the MFI.
11 Randomization of interviewers avoids selection of interviewer-interviewee parings from either
side. Randomization was done prior to the start of all sessions in Stata and the randomization
protocol was implemented by myself.
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ized at the session level and is only announced after the recruitment to avoid
selection effects.12
sessions and earnings 300 clients were interviewed in 31 different cen-
ters in semi-urban and rural areas of the Laguna Province on the main island
in the Philippines, Luzon (see Figure A.7). Center meetings take place Mon-
day to Thursday and usually start either at 9am or at 1pm, resulting in two
sessions per day that were conducted in spring 2017. Each center was revisited
four weeks after the initial session to deposit the match in the savings deci-
sion where applicable. Average earnings from the sessions were P 417 (€7.82
or US$ 8.30), including payouts for survey participation and preference elicita-
tion. 85 percent of all participants (93 percent of those who save) additionally
received the match after four weeks.
additional logistics A team of five local interviewers has been trained
to conduct the individual interviews on Surface Pro tablets from the Munich
Experimental Labaratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) us-
ing z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). First, five participants were interviewed in one
round. Selected participants were interviewed one-on-one by a local research
assistant in private. Once these interviews were over, the next five interviews
were conducted. Only two rounds of interviews were conducted in each center
to avoid information flow from already interviewed to to-be-interviewed par-
ticipants. Additionally, at the end of the interview, all participants were asked
not to talk about the details of the interview with others. All questions and
instructions have been translated into the local language, Tagalog, (and back-
translated to English) and piloted before the start of the experiments.13 The
study was approved by the Ethics Commission, Department of Economics,
12 Since I have an uneven number of centers in my sample, 15 centers receive P 300 and 16 P 500.
Cell sizes are thus as follows: 73 (73) individuals in CiH (CA) with P 300 and 77 (77) in P 500.
Randomization at the session level is necessary since the amount is publicly announced to
increase trust. Moreover, to avoid any denomination effects (see also Section 1.4), the different
bills are displayed during the announcement of the amount. Pre-tests have shown that this
establishes trust in receiving the money.
13 The entire questionnaire including oral consent and detailed instructions for the savings deci-
sions can be found in Appendix A.9.2.
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LMU Munich (project 2016-13) and is registered in the AEA RCT Registry
(Spantig, 2017).
1.3 results
1.3.1 Manipulation Check and Balance
While I make use of a standard manipulation that is widely used in lab exper-
iments, evidence regarding its effectiveness in the field is limited. I therefore
first assess whether the treatment manipulation was successful in my setting.
As briefly pointed out before, questions from Part 1 (general household survey
questions) might be influenced by the CiH treatment. I use this as a manipula-
tion check as specified in the pre-analysis plan. Questions related to cash, such
as income, might be especially prone to influence from the CiH treatment. As
the main manipulation check, I use the following question from Part 1: "How
much money do you think you will take home at the end of today?" (money
today). When being asked, CiH individuals already hold on to cash, whereas
individuals in CA only know that they will receive money later on. If CiH suc-
cessfully makes treated individuals feel endowed, they should report higher
money today. Note that at this point of the interview, individuals do not know
about the subsequent savings decision and can therefore not anticipate their
savings behavior and incorporate this into their report of money today.
Figure 1.1a presents the cumulative distribution function of reported money
today and indicates higher reports for CiH throughout most of the support of
the distribution (means: CiH P 707, CA P 606; Fligner-Policello test, p=0.032;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.039).14 It is important to verify that the differ-
ence in feeling endowed is not driven by actual differences in wealth. Evidence
for this comes from Figure 1.1b, showing that the two CDFs of CiH and CA
are identical for an asset index that is constructed based on ten wealth-related
14 The Fligner-Policello robust rank order test should be used to test whether two samples are
drawn from the same distribution w.r.t. their median when distributions differ across groups (by
more than just a shift - which is the assumption of the Wilcoxon ran-sum test). The more widely
used Wilcoxon rank-sum test provides similar results (p=0.032). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
assesses differences in distributions more generally (regarding e.g. central tendency, dispersion
or skewness).
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questions also asked in Part 1 (means: CiH 0.49, CA 0.48; Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p=0.681; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=1).15 The administrative data also
provides a measure for poverty, the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI).16
Based on ten questions regarding household wealth, the PPI score is compa-
rable to the asset index but cannot be influenced by my experiment. The PPI
score also shows that in terms of wealth, CiH and CA are the same (means:
CiH 43.9, CA 43.1; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.51; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
p=0.88). I provide additional manipulation checks in Appendix A.2 that sug-
gest a more general tendency to over-report cash income in CiH.
Randomization checks using interview data, savings and other administra-
tive data reaffirm that differences in money today are related to the treatment
manipulation. Table A.1 provides results from OLS regressions with the treat-
ment dummies as independent variables where CA300 is the omitted category.
The F-test of the treatment dummies jointly explaining the respective variables
is always insignificant. Together with low R2 values, this constitutes evidence
that the randomization was successful and that the effect on money today is
indeed driven by the CiH manipulation. The standard lab treatment is making
individuals in the field feel endowed, which is summarized in Result 1.
Result 1: Individuals with cash in hand feel endowed, i.e. they expect to take home
more money than the control group.
15 Questions range from households’ access to running water and electricity to possession of assets
such as TVs or mobile phones. All questions are binary and are aggregated into an equally
weighted index, as described in the pre-analysis plan and in Appendix A.7.
16 The Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) is a poverty measure ranging from 0-100 that is man-
aged by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA). For more information see Appendix A.7 and
www.povertyindex.org.
28 the endowment effect and savings decisions of the poor
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
money today
c.d.f. of  Cash Announced c.d.f. of  Cash in Hand 
(a) CDF of Money Today
hallo
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
asset index
c.d.f. of  Cash Announced c.d.f. of  Cash in Hand 
(b) CFD of Asset Index
Figure 1.1: Cumulative Distribution Functions
1.3 results 29
1.3.2 Main Results
The successful randomization allows for simple non-parametric comparisons
of CiH and CA. To make choices comparable across the two earnings amounts,
I focus on the share of endowment that subjects choose to save. Despite cre-
ating the feeling of endowment, CiH does not lead to lower savings (see Fig-
ure 1.2). This holds true irrespective of the size of the actual endowment. Sim-
ilarly, the absolute amounts saved ( P 135 in CA300, P 133 in CiH300 and P 199
in CA500, P 194 in CiH500) do not differ across the cash in hand treatments.17
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Figure 1.2: Mean Share of Endowment Saved
Notes: Mean of share saved and 95 percent CIs.
Interestingly, the share of the endowment saved also does not differ by
endowment size (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, pooling CiH and CA to increase
power and reduce the number of tests, p=0.5); on average, participants save
42 percent of their earnings. In addition, Figure 1.3 illustrates that not only
the mean shares saved are the same in CiH and CA (for both endowment
amounts, respectively), but there is also no difference in the distribution of
choices (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=1, irrespective of pooling or testing the
two endowment amounts separately). In all treatments, focal points clearly
17 Note how participants in P 500 save more in absolute terms, a tendency that might also exist
in the CiH treatment (due to feeling richer) and counter-balance the cash endowment effect. I
discuss this in more detail in Section 1.5.
30 the endowment effect and savings decisions of the poor
matter and reduce the quasi-continuous choice to a discrete one.18 I summa-
rize these findings as follows:
Result 2: Cash in hand does not lead to lower savings.
Using OLS regressions, I control for potential influences on the savings deci-
sions such as financial literacy, age, education, household size, owning a busi-
ness, having money left after buying all necessities, decision making power
and transaction costs in terms of time and money needed to travel to the cen-
ter meeting. Table 1.2 confirms the previous findings. The inclusion of control
variables in Columns (2) and (4) does not alter the results.19 The coefficients of
the CiH treatment dummies are small and statistically indistinguishable from
zero. When testing the two coefficients in Columns (3) and (4) for joint signif-
icance, the p-values of 0.79 and 0.95 clearly indicate that the null hypothesis
of no CiH effect cannot be rejected. These null results are further strengthened
by Table A.3 showing that money today, used for the manipulation check, has
no influence on savings.
18 Participants received five P 20 bills, two P 50 bills and either one or three P 100 bills. Individuals
in CiH knew they could change the bills into coins as well, but they did not receive coins as the
amount of coins needed to make decisions in P 1 steps has been perceived as unnatural and
even offensive during pre-testing. Participants in CiH did not request change and participants
in CA did not state amounts that would have required change.
19 The results are also robust to the inclusion of indicators for above median risk aversion, loss
aversion, present bias and future bias. Due to potential problems of reverse causation (e.g. CiH
could result in higher elicited loss aversion), however, they are not included as controls in the
reported regressions.
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1.3.3 Power
Whereas the null effect has been shown to be robust, one might be concerned
regarding the statistical power of the analyses. While I conducted ex-ante
power calculations to determine the sample size, I now provide ex-post power
calculations for the minimal detectable effect sizes (MDE). Considering α=0.05
and 1-β=0.8 and using a two-sided t-test, I would be able to detect a ten per-
centage point difference in shares saved between CiH and CA (pooling the two
endowment treatments), which represents 0.33 SD of the mean share saved. In
terms of amounts saved, I would be able to detect a difference of P 40, which
is equivalent to ten percent of the average endowment size or 0.32 standard
deviations of the amount saved.20 I use the MDE of ten percentage points and
calculate standardized effect sizes for several lab studies of the endowment
effect (see Appendix A.4 for details). Table A.11 provides evidence that my
power is sufficient to detect an effect size that is in the range of previous find-
ings.
1.3.4 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity and Covariates
In light of the null findings presented above, it is interesting to examine whether
the null effect masks treatment effect heterogeneity. Apart from characteristics
elicited in survey questions that have been used as controls in the regressions,
the administrative data can be a fruitful source to determine specific saver
types. The classification of types tries to capture various dimensions of sav-
ings behavior and is based on the amounts and regularity of deposits: Regular
vs. irregular deposits, high vs. small amounts and equally-sized vs. variable
amounts deposited (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed description). For all three
dimensions, I create binary indicators based on median splits of weekly sav-
ings deposits of all clients in the three participating branches since July 2016
(up to the date on which the first interviews were announced). Regular depos-
itors make deposits in at least 84 percent of the weeks, large weekly deposits
20 Calculated with Stata’s power twomeans command.
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amount to more than P 33 and those with equally-sized deposits have a ratio
of standard deviation to average deposit amounts of 1.03 or less. Table A.12
shows the resulting distribution of types in my sample, for non-participants in
sample centers and for all clients in non-sample centers. The types are equally
distributed across treatment groups, as shown in Table A.13. I use these types
and the deposit dummies (regular, high and equally-sized) to investigate treat-
ment effect heterogeneity.
Instead of arbitrarily subsetting the data, I use a model selection procedure
based on machine learning that automatically controls for multiple testing.
As this estimation is post-inferential, it describes effects that are apparent in
my data and can point to interesting questions to be considered for future
research. In contrast to manual data mining techniques, using an algorithm
has the advantage of reducing researcher degrees of freedom which have been
shown to increase false positive rates (see e.g. Simmons et al., 2011). I use
LASSOplus (Ratkovic and Tingley, 2017) that estimates both treatment effect
heterogeneity and important covariates. The algorithm is a Bayesian method
in which effects are simultaneously estimated and selected. First, each effect
of potential covariates and their interaction with CiH is consistently estimated
and then, following a thresholding rule estimated from the data, small effects
are trimmed to zero. Ratkovic and Tingley (2017) describe the method in detail
and show in simulation studies that the method is conservative and has a low
false discovery rate.
In addition to the type data, I include preference data dummies for present
bias, above median risk and loss aversion, and for consistency the control vari-
ables from the regressions.21 Figure A.2 shows the density of selected effects.
Consistent with previous results, the CiH dummy has not been selected as a
determinant of the savings decision. However, the algorithm has detected an
interaction effect of CiH with present bias: Those who are present biased and
hold cash in their hands save on average a 14 percentage points larger share of
21 Note that including "irrelevant" variables does not change the selection as they are shrunk to
zero: For instance, only including the selected variables in the LASSOplus estimation results in
all four variables being selected. I include saver types to test for treatment effect heterogeneity
based on real-life savings behavior. In addition, preferences and covariates are included as they
have previously been shown to influence savings. It is thus interesting to know whether they
are related to the experimental savings decision and whether they interact with the treatment.
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their endowment.22 It might be possible that those present biased individuals
are sophisticated and by holding the cash, their awareness of the fungibility of
money is increased. However, only 15 percent of my sample is present biased
and the experiment has not been designed to test for this effect, so this result
should be interpreted with caution. Future research could try to replicate and
explore the reasons for this significant interaction term. Further, three covari-
ates, high financial literacy, interviewer 2 and large households significantly
influence the savings decision.23
1.3.5 External Validity
I assess external validity with regard to the savings decision and the represen-
tativeness of my sample. External validity of the savings decision made dur-
ing the experiment is examined by comparing the decision to actual savings.
The decision is positively correlated with the amount in the account (Spear-
man’s ρ=0.138, p=0.017), but not with last week’s deposit (Spearman’s ρ=0.052,
p=0.37), which is likely due to the volatility of deposits. Moreover, the decision
is related to the total savings stock (Spearman’s ρ=0.173, p=0.003) that aggre-
gates all savings amounts reported in the survey. The experimental setting thus
reflects actual decision making and does not appear to be overly complicated
or artificial. Similarly, I find that participants’ answers in my survey are consis-
tent with administrative data and are thus not influenced by the experiment
(see Appendix A.6).
One remaining concern might be the representativeness of my sample. Selec-
tion into the sample might occur on different levels. First, participants might
be different from those who were also present at the center meeting but did
not participate. As everyone who was present volunteered to participate and
participants were randomly drawn from the volunteers, this should not be a
22 Note that neither CiH nor the variable present bias have been selected. The coefficient on the
interaction term can thus be interpreted without considering the effects of the two variables.
For illustrative purposes, I provide a standard OLS regression including the selected variables,
CiH and present bias in Table A.4. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results for amount
saved and share of endowment saved, respectively and Column (3) provides evidence that
present bias is balanced across treatments.
23 All selected covariates are balanced across treatments: Interviewer 2 by design and household
size and high financial literacy by randomization (see also Table A.1).
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problem. Second, as I sent announcement letters one week in advance, mi-
crofinance clients not interested in participating in the study might just have
decided not to attend the meeting during which the session took place. This is
unlikely as all clients are required to attend the meetings and non-attendance
negatively influences the credit rating. In terms of savings balance, poverty and
age, I find that the non-participating clients from the sample centers are com-
parable to my sample (see Table A.5). However, it seems that non-participants
are newer members and have smaller loans.24 Given that all other characteris-
tics, most importantly savings and poverty, do not differ, I argue that selection
into the experiment is not a concern. Lastly, the selection of centers based on
location and meeting times might have induced some bias. I therefore also
compare my sample to the remaining 3735 clients of the three study branches
that are part of centers that are not in my sample. Overall, I do not find siz-
able differences between my sample and non-sample center clients (Table A.5).
The sample was thus successfully selected as a random subset of the sample
population with respect to observables.
1.4 confounding factors
Based on the factors contributing to undersavings reviewed by Karlan et al.
(2014) and the factors that can potentially explain the endowment effect (Er-
icson and Fuster, 2014; Morewedge and Giblin, 2015), I first discuss which
other effects might reduce savings in my experiments, especially in CiH. I then
address factors that might increase savings and thus could cancel out a cash-
in-hand effect.
transaction costs Transaction costs have been shown to be an impor-
tant factor inhibiting savings (e.g. Dupas and J. Robinson, 2013b; Prina, 2015)
and can also contribute to endowment effects. In my setting, marginal transac-
24 The MFI grants larger loans in later loan cycles (after the successful repayment of a smaller loan),
therefore membership duration and loan amount are highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ=0.790,
p<0.001). The randomization was carried out at the beginning of the meeting. One reason for
this difference of my sample and the non-participants could therefore be late arrivals at the
center meeting, if newer members are less disciplined and thus have a higher likelihood of
being late.
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tion costs for saving are zero since individuals are required to take part in the
center meeting for their loan repayment and there are no account opening or
withdrawal fees. In addition, travel time to the meeting is very low (mean=6
minutes, SD=6) and costs are negligible (mean= P 0.77, SD=3.88). Both vari-
ables are balanced across treatments (see Table A.1) and CiH does not alter
transaction costs beyond the psychological costs of making the physical trans-
action. Transaction costs thus do not play a role in the experimental savings
decision.
lack of trust and regulatory barriers Since my sample consists
of clients of one MFI, regulatory barriers to savings are constant. Mistrust in
banks in general is quite high in my sample, but 96 percent consider savings
with the MFI safe. Both trust variables are balanced across treatments (see Ta-
ble A.1). Trust in the banking system therefore should not lead to lower savings
in my setting. However, since earnings have already been handed over in CiH,
the treatment might increase the credibility of and thus the trust in the inter-
viewer. It is unclear how lower trust in receiving the money in CA would affect
savings. Possibly, it increases the variance in savings. The standard deviation
of both savings measures, however, are very similar in CiH and CA (0.31 vs.
0.30 for share of endowment saved and 125 vs. 126 for amount saved). More-
over, the procedures have been designed to foster credibility and trust: An
announcement letter was sent a week in advance, sessions took place as de-
scribed and the cash to be earned was publicly displayed in front of all clients
and the loan officer before the interviews. In addition, receipts and vouchers
were shown during explanations and handed out after decisions were made.
Although I cannot fully rule it out, it is very unlikely that trust differentially
affected the savings decision.
information and knowledge gaps Both education and financial lit-
eracy are balanced across treatments (see Table A.1).25 Since CiH does not alter
25 While CA500 appears to be a positively related to financial literacy when considering α=0.1,
its coefficient is not statistically different from CiH300 or CiH500. This is reflected in the in-
significant F-test. Adjusting significance levels for multiple testing would render the coefficient
insignificant.
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information and all questions regarding savings are only asked after the de-
cision to save, information and knowledge gaps are not influencing savings
differently across treatments.
social constraints Especially in developing countries, where infor-
mal risk-sharing plays an important role, both intra- and inter-household claims
can result in substantial constraints to savings. In my sample, both claims
from family and friends and the husband are balanced across treatments (see
Table A.1). The same holds true for decision making power within the house-
hold, the levels of which are comparable to decision making power of females
in a different study in the Philippines (Ashraf et al., 2010).26 Since all trans-
actions in this MFI are public, depositing savings also leads to requests from
other clients to help out with loan repayment. While this is an important factor
and 63 percent would like to have a private account, these two variables are
also balanced across treatments. Moreover, participation in the study as well
as earnings are common knowledge, such that neither saving nor keeping the
money provides an opportunity to hide money. Social constraints thus do not
lead to lower savings in the CiH treatments.
behavioral biases The most prominent bias associated with lower sav-
ings is present bias. Time preferences and in particular temptation should not
differentially affect the experimental savings decision. Although holding cash
could increase temptation, spending the cash during the experiment is not pos-
sible. To further reduce the potential influence of present bias, savings during
the experiment are incentivized, offering a lucrative interest rate of 20 percent
for the first month. Present bias is balanced across treatments (see Column 3
of Table A.4) and as the analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity has shown,
present bias, if anything, increases savings in the CiH treatments. The sec-
ond most famous bias in the savings literature is inattention, both to savings
and emergencies that could require savings. I elicited attention to household fi-
nances and show that both attention to short run (day-to-day) and medium run
26 While CiH500 appears to be a negatively related to decision making power when considering
α=0.1, its coefficient is not statistically different from CA500. The considering the coefficients of
the two CiH treatments jointly, they become statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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finances are balanced (see Table A.1). Attention to decision making more gen-
erally is addressed by incentivation, making the savings decision high-stake.27
The match, high stakes and successful randomization thus rule out that other
biases lead to differentially lower savings.
misconceptions regarding the decision Misunderstanding of
WTP/WTA elicitations can result in an overestimation of endowment effects
(Plott and Zeiler, 2005). My task, however, is very simple and the savings de-
cision and the match are described in the same way in all treatments before
making the decision. In addition, my sample is experienced both in making
savings decision and transacting in cash. While experience with a particular
transaction has been shown to reduce the endowment effect (Engelmann and
Hollard, 2010; List, 2003), this implies that I might estimate a lower bound of
the effect. However, being experienced with cash transactions is at odds with
individuals feeling richer with CiH.
The combination of sample balance on all relevant observables and design
features that prevent the differential influence of trust and temptation on the
savings decision allows to rule out any reduction in savings in the CiH treat-
ments other than the endowment effect. However, there might be effects that
operate in the opposite direction and therefore cancel out the CiH effect.
income effects The cash endowment effect on savings has at least one
important difference as compared to standard endowment effect experiments.
A common feature of the latter is that by endowing some participants, these
participants are made richer, which might affect their valuation of the good
in question. This "income effect" is usually assumed to be negligible in the
lab since the value of goods relative to participants’ wealth is small. In their
review paper, Ericson and Fuster (2014), however, note that even with small
increases in wealth, mental accounting could lead to WTA/WTP gaps. Indeed,
27 This might lead to an estimation of the lower bound for the endowment effect in all treatments.
For instance, if the bias is comparatively small it might only exist when impulsive, less impor-
tant decisions are made (e.g. (over)reporting money today in the survey). For incentivized, rather
high-stakes decisions (the savings decision in my experiment), individuals might be able to
override this bias.
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Morewedge et al. (2009) show that when buyers already have a mug and bid
for a second one, their valuations are indistinguishable from valuations of sell-
ers and higher than bids of non-endowed buyers (the authors attribute this to
ownership, but do not discuss the increase in "wealth"). In these conventional
endowment effect experiments, both the income and the endowment effect can
increase the valuation of a good.
Contrary to other endowment effect experiments, the income and the en-
dowment effect operate in opposite directions in my setting, at least for ab-
solute savings: An endowment effect would result in lower amounts handed
over for depositing, whereas higher income should lead to higher absolute
savings. In light of income uncertainty that arguably exists in my sample, a
positive income shock should be used to build up precautionary savings (Car-
roll and Samwick, 1998; Sandmo, 1970). Indeed, comparing absolute savings
in the different endowment amount treatments yields direct evidence for such
an income effect: Individuals in CA with P 500 save significantly more than
those with P 300. Since participants with CiH feel richer, both mechanisms
could be at play in the treatment. This would imply that I am estimating the
lower bound of the pure CiH effect.28 However, it is unlikely that the income
and the endowment effect cancel each other out in both endowment amount
treatments.
motivation to save Related to income effects, the motivation to save
for later might override the cash endowment effect. Indeed, my sample is mo-
tivated to save: 81 percent state that they are currently saving and in response
to an open-ended question regarding the use of a hypothetical windfall, 44
percent state that they would save (some of) it. However, I cannot assess how
this motivation compares to a potential CiH effect.
institutional incentives to save The account only bears interest
when a minimum balance of P 500 is maintained for a year. This might create
28 An ideal treatment would vary cash endowment without increasing income. This, however is
impossible: Even if people are equally rich, this study has shown that holding cash results into
feeling richer. An alternative would be to reduce the endowment to lower the income effect but
this will render the savings decision meaningless.
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an additional incentive for the 147 participants (73 in CiH and 74 in CA) below
this threshold to save. This is not a concern since participants above the thresh-
old save significantly more (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.054) and the amount
needed to make the threshold is not correlated with the savings decision of
those who have fewer than P 500 in savings (Spearman’s ρ=-0.062, p=0.456).
denomination effects The treatment variation might also result in dif-
ferent savings decisions if participants in CA think about the cash in a different
denomination than the ones in CiH who actually hold the bills in their hands.
At least for spending, it has been shown that a single, larger denomination bill
reduces spending as compared to the same amount of money in smaller bills
(Raghubir and Srivastava, 2009). While it is not clear how this would impact
savings, the equality of distributions of the share and amount saved in CiH
and CA (as depicted in Figures 1.3 and A.1) show that this is not a concern.
interviewer demand effects Especially in a culture in which keep-
ing face is important, participants might want to save just to please the inter-
viewer. Although the instructions make it clear that any amount from zero up
to the endowment can be saved, the match could be interpreted as a signal
that the interviewer or the experimenter values savings. However, it is unclear
whether and how interviewer demand would interact with CiH. If anything,
one could imagine the demand effects to be stronger in CiH, e.g. due to posi-
tive reciprocity. This would lead to larger savings in CiH and thus reduce the
endowment effect. Moreover, as discussed in Section 1.3.5, the experimental
decision is related to pre-experimental savings behavior, further alleviating de-
mand concerns. Differential demand effects across interviewers are ruled out
by balancing CiH and CA within each interviewer.
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1.5 discussion
1.5.1 Design Choices
In addition to ruling out all other factors that would result in lower savings,
the experimental design was set up to cleanly measure the lower bound of the
CiH effect. This conservative choice was made to convincingly argue for this
effect to exist instead of providing an upper bound that might be driven by a
variety of factors. Changing several parameters of the experiment might thus
increase the chances of finding an effect.
Participants held on to the cash for on average 15 minutes before making
the decision. Whereas this is the upper bound of standard endowment exper-
iments in the lab, it is likely that the effect grows stronger with an increase
in duration. Since participants might need to hold on to cash before making a
savings deposit for up to one week in the real-life setting, increasing the time
with CiH would make the experiment more realistic and would arguably in-
crease the treatment effect. However, this would also open the door for other
mechanisms such as temptation. If participants were to take home the cash
and keep it for e.g. a day, they might be tempted to spend it instead of sav-
ing it. Therefore, an interaction of temptation and CiH might lead to a larger
reduction in savings.
Another design feature that might reduce the CiH effect in the experiment is
the high endowment. Making the endowment large enough such that the sav-
ings decision is meaningful was crucial. Despite the endowment being framed
as compensation for taking part in the survey, it is a very high incentive (1.5 or
2.5 average daily wages) and might be treated as a windfall gain rather than
earned money. Earned money, however, could create a greater sense of attach-
ment. Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) show that goods earned by perform-
ing well create a larger valuations compared to this good being obtained by
chance. Moreover, the public randomization of participation was necessary to
avoid fairness concerns, but might have reinforced the perception of the en-
dowment as "won" rather than "earned", which in turn translates into a lower
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bound of the CiH effect. Strengthening the feeling of earning the money by
increasing the time spent on the task or its demandingness, or reducing the
endowment might thus lead to a larger the CiH effect.
1.5.2 The Endowment Effect and Savings in General
Even if the endowment effect does not influence savings deposits, it could still
impact savings behavior more generally. For instance, if individuals are re-
luctant to give away cash, they automatically save it at home. In this case the
endowment effect would increase savings. In a setting in which the majority of
transactions in done in cash and individuals are subject to a variety of claims,
it is less likely that an endowment effect results into higher savings at home.
Other samples that use a mix of cash and card payments may have a higher
propensity of saving at home by spending less when using cash. While this
points to other interesting questions, this study focuses on deposits because
the promising effects of savings have been found for formal savings (that re-
quire a deposit). This is inter alia due to the fact that saving at home is often
unsafe in developing countries (55 percent agree or strongly agree that this is
the case vs. five percent who say so for the MFI) and these savings bear no
interest.
The endowment effect might also lead to higher savings if individuals feel
endowed with their savings in the account. This might foster the reluctance to
withdraw and therefore increase the balance. In comparison to the endowment
effects on deposits and savings at home, however, this effect is likely to be
small. First, cash needs to be deposited into the account before individuals
can feel endowed with their savings and second, money in the account is less
tangible and therefore less salient than cash because savings in the account are
represented by a number rather than physical banknotes.
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1.6 conclusion
This study tests the endowment effect as a new explanation for undersavings
and establishes both internal as well as external validity, providing a manipula-
tion check and showing that the savings decision taken during the experiment
is related to actual savings behavior. In this controlled setting, I can rule out
that holding on to cash increases the burden of savings decision making on
top of other known biases such as present bias and inattention. Given suffi-
cient power to detect meaningful effect sizes, this null effect is an interesting
result that complements the literature in several aspects.
First, it shows that stronger endowment effects for physically present goods
found in the lab (Bushong et al., 2010; Peck and Shu, 2009) even apply to a
fungible "good" in the field. Using a treatment manipulation similar to these
studies, I find that individuals feel more "endowed" when they already hold
cash in their hands.
Second, it helps interpreting the currently mixed evidence regarding cash
endowment effects. I show that despite feeling endowed, participants do not
alter their savings behavior with cash endowments. The low powered null
result from Svirsky (2014) is confirmed outside the lab. This is important, as
one of the major critiques of lab studies is limited external validity, a concern
I specifically address and dismiss.
Third, by examining a poor sample, this study also broadly relates to the
growing literature of poverty and decision making (e.g. Haushofer and Fehr,
2014; Mani et al., 2013). While these studies show that poverty can cause ad-
ditional or more severe biases, I do not find a cash endowment effect. In that
sense, the null effect is good news as I do not detect an additional bias that
further impairs decision making of the poor.
In addition to complementing the literature, this chapter also points towards
interesting questions for future research. While this study has investigated the
lower bound of the cash endowment effect to provide a conservative test, it
could be instructive to do the opposite by increasing the attachment to cash via
the factors discussed in Section 1.5. Finding no effect of cash endowment at the
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upper bound would be a strong indication of no cash endowment effect at all.
Moreover, it would be fruitful to investigate the interaction of cash endowment
and present bias in more detail. First, a replication of this finding would be
necessary to establish the effect and second, the interaction could be explored
in several decision environments to assess whether and how it could be used
to design (policy) interventions. The present design could easily be modified
to test the competing hypothesis that cash increases temptation which would
be an interesting, different angle on decision making with cash in hand.

2
H I G H L O A N R E PAY M E N T A N D L O W P E E R P R E S S U R E ?
R E PAY M E N T F L E X I B I L I T Y I N M I C R O F I N A N C E G R O U P
L E N D I N G *
2.1 introduction
Microfinance organizations successfully offer small loans to poor borrowers
with extremely high loan repayment rates. Good repayment performance is
often attributed to joint-liability and a rigid, high-frequency repayment struc-
ture.
Joint-liability refers to loans given to a group of borrowers that are jointly re-
sponsible for the group’s repayment obligation. Theoretical models show that
with joint-liability, social capital is seized for providing mutual insurance (Ar-
mendáriz, 1999; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999) and that the possibility of peer
sanctions within joint-liability groups improves repayment further (Besley and
Coate, 1995). Empirical evidence confirms that social capital is important for
high repayment (Karlan, 2007) and that joint-liability leads to high repayment
rates. This is due to its successful trade-off between risk-sharing via mutual
insurance and free-riding on the other group members’ loan repayment when
dynamic incentives through follow-up loans are present (Abbink et al., 2006).
However, more recent evidence shows that joint-liability is not per se responsi-
ble for high repayment (Attanasio et al., 2015; Giné and Karlan, 2014) and that
peer monitoring and punishment helping to improve loan repayment can also
have adverse effects. High-risk, high-return investments are usually discour-
aged in joint-liability groups to reduce instances of mutual insurance among
group members (Fischer, 2013) which may be one of the reasons why only
modest positive effects of access to microcredit on poverty reduction are found
(Angelucci et al., 2015; Attanasio et al., 2015; Augsburg et al., 2015; Banerjee
* This chapter is based on joint work with Kristina Czura and Anett John.
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et al., 2015a,b; Crépon et al., 2015; Tarozzi et al., 2015). In addition, evidence on
excessive peer pressure in joint-liability borrowing groups is mounting: Czura
(2015b) presents rigorous evidence from framed field experiments on excessive
peer punishment and social anthropological studies by Karim (2008), Mont-
gomery (1996), and Rahman (1999) provide anecdotal evidence of drastic social
pressure on defaulting borrowers. These include verbal harassment, shaming
in public, the raiding of houses to confiscate liquidable assets to cover the
loan installments and even stripping down the defaulter’s house completely.
While individual-liability lending does not suffer from these potential prob-
lems related to group monitoring and peer pressure, it also does not offer any
insurance against income and expenditure shocks. Thus, the liability structure
presents a trade-off between mutual insurance and low peer pressure.
The second potential driver for high repayment rates in microcredit lending
is the rigid, high-frequency repayment structure which refers to same-sized,
small and frequent installments for loan repayment. This is a feature of the
typical microcredit loan with most lending contracts requiring weekly repay-
ments of the same amount. It is believed to make repayment a less cognitive de-
manding process and to instill repayment routine and high repayment morale
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Labie et al., 2017; Meyer, 2002). Two reasons
are proposed in the literature. First, tight repayment schedules force borrowers
to cross-finance their loan repayment by borrowing from informal lenders and
hence allow microfinance institutions to free-ride on the information advan-
tage of informal lenders (Jain and Mansuri, 2003). Second, for present-biased
borrowers smaller repayment burdens are subject to lower temptation, which
is particularly important when rewards in the form of access to credit in the
future are farther away (Fischer and Ghatak, 2010). However, the frequent,
same-sized repayments are hard to reconcile with income and expenditure
shocks and can lead to a cash flow disconnect (Karlan and Mullainathan, 2007).
Possible resulting consequences may be over-indebtedness of borrowers (Jain
and Mansuri, 2003) or underinvestment in profitable investment opportunities
(Barboni and Agarwal, 2018; Czura, 2015a; Field et al., 2013). Although em-
pirical studies do not find an increase in delinquencies with larger repayment
intervals (Field and Pande, 2008), microfinance practitioners share an almost
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universal belief that frequent repayment schedules improve repayment rates
(Fischer and Ghatak, 2010).
More flexible repayment schedules can possibly increase shock coping capac-
ity of clients (Czura, 2015a; Shonchoy and Kurosaki, 2014) and might render
microcredit more interesting for entrepreneurs with riskier projects (Barboni
and Agarwal, 2018; Field et al., 2013). On the other hand, flexibility may reduce
repayment morale and make the repayment itself a more cognitively demand-
ing process (Fischer and Ghatak, 2010; Jain and Mansuri, 2003; Labie et al.,
2017). The repayment schedule thus posits a trade-off between shock coping
capacity and repayment morale.
In light of these two trade-offs in the design of microcredit loan contracts –
the one between mutual insurance and peer pressure in the liability struc-
ture and the one between shock coping capacity and repayment morale in
the repayment schedule – we jointly analyze the two loan contract features
of joint-liability and repayment flexibility. In order to understand the benefits
and costs of the two features and their interaction, we conduct framed field
experiments with microcredit borrowers in the Philippines. Participants play a
microcredit repayment game with risky income in which we exogenously vary
the liability structure (individual, IL, or joint-liability, JL) and the availability
of flexibility (flexibility, flex, or no flexibility, no flex). We focus on strategic de-
fault in loan repayment, i.e. the choice not to repay despite being able to, and
elicit participants’ repayment decisions of their loan installments during the
loan cycle.
We consider a structured version of repayment flexibility that offers clients
to defer one repayment installment and make up for it later. Flexibility thus al-
lows a borrower to self-insure against an idiosyncratic shock. In joint-liability,
this implies that each borrower can reduce mutual insurance obligations in
the group which may alleviate peer pressure among group members. An im-
portant practical aspect for flexibility is its easy and low-cost implementation
without the need of costly verification of eligibility, for example when the bor-
rower suffered an income or expenditure shock. Therefore, we design our flex-
ibility as a "flexibility token" that each borrower can use once during their loan
duration at her own discretion. This leaves room for misusing repayment flex-
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ibility to increase current consumption instead of coping with a shock – the
intended use of repayment flexibility.
Both studied contract features, joint-liability and repayment flexibility, come
with important advantages and disadvantages. We hypothesize that the inter-
action of both features helps to seize the advantages of each feature while
keeping its disadvantages at bay. We see three reasons for potential gains from
combining joint-liability and repayment flexibility. First, repayment flexibility
and joint-liability are partial substitutes as they offer individual insurance and
mutual insurance, respectively. Therefore, flexibility in joint-liability group
lending may reduce peer pressure. The group structure with possibilities of
social sanctions can help ensure that, second, flexibility is exercised properly
and only used in case of a shock and that third, the deferred installments are
eventually repaid and not indefinitely delayed.
In our microcredit repayment game, participants decide in three periods
between loan repayment with uncertain delayed rewards and consumption
with instant gratification. More specifically, participants decide in each period
whether to spend their per period income y on repayment and consumption,
RC, or exclusively on consumption, 2C (with y = RC = 2R = 2C). In each
period, participants may suffer an idiosyncratic shock that destroys income in
the respective period with probability θ=0.25. As soon as a participant defaults
in any of the three periods, she will not receive the delayed gratification sym-
bolizing the continuation value of a good relationship with the bank. Default
on loan repayment depends on the liability structure of the loan. In a 2× 2 de-
sign, we cross the liability structure, IL vs. JL, and the availability of flexibility,
flex vs. no flex.
In IL, default is characterized by non-repayment in at least one of the three
periods, either due to choosing no repayment and high consumption (2C) or
due to suffering a shock. In JL, group members are jointly responsible for re-
paying 2R. In our design, joint-liability is automatically enforced, so that the
lending group defaults when both borrowers do not repay in at least one pe-
riod. The reason for non-repayment, i.e. whether it is because of choosing no
repayment and high consumption or suffering a shock (and any combination
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of these among both borrowers), is irrelevant for determining default.1 Flexibil-
ity allows borrowers to cope with a shock and defer the repayment obligation
to the next period. In this way, default in the current period is prevented and
a double repayment is due in the next period. Each borrower can exercise the
flexibility once, either in period one or two. Although intended as insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks, the use of flexibility is not restricted to having a
shock. Flexibility that is used to increase consumption instead of shock coping
will be labeled as misuse of flexibility.
Our results suggest that flexibility provides insurance against shocks. De-
faults due to a shock are significantly lower, especially in the first period, since
borrowers can insure themselves by exercising their repayment flexibility. The
reduction in default is highest in the absence of mutual insurance: We find
12 percent of borrowers default in IL-flex in the first period compared to 40 per-
cent in IL. Individual repayment decisions in both IL and JL with and without
flexibility are high – participants chose to repay 73 percent of their overall out-
standing debt over the three-period loan cycle. While repayment choices do
not differ across the liability structure, we find about 10 percent lower repay-
ment in both flexibility treatments.
While we find no difference in individual repayment behavior in IL and
JL, the mere enforcement of JL yields the best insurance against shocks and
thus the lowest default rates (39 percent after all three periods). Although JL
performs best in terms of defaults, it comes at high social costs in the form
of excessive anti-social punishment. Fifty percent of participants punish their
partner when they have an observable shock and cannot repay, such that joint-
liability is enforced. In JL-flex, in contrast, group members are able to insure
themselves against a shock without relying on their partner. This is mirrored
in the fact that punishment is halved when flexibility is used (only 25 percent
of participants choose to punish). Conversely, the threat of punishment leads
to less misuse in JL-flex than in IL-flex (58 percent misuse vs. 74 percent).
We chose the design features to keep the experiment as simple as possible
in the complex interaction of liability structure and repayment flexibility. Our
1 Automatically enforcing joint-liability payments reduces the decision space and helps to sim-
plify the design. It is widely used in other lab experiments focusing on repayment choices and
ex post moral hazard, see Abbink et al. (2006) and Cassar et al. (2007).
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design features have some mechanical influence on eventual default: The use
of flexibility in JL-flex excludes the possibility of mutual insurance in the same
period. In addition, defaulting on the repayment of flexibility automatically
leads to group default in the next period since the double repayment obliga-
tion cannot be covered by mutual insurance. In addition, flexibility provides no
insurance in period 3. Consequently, after all three periods, a similar percent-
age of participants in IL, IL-flex and JL-flex is in default (72 percent, 69 percent
and 73 percent respectively).
Our framed field experiment has several advantages. In comparison to (nat-
ural) field experiments, we are able to introduce fully observable individual
idiosyncratic shocks and cleanly measure group pressure. Even more impor-
tantly, we can separate behavioral responses to specific contract features from
the mechanical effects of these features.2 The results from our experiment thus
allow us to pin down different mechanisms at work as we are able to observe
counterfactual behavior, have perfect knowledge of shocks, individual repay-
ment choices, flexibility use as well as eventual loan repayment, and we can
measure group pressure and beliefs. In contrast to lab studies with student
samples, our setting is ideal to test our hypotheses for at least two reasons.
First, we observe the behavior of the relevant population that uses microfi-
nance products and is experienced in borrowing in group settings. Second,
participants are used to enforcing repayment and mutual insurance norms by
applying social pressure in their real-life borrowing groups.
Our study relates, first, to a recent but growing strand of literature on repay-
ment flexibility in microcredit and its effect on investments, repayment, and
more recently, borrower self-selection. While most studies find some evidence
on increased investments, evidence of flexibility on loan repayment is mixed.
Field and Pande (2008) study repayment flexibility in terms of repayment fre-
quency by randomly assigning borrowing groups to weekly and monthly re-
payment installments. They only study repayment performance and do not
find any difference across different installment frequencies. Studies on more
structured flexibility with some pre-specified rules on how to exercise flexibil-
2 For instance, do clients with joint-liability have lower default rates because they choose to repay
more reliably or is this entirely driven by mechanical effects such as automatic enforcement of
joint-liability that lead to better shock coping capacities?
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ity which also study investment choices find more heterogeneous effects on
default. Field et al. (2013) study the effects of a grace period between loan
disbursement and the start of the loan repayment and find increases in busi-
ness profits at the expense of higher default. Our results are similar in that
we find lower repayment (and higher default) with flexibility. Czura (2015a)
examines two types of flexible repayment schemes, one tailored to the pro-
duction cycle of the typical borrower in the sample, and another allowing for
skips in repayment similar to the one studied here. She finds some suggestive
evidence of improved investments and higher income but cannot say much
on default due to a unique default environment in her setting. Barboni and
Agarwal (2018) offer a waiver of repayment for a three-month period every
12 months of the loan duration and analyze which type of borrowers take-up
this loan and what are its effects. They find positive effects on profits with
an increased variance, and no differences in repayment performance. All of
the later three studies argue that flexibility enables higher return yet higher
risk investments, but they cannot disentangle other mechanisms influencing
repayment. We complement these studies and exclusively examine strategic
default with and without flexibility that lies at the heart of borrowers’ repay-
ment discipline. In contrast to these studies, our design enables us to identify
different channels such as behavioral effects in individual repayment choices,
flexibility use, mutual insurance and shock exposure that determine eventual
loan repayment.
Second, our study relates to a rich literature on punishment in coopera-
tion that studies punishment behavior in Public Good Games (e.g. Fehr and
Gächter, 2000, 2002). Following Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), we design peer
punishment as costly and pecuniarily non-beneficial so that it should not be
applied by selfish rational agents. This constitutes a theoretical benchmark
and it allows us to test whether peer punishment is applied excessively. How-
ever, in this behavioral literature, non-credible punishment (monetary and non-
monetary) is frequently reported (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Henrich et al.,
2010, 2006; Masclet et al., 2003) suggesting that the theoretical benchmark for
selfish rational agents is too conservative. There is broad consensus that peer
punishment crucially depends on intentions for non-cooperation (Charness
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and Levine, 2007; Rand et al., 2015). Therefore, we apply a second benchmark
to classify punishment as excessive: Unjust punishment, i.e. punishment of in-
voluntary defaulters that is exercised despite any evidence of bad intentions.
In this respect, our study is most closely related to Czura (2015b) who rigor-
ously documents excessive peer pressure in microcredit group lending. While
our results confirm her findings, we complement her study by analyzing how
the credit contract design can alleviate excessive pressure.
Third, our experimental design builds upon the literature on microcredit
mechanisms for strategic default. Besley and Coate (1995) show that strategic
default is reduced if the social sanctions borrowers can impose on their joint-
liability group members are severe enough, such that the credible threat of so-
cial sanctions is sufficient to induce higher repayment in joint-liability group
lending than in individual lending. Armendáriz (1999) shows that strategic
default among borrowers can be prevented if the cost of monitoring is suffi-
ciently low relative to the size of possible social sanctions. By relying on the
assumption that only strategic default is punished, both models explain high
repayment in joint-liability group lending but fail to explain positive levels
of punishment in equilibrium. Our design complements existing studies on
strategic default by simultaneously analyzing the role and use of joint-liability,
repayment flexibility and peer pressure for individual loan repayment choices.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes
the setting as well as our experimental design and procedures. In Section 2.3,
we present our results which we discuss in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 experiments
2.2.1 Subject Pool
We conducted framed field experiments with borrowers of the Filipino micro-
finance provider Ahon Sa Hirap, Inc. in two different locations in the Philip-
pines: First in the neighboring Laguna and Rizal provinces and second in An-
tique province (see Figure B.3). In Laguna and Rizal, all clients receive a joint-
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liability loan for general business activities, whereas in Antique, some clients
receive an individual-liability loan for agricultural activities that they repay
lump-sum after harvest. Loan sizes range from 2,000 to 100,000 Philippine Pe-
sos ( P ).3
Regular joint-liability loans have to be repaid in 25, 50 or 100 weeks with an
interest rate of 46 percent on the declining loan balance. These loans are dis-
bursed to borrowing groups of five borrowers. Each group is part of a borrow-
ing center, consisting of two to eight groups, in which all financial transactions
with the lender take place (loan application, disbursement and repayment).
Upon application to become a member of the microfinance institution, bor-
rowers form the borrowing group themselves which ensures that borrowers
know each other well. This makes joint-liability for loan repayment easy to
enforce: Borrowers have better information on each other and they can exert
social pressure to ensure all group members repay their loan. This is impor-
tant in joint-liability lending, since with joint liability the borrowing group
is considered in default as soon as one group member defaults on her loan.
Therefore, side-payments among borrowers occur very often: If one borrower
cannot repay her loan, other group members will cover her loan repayment
to maintain a good credit rating for the borrowing group. Often, long center
meetings are the consequence since the group and the loan officer wait until
all loan installments have been repaid.
The microfinance institution uses various measures to ensure high loan re-
payment rates. Joint-liability among borrowing group members increases re-
payment by mutual insurance as well as peer monitoring and punishment.
In addition, all transactions are made publicly and loan applications have to
be approved by the fellow group members. This helps align borrowers’ actions
and the lender’s requirements for good borrowers due to little room for hiding
misbehavior. Further, the lender takes actions to instill norms of solidarity and
repayment. Borrowers and loan officers hold a pledge at every weekly center
meeting and promise to repay their loan and support each other. In addition
to the weekly meetings, social activities are organized within the borrowing
centers to build solidarity between borrowers. All these measures result in
3 One Euro was worth around P 51 in March 2016 when the experiments were conducted.
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high repayment rates among borrowing groups, often at the expense of good
borrowers ending up repaying the loan installments for bad borrowers.
For their agricultural activity, farmers receive an individual-liability loan
with a lump-sum repayment of the principal at harvest time. Interest needs to
be repaid weekly throughout the loan cycle which can last up to six months
and depends on the cropping cycle and the type of farming. Despite individual-
liability, clients are also organized in borrower centers that meet once a week.
The lender states that these groups are intended to ’provide mutual support
and learning’. The same social activities and pledges as described above are in
place.
Every time the client applies for a new loan, some basic demographics of the
borrower and her household are collected. We use these data to present some
background characteristics of our participants in Table 2.1 and to provide ev-
idence that the between-subject randomization of treatments was successful.
Our sample is predominantly female, on average 46 years old and 49 percent
have not completed secondary school. For 37 percent, the main source of the
household income consists of their own business and for 22 percent of farm-
ing. Forty-eight percent have a monthly household income of below P 5,000
and the mean likelihood of our participants to live below the national poverty
line is 46 percent as measured by the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI).
Eighty percent of participants’ households are connected to the electricity grid
(23 percent to a water line and two percent to the telephone grid). Most house
sizes range between small and medium (on a scale from small to large) and are
either poor or medium in strength (in terms of the materials used). Participants
have an average loan size (most recent loan only) of P 14,352.4
2.2.2 Design
We use a microfinance repayment game to analyze the enforcement problem
(ex-post moral hazard) under risk. We exogenously vary the liability structure
and the availability of repayment flexibility in a 2× 2 design: Individual vs.
4 This equaled about 281 euros at the time the experiments were conducted.
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Table 2.1: Balance: Borrower Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Mean in
IL Sessions
Mean in
JL Sessions Difference
Female 0.951 0.908 -0.043
(0.217) (0.290) (0.514)
Age 46.626 46.135 -0.491
(12.301) (11.153) (0.774)
Education of female head:
no secondary graduate (y/n)
0.527
(0.500)
0.450
(0.498)
-0.077
(0.305)
Main income: Enterprise (y/n) 0.341 0.414 0.073
(0.475) (0.493) (0.511)
Main income: Farming (y/n) 0.185 0.253 0.068
(0.389) (0.435) (0.582)
Electricity (y/n) 0.785 0.814 0.029
(0.412) (0.390) (0.741)
Water (y/n) 0.179 0.273 0.093
(0.384) (0.446) (0.339)
Landline (y/n) 0.028 0.017 -0.011
(0.165) (0.128) (0.548)
House size (0-2) 0.669 0.558 -0.111
(0.662) (0.560) (0.318)
House strength (0-2) 0.757 0.769 0.012
(0.646) (0.478) (0.919)
Probability of living below NPL 47.431 43.398 -4.034
(32.690) (30.651) (0.507)
Monthly income below P 5000 (y/n) 0.469 0.498 0.029
(0.500) (0.501) (0.808)
Loan Amount in P 1000 13.712 15.054 1.342
(10.140) (12.068) (0.398)
Observations 308 261 569
Notes: Means and SDs in parentheses in Columns (1) and (2). Differences and
p-values from regressions with clustered standard errors at the session level
in parentheses in Column (3). IL Sessions consists of IL and IL-flex treatments,
whereas JL Sessions consists of IL, JL and JL-flex. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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joint liability and flexibility vs. no flexibility. Throughout the experiment, we
use the strategy method.5
The standard game (individual-liability and no flexibility, IL) models a sim-
ple credit repayment choice under risk over three periods. We abstract from
the investment choice and the presence of any savings technology and assume
the investment yields a steady income y=2 per period. In each period, the
bank requires a repayment R=1, and clients face the choice of repaying or us-
ing the entire income for consumption. Individual idiosyncratic shocks occur
with probability θ=0.25 and destroy the entire income of a period, thus lead-
ing to non-repayment. Clients make their repayment choice conditional on
being able to make the repayment installment. When they suffer an income
shock, they can neither repay nor consume in that period. Following the first
non-repayment, whether due to choice or bad luck, clients are in default for
the rest of the game. If the client repays in all three periods, she receives the
continuation value V , a monetary reward which symbolizes the value of the
future relationship with the bank. As this value only materializes in the fu-
ture, V is paid one month after the experiment. In contrast, all experimental
income allotted to consumption during the experiment (income not spent on
repayment or lost to the shock) can be spent right after the experiment on a
vast selection of consumption items – resembling the temptation of immedi-
ate consumption.6 We artificially induce temporal discounting by reducing the
consumption value of income tokens earned in the experimental tasks from
round to round. The same mechanism implies that future repayments are dis-
counted.
We model joint-liability (JL) as a two-person borrowing group that is jointly
responsible for repaying 2R in each period. Joint-liability is automatically en-
forced in case of non-repayment of any member of the borrowing group. While
the reduction of the usual five-person group to two persons is a simplification
of reality, automatic enforcement is a realistic representation of how microfi-
5 The strategy method was first introduced by Selten (1967). It is used to elicit the complete
strategies of players of the game, and it allows information to be collected on subjects’ behavior
in different hypothetical decision making scenarios.
6 Consumption items were visible throughout the session on a consumption table (see Figure B.2
in the appendix), and participants were encouraged to familiarize themselves with the items
before the start of the explanations with the help of a ’consumption catalog’.
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nance institutions put joint-liability into practice.7 The repayment choice thus
becomes a coordination game: Clients simultaneously choose whether to repay
or not. If they choose to repay, but their partner does not, they automatically
repay for their partner as well. To keep the experiment simple, we only elicit
unconditional repayment choices. Further, the bank does not distinguish be-
tween the source of repayment: As long as R=2 in each period, both clients
will receive V . A measure of peer pressure and punishment is introduced via
the possibility to send punishment points which are framed as "dislike" mes-
sages to one’s partner, conditional on their behavior. Participants can choose
between allocating zero, one or two punishment points (at the cost of P zero,
five and ten respectively), reducing the partner’s show-up fee by P zero, 15
and 30 respectively. The deduction from the show-up fee ensures that punish-
ment does not influence repayment capacity. Shock outcomes and repayment
decisions are perfectly observable when making punishment choices. In addi-
tion to these incentivized measures for repayment and punishment, we ask
for beliefs of whether the partner repays and of how much she punishes i)
repayment, ii) non-repayment and iii) having a shock.
We design repayment flexibility as the option to defer one repayment to the
next period. This sets the repayment obligation for the current period to zero,
but requires a double repayment in the subsequent period. In this way, default
in the current period is prevented for sure. Flexibility is implemented using a
flexibility token that can only be used once, either in period 1 or 2. This results
in three possible realizations of flexibility: First, the borrower does not use
flexibility at all. Second, the borrower uses flexibility in the first period and is
required to make up her missed repayment with a double repayment in the
second period. Third, the borrower uses flexibility in the second period and is
required to make up her missed repayment with a double repayment in the
third period. Failure to make the double repayment results in default, as do
shocks once the the flexibility token has been used. While the provision of flex-
ibility is intended to allow the borrower to self-insure her repayment against
an idiosyncratic shock, it can also be used to increase early consumption (in
7 Our partner organization, for example, instructs the loan officer to extend the weekly repayment
meeting until all repayments are made.
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the absence of shocks). Early consumption is attractive because future income
is discounted by design.
We examine the combination of joint-liability and flexibility in JL-flex. In a
two-person borrowing group, both partners have one flexibility token and can
defer one repayment obligation to the next period in any of the first two peri-
ods. In our setting, this has two important implications. First, when a borrower
uses the flexibility token, she is unable to insure her partner’s repayment obli-
gation in the same and in the next period. By using the flexibility token, the
repayment obligation of the borrower is reduced to zero and no repayment
can be made by this borrower in this period, not even to cover her partner’s
repayment.8 In the next period, the borrower is required to make a double re-
payment and hence use her entire income for her own loan repayment, which
again leaves no scope for insuring her partner. In addition, if she faces a shock
when the double repayment is due, her partner would be unable to insure her,
since group repayment obligation (Rgroup=3) exceeds group income (ygroup=2)
in this case. The use of flexibility in our setting thus results in a substitution
of mutual group insurance with individual self-insurance. These very strong
assumptions are necessary to simplify the design and make it understandable
and practicable.9 As before in the JL treatment, the possibility to punish repay-
ment choices as well as the use of flexibility is known before making choices.
All punishment decisions are made under full information, i.e. clients know
whether their partner defaulted voluntarily. In addition, we ask for beliefs
about the partner’s use of flexibility in period 1 and period 2, both with and
without a shock.10 More details on the exact elicitation procedure of flexibility
use and punishment can be found in Appendix B.4.
8 This simplification is necessary to exclude unofficial side-payments between borrowers. Paying
for the partner while officially making use of flexibility would allow the bank to infer a misuse
of flexibility, which we rule out.
9 Strong temptation was necessary to induce a positive amount of strategic defaults. Piloting
with an individual income of 3 and consumption of 2 yielded insufficient temptation to induce
strategic defaults. Increasing income beyond 2 would also have made calculations more complex
for participants.
10 We did not elicit beliefs for punishment in JL-flex, so we assume that beliefs about the partner’s
punishment of repayment and non-repayment does not change with the availability of the
flexibility option. This assumption is in line with general punishment behavior, as discussed
below.
2.2 experiments 61
2.2.3 Procedures
We use a mixture of within- and between-subject designs. We randomize treat-
ment allocation on session level and conduct sessions consisting of IL and
IL-flex, as well as sessions consisting of IL, JL and JL-flex. Due to the natural
order of these treatments and to keep the experiment as simple as possible, the
order of treatments stays the same in all sessions.11 At the end, we randomly
select one treatment to be paid out, realize the shocks and, where applicable,
the group matching without revealing partners’ identities. Participants draw
the shock realizations themselves from an opaque bag and where applicable,
are randomly and anonymously matched with a partner from the same session
by a research assistant.
To provide a behavioral measure of time-inconsistent preferences, partici-
pants are allowed to revise their choices after the payoff-relevant treatment has
been selected, but before the shock realizations. While consumption realizations
occur after around one hour of the experimental choices (with the exception of
V , which is paid after one month), the use of the strategy method introduces
a level of abstraction. This may be sufficient to induce more forward-looking
behavior, as if making decisions for one’s future self. Once one treatment is
randomly chosen for payout at the end, the choices become very tangible, and
respondents receive their rewards within 15 minutes. The possibility to revise
choices at this point in time is not announced beforehand.
The general setup of the microfinance repayment game was explained exten-
sively using flip chart graphics, test questions and a practice round with shock
realizations (see Appendix B.7 for detailed instructions). We used loaded fram-
ing, referring explicitly to loan repayment and consumption, explained the in-
dividual idiosyncratic shock as a thief that steals all of the period’s income
and introduced flexibility as a "pass token" (the concept of passing was known
from card games). Each of the treatments was explained in the same manner
and test questions were asked. If more than five persons failed a specific ques-
11 In Section 2.3.6 we argue that order effects do not play a role.
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tion, the explanation would be repeated before choices were made.12. Choices
were noted in private by local research assistants using paper and pen.
Together with our partner organization, we determined centers of clients
that would be eligible for participation.13 From these centers, we received the
exhaustive member lists, out of which we randomly selected 20 borrowers to
be invited for participation; five borrowers were invited as back-up. Invitation
letters were handed out one week in advance during the center meeting. One
session consisted of at most 20 participants. Participation was voluntary and
all participants gave oral informed consent before taking part. The study was
approved by the Ethics Commission, Department of Economics, LMU Munich.
In total, 569 participants took part in 33 sessions. On average, sessions lasted
about three hours. All sessions were conducted from March 14 to April 21,
2016. Sessions took place at the center meeting hall on different days than the
weekly meetings. After registration, participants took part in a small individ-
ual survey covering incentivized measures for risk and time preferences as well
as survey questions regarding their borrowing group (see Appendix B.7.7). We
randomly allocated seating to the participants.
Average earnings amounted to P 202 (roughly four euros), which equals ap-
proximately a daily wage for this population. The earnings came from three
different sources. First, the show-up fee of P 70 was paid in cash. It would
be reduced by any punishment activity ( P five (ten) for allocating one (two)
punishment points and P 15 for each punishment point allocated; so a maxi-
mum of P 40 could be deducted). Second, the continuation value V was paid
in form of a voucher that would be redeemed to P 100 in one month when
a research assistant re-visited the borrowing centers to cash in the vouchers.
Third, the income tokens earned in the microcredit repayment game could be
traded for consumption items from the consumption table with a variety of
products, such as sweets, food staples, household items and beauty products,
12 We excluded participants with limited understanding based on the following rule: If less than
50 percent of the test questions from one treatment or 25 percent of all test questions of all
treatments were answered correctly, the participant would be excluded from the analysis. This
exclusion does not change our results (see also Section 2.3.6)
13 Center eligibility was determined based on the following criteria: The center has at least 20
borrowers and a center meeting hall with seating. We aimed at a balance of centers across the
three regions (Laguna, Rizal and Antique) and across the applied center rating (very good,
good, bad) by the microfinance institution.
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offered roughly at market prices. The income tokens of the first (second, third)
period were worth P 40 (30, 20) representing the reducing purchasing power
of consumption income over time.
2.2.4 Strategic Considerations and Behavioral Predictions
All decisions were elicited using the strategy method, i.e. before shocks are
realized. Repayment choices are conditional on being able to repay: When-
ever a shock occurs, there is no repayment choice and the borrower defaults
on her loan repayment in this period in IL. In the joint-liability treatments, the
repayment choices and shock realization of the partner are important for deter-
mining group default. An essential feature of the repayment game is that the
delayed rewards in form of the P 100 voucher are lost as soon as a borrower or
the borrowing group defaults in any of the three periods. Consequently, two
strategies exist: The first strategy is to repay in each period and receive the
continuation value at the end of the loan cycle if the borrower did not suffer
a shock and actually repaid her loan. The second strategy is to default in all
periods. This clearly dominates default in only one of the three periods, since
the continuation value is already lost with strategic default in only one period
already. The income tokens and the continuation value are designed in a way
that default in all periods is the optimal strategy both in the individual-liability
and the joint-liability treatments unless participants incur a psychological cost
for defaulting.14 We chose this calibration since all participants are real-life
microcredit borrowers and we still expected a substantial repayment rate.
In a first step, we focus on individual repayment choices and disregard me-
chanical effects of loan repayment in joint-liability groups driven by automatic
enforcement of mutual insurance. Borrowers feeling responsible for the group
and more importantly, the threat of punishment may lead to higher repayment
in the joint-liability treatments. These behavioral aspects of the individual re-
14 Calculations are based on expected income tokens per period (income token value times prob-
ability of not suffering a shock) plus the expected value of V if applicable. Discounting is not
considered; it would make the strategy to default in all periods even more attractive.
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payment choice are independent of the availability of flexibility and should
hold for both liability structures. Therefore, we hypothesize
H1a: Repayment in JL is higher than in IL.
H1b: Repayment in JL-flex is higher than in IL-flex.
Further, the threat of punishment and feeling responsible for the group may
further reduce misuse of flexibility. Misusing flexibility reduces the capacity
to self-insure, strains the group’s insurance requirements and, in some cases,
erodes the mutual insurance capacity completely. Therefore, groups will seize
their possibilities to minimize the misuse of flexibility. Two other strategic con-
siderations are important in this regard. In the first period, the misuse of flexi-
bility results in no shock coping capacity in the second period, both in IL-flex
and JL-flex. In addition, in JL-flex no mutual insurance is possible by design
neither in the period in which flexibility is used nor in the subsequent one.
Group default is the consequence when one of the partners suffers a shock
and cannot or does not use flexibility. This provides an additional incentive
not to misuse flexibility in JL-flex. In the second period, however, the misuse
of flexibility is dominant in IL-flex, since it increases the value of consump-
tion income and flexibility cannot be exercised in the third period in any case.
In JL-flex treatment, in contrast, the above named constraint still applies. We
therefore hypothesize:
H2: Flexibility is misused less in JL-flex.
The second part of our motivation for this research was high punishment in
joint-liability lending. Since joint-liability is enforced automatically in both JL
treatments in our experiment, participants’ only opportunity to express their
disapproval of their partner’s choices is by engaging in costly peer punish-
ment.15 The realization of punishment at the very end of the experiment leaves
no room for reputational concerns in the punishment choice. Backward induc-
tion yields the prediction of zero punishment as punishment is costly for the
sender and cannot influence the partner’s behavior ex post. Since we elicit the
15 In the real-life borrowing situation, different forms of peer punishment are available, such
as social sanctions, destroying reputation by gossip, appeals at the local arbitration court, or
eventually, ending cooperation completely by stopping repayment.
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punishment choices with the strategy method, we may detect lower punish-
ment levels than when using direct responses since emotions may be curbed
(Brandts and Charness, 2011). While these considerations are the same across
treatments, the main difference that can affect punishment behavior is the op-
tion to self-insure instead of relying on the partner that is provided by repay-
ment flexibility. More specifically, we are interested in punishment behavior
in the case of observable shocks that have previously been documented to be
very high (Czura, 2015b) and hypothesize:
H3: Punishment for observable shocks is lower in JL-flex than in JL if
self-insurance is used.
2.3 results
One of the main advantages of our framed field experiment is that we can
distinguish between pure choices and outcomes that arise due to contractual
features, such as enforcement of joint-liability. Since contracts and the struc-
ture they impose vary widely in the real world, we put more emphasis on
behavioral responses to choice environments and thus focus predominantly
on individual choices. More precisely, we examine pure choice data regard-
ing loan repayment, the use of flexibility and peer punishment in detail. To
understand how these choices translate into final outcomes in our particular
setting, we also provide results from a simulation including shock realizations
and partner matching.
2.3.1 Loan Repayment
To compare repayment across all treatments, we focus on the share of tokens
repaid considering all periods jointly. This measure ranges from zero (no to-
kens repaid) to one (all three tokens repaid) and is robust to the dynamics of
flexibility use since a "repay strategy" will result in three tokens repaid, both
66 high loan repayment and low peer pressure?
with and without flexibility.16 We focus on individual choices to avoid con-
founding effects stemming from group matching and only consider the case
of no shock. Comparing IL and JL, we find no differences in repayment (see
Figure 2.1). The average share of tokens repaid is 76.3 (76.8) percent in IL (JL).
This is in line with findings of Attanasio et al. (2015) and Giné and Karlan
(2014) who find similar repayment rates in individual- and joint-liability, but
in contrast to Carpena et al. (2013) who find increased repayment rates after
a switch from individual to group liability. In contrast to these studies, we
can distinguish between repayment choices and defaults that are driven by
shocks. In our setting, knowing that a partner will insure non-repayment and
prevent default in case of joint-liability and that this partner has the possibility
to punish, does not affect overall repayment levels.
Flexibility reduces repayment by ten (nine) percent in IL-flex (JL-flex), evalu-
ated at the mean share repaid of 0.763 in IL. Our finding of lower repayments
with flexibility reaffirms Field et al. (2013) who find higher defaults with a
grace period. However, they are in contrast to Barboni and Agarwal (2018)
who does not detect repayment differences with a three-months waiver. While
the coefficient of JL-flex depicted in Figure 2.1 is not statistically significant, we
fail to reject a difference between the coefficients of IL-flex and JL-flex (p=0.87).
This reaffirms the above finding that the liability structure does not influence
individual repayment choices. We therefore reject our hypotheses H1a and
H1b and summarize these findings in Result 1:
Result 1: Repayment rates do not differ across liability structure. Flexibility reduces
repayment rates by ten percent.
Beliefs can play an important role for repayment choices. Here, we focus
on beliefs about the partner’s repayment and whether it is expected that the
partner punishes (non)-repayment. These beliefs have been elicited in the JL
treatment. Believing that the partner will repay is associated with a 32 percent
higher share repaid (evaluated at the mean of those who do not believe in
16 See Appendix B.2 for an analysis of repayment choices per period and Appendix B.4 for a more
detailed discussion on how we measure repayment.
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Figure 2.1: Individual Repayment (Share Repaid)
Notes: Share of tokens repaid. Coefficients from OLS regressions with session FE and SE
clustered at session level (not shown). IL is the reference category with a mean share repaid of
0.763. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the repayment of their partner, see Column 1 in Table B.1). Believing that the
partner would punish non-repayment is related to similarly higher repayment
of 36 percent, whereas beliefs about being punished for repayment are not
related to the amount repaid (Columns 2-4). The strongest association with
repayment exists for believing that the partner repays and that she would pun-
ish non-repayment. This doubles repayment as compared to those who believe
in neither. Taken together, the overall high repayment rates and strong beliefs
that the partner would repay (67 percent) can be interpreted as evidence that
participants bring a strong real-life repayment norm to the lab. Having inter-
nalized the norm of high loan repayment in the group might be one reason
why we do not find differences in loan repayment choices.
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2.3.2 Flexibility
Flexibility can be used in either period 1 or 2, but there is only one flexibility
token available per participant. Although flexibility is intended to help bor-
rowers cope with an income shock, the use of flexibility is not contingent on
having a shock. When facing a shock, nearly all participants choose to use flex-
ibility with hardly any difference between the IL-flex and JL-flex treatment (in
period 2 participants in JL-flex use flexibility slightly less, see Figure 2.2). This
shows that participants understand the value of flexibility in general.17 In our
JL-flex treatment, this implies that participants prefer self-insurance against
income shocks using their flexibility token over relying on mutual insurance.
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Figure 2.2: Use of Flexibility
Notes: Percent of participants who use flexibility conditional on not having used it before.
Coefficients from four OLS regressions comparing the use of flexibility in the respective
scenario, with IL as the reference category and SE clustered at session level (not shown).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
17 In IL, the use of flexibility with a shock in period 1 should amount to 100 percent if participants
try to avoid default. Out of the 15 participants who chose not to use flexibility in this case, only
one repays in both subsequent periods.
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We observe misuse of flexibility without a shock in 55 (29) percent in IL-flex
(JL-flex) in period 1 and 72 (51) percent in IL-flex (JL-flex) in period 2, condi-
tional on not having used it before (see Figure 2.2). The misuse rate is signifi-
cantly lower in JL-flex in both period 1 and 2: in period 1, misuse is reduced by
48 percent in JL-flex and in period 2 by 29 percent (based on regression results
and evaluated at the mean of IL-flex; coefficients shown in Figure 2.2). Consid-
ering both periods jointly, 88 (43) percent in IL-flex (JL-flex) misuse flexibility.
These findings are in line with our hypothesis H2 postulating less misuse in
JL-flex.
In addition to choices regarding flexibility, we have elicited beliefs about the
partner’s use of flexibility in JL-flex. Actions and beliefs are well aligned in
case of a shock: in period 1 (2), 91 (78, conditional on being able to use it)
percent decide to use flexibility and also believe their partner would. Actions
and beliefs correspond less in case of no shock: 58 (30) percent decide not to
use flexibility in period 1 (2) and also believe their partner would not.18
One of the main concerns regarding flexibility is its repayment. In our exper-
iment, repayment of flexibility implies giving up the entire income of the pe-
riod which is a very strong requirement that we discuss further in Section 2.4.1.
Repayment rates of the double repayment are lower than repayment rates of
76 percent in IL and JL (which also explains our Result 1), yet more than 50 per-
cent of participants repay flexibility in each case (see Figure 2.3).
Having used flexibility as self-insurance for a shock in period 1, 64 (74) per-
cent repay the double installment in IL-flex (JL-flex) in period 2 and 59 (68) per-
cent in period 3 (see Figure 2.3). When misusing flexibility, 76 (85) percent
in IL-flex (JL-flex) repay it in period 2. In period 3, repayment of flexibility
amounts to 61 (67) percent in IL-flex (JL-flex).
While the difference is not statistically different at conventional levels, there
seems to be a tendency towards more double repayments in JL-flex, hinting at
a disciplining feature of the group.19 This constitutes additional evidence for
18 Early misuse is strongly related to thinking that the partner would do the same (Spearman’s
ρ=0.369, p<0.001). For those who still have the flexibility token left in period 2, the use in case
of a shock is related to believing that the partner would do the same (Spearman’s ρ=0.178,
p=0.039). The other two correlation coefficients are also positive but not statistically significant.
19 All coefficients shown in Figure 2.3 are positive. The minimal detectable effect sizes for α=0.05
and 1-β=0.8 the four comparisons are 0.11, 0.16, 0.15 and 0.19. Power is highest in the case in
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Figure 2.3: Repayment of Double Installment
Notes: Percent of participants who repay flexibility conditional on having used it for either
insurance (left) or increased income (right). Coefficients from four OLS regressions comparing
the repayment of flexibility in the respective scenario, with IL as the reference category and SE
clustered at session level (not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
rejecting hypothesis H1b of higher repayment in JL-flex. Result 2 summarizes
these findings:
Result 2: Flexibility is used when needed. However, there is substantial misuse, espe-
cially in IL-flex. Joint-liability can half this misuse. The double repayment of flexibility
is lower than standard repayment and does not differ across liability scheme.
2.3.3 Peer Punishment
We first notice that punishment is widely used, both at the extensive and at
the intensive margin: In both JL treatments, 89 percent of participants want to
which nearly everyone uses flexibility as in the other cases treatment influences cell sizes as
shown in Figure 2.2.
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punish their partner if she does not repay (see Figure 2.4). The intensive margin
of punishment for this situation amounts to 1.23 (1.22) punishment tokens in
JL (JL-flex). We classify this type of sanctioning as deterrent punishment as this is
clearly directed towards irresponsible behavior that increases the likelihood of
group default. Deterrent punishment does not differ across treatments, neither
at the extensive nor at the intensive margin (see also Panel A of Table 2.2 that
provides within-participant estimates).
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Figure 2.4: Punishment Choices (Extensive Margin)
In line with the previous literature, we also find high levels of non-deterrent
punishment that participants use in case of a shock, irrespective of the partner’s
motive and despite full observability of shocks. This type of punishment could
be interpreted as an expression of aversion to repay for the partner. Figure 2.4
illustrates that in JL, 50 percent punish their partner if she cannot repay be-
cause she has been hit by a shock (intensive margin: 0.73 punishment tokens).
With flexibility, participants who are hit by a shock face two options: Using
flexibility as self-insurance or not using it and relying on the partner to repay.
The former reduces non-deterrent punishment both at the extensive margin
by 25 percentage points (46 percent evaluated at the mean of JL when con-
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sidering within-participant estimates in Table 2.2) and at the intensive margin
by 0.40 punishment points (54 percent). Flexibility thus has the possibility to
significantly reduce non-deterrent punishment, both at the intensive and the
extensive margin as compared to punishment for a shock in JL. This is in line
with hypothesis H3. If flexibility is not used despite being available, punish-
ment increases at the extensive margin by 20 percentage points (44 percent)
and at the intensive margin by 0.29 punishment points (41 percent).
One concern is that flexibility could increase both deterrent and non-deterrent
punishment if defaulting on the double repayment for flexibility is punished
more severely than a simple default. Deterrent punishment for not making the
double repayment is the same as simple non-repayment, both at the extensive
(Column 3) and intensive margin (Column 6 of Panel A in Table 2.2). The same
holds true for non-deterrent punishment in case of a shock (see Panel B). This
is remarkable since not repaying the double repayment obligation of flexibility
leads to group default for sure.
One last concern is that the possibility to use flexibility also impacts punish-
ment of actions unrelated to flexibility. For instance, participants might change
their punishment behavior also for cases in which the partner repays or does
not repay the single installment. As discussed above, this is not the case for
simple non-repayment and Columns (1) and (4) of Panel A in Table 2.2 show
that there is also no difference in extensive and intensive punishment of repay-
ment.20 Result 3 summarizes these findings:
Result 3: Flexibility can reduce the high levels of punishment in JL when a partner
defaults due to a shock by 46 percent at the extensive and 54 percent at the inten-
sive margin. Flexibility has no adverse effects on punishment behavior for (double)
repayment and default in the absence of a shock.
20 Figure B.1 shows all punishment choices for JL-flex at the extensive margin. Examining the
intensive margin yields a similar pattern.
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2.3.4 Outcome Simulation
We complement the analysis of individual decisions by a simulation of out-
comes considering shock realizations and, in the JL treatments, the partner
matching. We randomly and independently draw one shock outcome for each
period for each individual with probability 0.25. For the JL treatments, we ran-
domly match pairs within a session and automatically enforce JL. Both the
shock outcome and the group matching stay the same across treatments. To
avoid results being influenced by this one draw, we repeat this simulation 100
times and take averages of participants’ outcomes in these 100 simulations.
This simulation allows us to compare default rates across treatments. Note
that a borrower (group) is considered in default if she does not repay her loan
installment in at least one period.
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Figure 2.5: Percent of Participants in Default by Period
Figure 2.5 presents simulated cumulative default rates for each period and
treatment. After the first period, 40 percent of participants in IL are in default.
As no insurance for shocks is available in this treatment, the lower bound of
this number corresponds to the shock probability of 25 percent. In the other
three treatments, at least one form of insurance is possible (either via flexibil-
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ity or via joint-liability) which is reflected in significantly lower default rates:
12 percent default in IL-flex, 16 percent in JL and 19 percent in JL-flex.
After the second period, an additional 21 percent are in default in IL. The
increase in defaults is larger for the flexibility treatments (31 percent in IL-flex
and 33 percent in JL-flex), as repayment morale for the double repayment is
lower than repayment in the no-flex treatments (compare Figure 2.2 and 2.3
above): For IL, we have at least 74 percent of participants choosing repayment
in a given period, while in IL-flex repayment of double installments can be as
low as 59 percent (in period 3 after using flexibility for insurance). Comparing
JL and JL-flex, a similar picture emerges: At least 74 percent choose repayment
in a given period in JL, whereas the repayment of flexibility can be as low as
67 percent (in period 3 after misusing flexibility). Even for participants who
choose not to use flexibility, the repayment morale in these two treatments
can drop to levels as low as 61 (63) percent for IL-flex (JL-flex)). Due to better
repayment morale than in the flexibility treatments and the automatic enforce-
ment of joint-liability, only an additional 14 percent are in default in JL after
period 2.
After the third period, 72 percent of participants are in default in IL – either
due to their repayment choices or the shock realization. In the two flexibility
treatments, insurance via flexibility is no longer available – there is no flexibil-
ity token to be used in the third period – such that an additional 26 percent
default in IL-flex. The overall default rate cumulates to 69 percent. While in
JL-flex mutual insurance is still possible, the limitations that flexibility imposes
on mutual insurance appear clearly in the last two periods. Default rates cu-
mulate to 73 percent in the third period. In our experimental setting, automatic
enforcement, not the behavioral implications (see Result 1) of joint-liability is
the most powerful shock coping capacity with the lowest possible overall de-
faults rates of 39 percent.
Comparing the two individual-liability treatments, the insurance value of
flexibility in the first two periods is evident despite the high rates of flexibility
misuse. When contrasting the two joint-liability treatments, we find that the
additional insurance by flexibility (ten percent of participants default because
both partners are hit by a shock in JL-flex compared to 17 percent in JL, p<0.001,
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paired t-test) is outweighed by a substantially higher percentage of cases in
which both partners voluntarily default (35 percent in JL-flex and ten percent
in JL, p<0.001, paired t-test).21
The comparison of the two flexibility treatments indicates that the behav-
ioral advantages of JL-flex discussed above are offset in particular by mechan-
ical implications of defaulting on the repayment of flexibility (see Table 2.3).
Due to our experimental setup, defaulting on the double repayment implies
group default, thus mechanically doubling the number of participants in de-
fault as compared to a double default in IL-flex. Overall, 39 percent of partic-
ipants in IL-flex default on the double repayment (17 percent due to a shock
and 22 percent due to non-repayment), while 49 percent in JL-flex default due
to not repaying flexibility (25 percent due to a shock and 28 percent due to
non-repayment).22 Indeed, when only examining individual choices and not
matching participants to their partner in JL-flex, only 29 percent of participants
default on their flexibility repayment (14 percent due to a shock and 15 per-
cent due to non-repayment). Thus, an additional 20 percentage points are in
default due to mechanical effects of the double repayment in JL-flex and the
partner matching. These findings are summarized in our last result:
Result 4: Mutual insurance in JL leads to the lowest defaults due to automatic en-
forcement of joint-liability. Behavioral benefits of JL-flex are outweighed by mechanical
effects in our setting.
2.3.5 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
As discussed above, participants bring their experiences and norms as micro-
finance clients into the lab. Most clients have joint-liability contracts (82 per-
cent), but we also conducted sessions with clients who have individual-liability
(ASHI GRAMEEN Agricultural Program) AGAP loans. This allows us to com-
21 Here, we define "voluntarily" as all cases in which participants risk default, e.g. by not-repaying
or by not using flexibility in case of a shock.
22 Note that the percentages in JL-flex do not need to add up, as there are some cases in which
both participants default on the double repayment for different reasons.
2.3 results 77
Table 2.3: Percent of Participants Defaulting on the Repayment of Flexibility
IL-flex JL-flex JL-flex
(no group
matching)
Double defaults due to a shock 0.17 0.25 0.14
Double defaults due to non-repayment 0.22 0.28 0.15
All double defaults 0.39 0.49 0.29
pare behavior of individual and joint-liability clients in the different treatments.
Carpena et al. (2013) use a natural field experiment to examine the effects of
introducing joint-liability in an individual-liability setting and find higher re-
payment in joint-liability. Based on these findings, one could expect higher
repayment of AGAP clients in JL. In contrast, when considering the findings
of Giné and Karlan (2014) who study the removal of joint-liability and find no
difference in repayment, one would expect no differences in repayment in both
IL and JL between standard and AGAP clients. The first panel of Table B.2 in
the appendix presents the results that are in line with the latter study: We find
no differences in repayment choices in any treatment.
Different types might also lead to differences in behavior. Making use of the
within-design feature, we can compare repayment choices of one individual
both in IL and JL. This gives rise to an interesting pattern: While 70 percent
of participants do not change their repayment strategy with the liability struc-
ture (51 percent repay their full share and 19 percent do not), the remaining
30 percent adjust repayment behavior: 16 percent repay in JL, but not in IL and
14 percent repay in IL but not in JL.23 This results in similar repayment rates
in IL and JL.
Another source of potentially relevant heterogeneity are preferences. In par-
ticular, it is conceivable that time preferences play a role in repayment choices
and in the misuse of flexibility. Regarding repayment, present-biased partici-
pants might discount the continuation value more and thus prefer higher con-
23 This change in behavior is reflected in beliefs about partners’ repayment and punishment
choices: 80 percent of those who switch to repayment in JL believe that their partner repays
and 91 percent think that they will be punished for non-repayment. In contrast, 62 percent of
those who repay in IL but not in JL think that their partner repays and 79 percent believe that
they will be punished for non-repayment.
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sumption at the expense of default. However, we do not find treatment effect
heterogeneity along these lines (see Panel 2 of Table B.2 in the appendix). With
respect to the misuse of flexibility, present-biased participants might value the
income from two early consumption tokens more than the insurance value of
flexibility in the second period. Column 1 of Table B.3 in the appendix shows
suggestive evidence that present biased individuals use flexibility more in the
first period. However, this effect is not robust to controlling for JL-flex (see
Column 2).
Risk aversion might play a role in both repayment choices and the use of flex-
ibility: Given that the continuation value of P 100 can only be obtained without
having a shock (in IL), risk averse participants might choose ’safe’ consump-
tion over repayment (and thus lower consumption) with a risky continuation
value. Depending on beliefs and their strength, risk aversion might also be rel-
evant in the JL treatments as it is not known how the partner decides. The last
panel of Table B.2 in the appendix shows that risk does not matter for repay-
ment. Regarding the use of flexibility, risk averse participants might misuse
flexibility less in period 1 to keep the insurance value for the second period.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table B.3 in the appendix clearly show that risk aversion
does not matter for the use of flexibility, either.
2.3.6 Robustness
randomization and order effects We have randomly allocated cen-
ters to either IL or JL sessions. In both types of sessions, we administer the IL
treatment, such that choices in this treatment can serve as a randomization
check. Column 1 in Table B.4 in the appendix shows that the number of tokens
repaid is the same in both session types. This also holds true if we examine
the three periods in IL separately (Column 2). Given the additional balance of
observable characteristics shown in Table 2.1, we are confident that our ran-
domization was successful.
However, as we did not randomize the order of treatments, one might be con-
cerned about order effects. Several points alleviate these concerns. First, since
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we elicited choices with the strategy method and only realized shock outcomes,
matching (where applicable) and corresponding earnings after all decisions
had been made, participants did not receive intermediate feedback that would
have lead to learning. Second, we can assess "rationality" of choices by exam-
ining the repayment decision after default in each treatment. As pointed out
above, absent norms, participants should choose not to repay once in default.
Columns 3-5 in Table B.4 in the appendix show that about 23 percent of par-
ticipants still repay after default. If participants would learn with the progress
of the experiment, this fraction should decrease in the flexibility treatments.
This fraction, however, is the same across treatments with all coefficients of
the treatment dummies being small and not statistically distinguishable from
zero, even when focusing on within-session (Column 4) and within-individual
variation (Column 5). This alleviates the concern of learning.24
Lastly, we can use the punishment decisions in JL sessions in JL and JL-flex
to verify whether the same choice situation results in the same punishment de-
cision. Two punishment choices are the same in the two treatments: Whether
to punish the partner for repayment (of one token) and whether to punish
the partner for non-repayment (of one token). The first two bars in Figure 2.4
show that extensive punishment for repayment (17 vs. 12 percent) and non-
repayment (89 vs. 89 percent) in JL and JL-flex is very similar. Columns 1 and
2 of Panel A in Table 2.2 provide parametric evidence that they are indeed in-
distinguishable. Participants thus make consistent choices and the same "mis-
takes" in the different treatments. Therefore, we are confident that not the order
but rather the treatments cause behavior.
exclusion of participants In our main analysis, we excluded partic-
ipants with a limited understanding based on their answers of the test ques-
tions. To make sure that this is not driving our results, we repeat the analysis
for our main results including all participants. Table B.5 in the appendix shows
that the share repaid, the misuse of flexibility and its repayment are robust to
the inclusion. The same holds true for punishment choices: In Table B.6 in the
24 Note that repayment after default is not correlated with the number of correctly answered test
questions (Spearman’s ρ and respective p-values in parentheses: IL 0.002 (0.969), JL 0.094 (0.129),
IL-flex -0.017 (0.780) and JL-flex 0.111 (0.090)).
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appendix, we replicate Columns 1-2 and 4-5 of Panel B in Table 2.2 with nearly
identical coefficients.25 The exclusion is thus not a driver of our results.
choice reversals The choice reversals are a robustness test regarding
how our results would change with more present bias. With respect to the
share repaid, we find lower repayment in the revision (Column 1 in Table B.7
in the appendix). It appears that especially in JL-flex, more present bias would
lead to lower repayment rates. Only in JL, the revision does not lead to statis-
tically significantly lower repayment rates.
The second result that might change due to more present bias is misuse
and repayment of flexibility. Pooling the two flexibility treatments and time
periods 1 and 2, we find that misuse is higher in revised choices (Column 3
in Table B.7). Column 4 pools the two periods and shows that participants
misuse flexibility less (as compared to the IL-flex treatment) both in JL-flex and
the revision of JL-flex. In JL-flex, the revision does not change misuse but in
IL-flex, it increases misuse. Joint-liability thus significantly reduces the misuse,
even in a situation in which consumption is imminent and thus very tempting
(as can be seen in the increase in misuse in the reversion in IL-flex). However,
if flexibility is used in JL-flex, it is repaid significantly less in the revision (see
Column 6).
2.4 discussion
2.4.1 Design Choices
We designed our experiment as realistically as possible while keeping it as
simple as necessary to guarantee good understanding of our participants. Our
results are influenced by assumptions made to simplify the experimental de-
sign. First, borrowing groups in our design consist of two borrowers instead
of five borrowers as in the real-life borrowing situation. We seize the advan-
tage that a two-person borrowing group is easier to explain and that strategic
25 For ease of presentation, we only focus on the main results. All other results are equally robust
to the inclusion of participants with limited understanding.
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considerations regarding the partner’s choices can be made. This is particu-
larly important for the strategy method without realization during the decision
making phase of the experiment. In five person groups, it would not be feasi-
ble to apply the strategy method, and decisions could only be elicited using
actual realizations of idiosyncratic shocks and partners’ decisions. Of course,
this undermines potentials for risk-sharing in larger groups in which risks are
diversified and more persons can offer mutual insurance when one member
suffers a shock.
Second, we assume that joint-liability is automatically enforced. This reduc-
tion in the decision space is important to focus on repayment choices and ex
post moral hazard and is widely used in other lab experimental studies (Ab-
bink et al., 2006; Cassar et al., 2007). It is also quite realistic: In our partner mi-
crofinance institution loan officers usually wait until repayment installments
have been made, irrespective of who made the payment, before they close the
center meeting. This assumption mechanically decreases default in the joint
liability treatments: As long as one borrower can repay both loans, she will do
so automatically.
Third, we study a short time horizon of three repayment periods in our
experimental design whereas in reality, a loan cycle lasts at least 25 weeks.
Three periods is the smallest possible number of periods to test this version of
flexibility, but it substantially limits the number of possible flexibility tokens –
one in our design. In addition, the last period in which no flexibility is possible
and which is needed to make up for all repayment installments delayed by
flexibility in the previous period, carries more weight with such a low number
of periods. This is an important aspect when deducing policy implications
from our framed field experiment.
Fourth, the idiosyncratic shocks in our experiment are modeled as a very
severe shock that destroys all available income in a given period and the prob-
ability that the shock occurs is quite high with 25 percent. The simplifying
assumption of entire income loss prevents partial repayment choices which
would complicate the experimental decisions unnecessarily. However, it over-
simplifies reality and neglects possible partial mutual insurance. The probabil-
ity of 25 percent is easy to understand and high enough to have an impact
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on decisions in our design. In addition, it sets the baseline level of defaults
in IL high enough such that we can detect meaningful reductions in other
treatments.
Fifth, by design borrowers have to pay half their income for their loan in-
stallment and their full income in the flexibility treatments when they have
used their flexibility token. Repaying the double installment after flexibility
use becomes very unattractive: No consumption is possible when the double
repayment is made. For the joint-liability treatments this assumption implies
that partners cannot mutually insure each other in the period in which they
use their flexibility token and in the following period. Default increases due
to this very strict assumption that renders flexibility and mutual insurance
pure substitutes in certain combinations of shocks and repayment choices. In
reality, it is very unlikely that a double repayment cannot be insured by the
(five-person) group, thus defaults may be significantly lower. However, in re-
ality, shocks may last for more than one period which has to be considered
when designing an actual flexible loan product.
Despite all these simplifying assumptions, we can study the interactions
of joint-liability and repayment flexibility in a clean manner and are able to
detect underlying mechanisms. For instance, it has been documented before
that joint-liability per se is not responsible for high repayments (Attanasio et
al., 2015; Giné and Karlan, 2014). We can draw a more differentiated conclusion
and we can show that this is due to different behavioral types. Our results
show the potential benefits when joint-liability and flexibility are interacted:
The responsible use of flexibility is enhanced and anti-social punishment is
reduced. These behavioral insights should be taken into account when further
studying the improvement of microcredit products.
2.4.2 Implementation of Flexibility
There are several ways in which repayment flexibility could be implemented.
In this study, we opted for a deferral that needs to be repaid in the next period.
While this version of flexibility is helpful for small shocks that last only one
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period and are not correlated across time, the burden of the double repayment
does not seem to be negligible. The clear advantage of this implementation is
that, in theory, it can be flexibly used (or not used) throughout the cycle and
one could easily add another flexibility token in a given loan cycle.
Another way to implement flexibility would be a "repayment pause" that
simply skips a repayment but instead of making up for it with the next in-
stallment, it would be priced into all remaining installments. While the repay-
ment of the pauses is smoothed over the cycle and thus reduces the burden of
comparatively large installments, it would be necessary to determine ex-ante
how many pauses will be used (non-use would not be an option). While it was
not possible to thoroughly test this version of flexibility, we conducted discrete
choice experiments with a subsample of clients to get an idea of the demand of
these two versions of flexibility (see Appendix B.3 for a detailed description).
We find that clients would be willing to pay an additional P 552 in interest
charges for the repayment pause as compared to a standard loan, but no ad-
ditional willingness to pay for the flexibility token as we implemented it. This
shows that the repayment pause is a promising way of offering flexibility that
should be explored in future research.
2.5 conclusion
In our study, we analyze an innovative design feature for microloans: flexibility
in loan repayment. It offers borrowers the option to self-insure against income
shocks. However, lenders may be reluctant to offer flexibility since it could
deteriorate repayment morale. While repayment morale is usually high in joint-
liability lending due to mutual insurance and peer monitoring, peer pressure is
usually excessive with high levels of anti-social punishment. We propose that
interacting joint-liability and repayment flexibility helps to seize advantages of
both loan features while reducing the disadvantages.
Our results from the framed field experiments with microfinance borrow-
ers in the Philippines partially confirm our hypotheses: There are potential
benefits when joint-liability and flexibility are interacted as the responsible
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use of flexibility is enhanced and anti-social punishment is reduced. However,
we do find lower repayment rates with flexibility, irrespective of the liability
structure. While we have to make strong simplifying assumptions to keep the
experimental design straightforward and understandable, we learn important
aspects for flexible loan features in real-life loan products. First, the grade of
substitutability between mutual insurance in joint-liability and flexibility is
crucial for default levels. In our design, mutual insurance is not possible after
the flexibility token has been used which results in high default levels. If mu-
tual insurance is still possible after using flexibility, default levels will be lower.
Second, the repayment installment relative to the income of borrowers is an
important aspect in determining the temptation to default on the loan repay-
ment, in particular the double repayment to make up the payment deferred to
a later period by flexibility. In our design, the loan repayment installment con-
stitutes 50 percent of the income in this period. A double repayment requires
using the total period income for repayment. With a lower repayment burden
also for the double repayment, temptation to default on repayment is reduced.
Third, the number of flexibility tokens in relation to loan repayment periods is
crucial for the restrictions imposed by make-up payments for flexibility. In our
design, one flexibility token could be used in two out of three periods so that
repayments can only be delayed for one period and make-up payments are
due in the next period. A higher number of repayment periods will ease these
restrictions: Payments can be delayed for longer time periods and make-up
payments can be made when income levels are high.
More research is necessary to identify how these aspects translate to an
implementable design for flexible features of real loans. Our findings guide
the design of flexible repayment features that may help to improve the impact
of microloans on borrower welfare.
3
I L I E ? W E L I E ! W H Y ? E X P E R I M E N TA L E V I D E N C E O N A
D I S H O N E S T Y S H I F T I N G R O U P S *
"I did steal from Enron. We stole from Enron."
The Enron Trial: Testimony of Andrew Fastow (former CFO of Enron)
"The conduct was fairly open and notorious, I would say.
It was no great secret what we were doing."
Christopher Loehr (former analyst for Enron)
3.1 introduction
Groups and organizations sometimes fail to comply with a moral norm. They
lie, they cheat, they are dishonest, they are corrupt and they commit fraud.
However, it is not organizations that take those decisions; it is individuals that
are part of the organization. Can we thus explain undesired behavior in orga-
nizations simply by aggregating individual failures to comply with the norm?
Or, are there other elements inherent to the organization or to its structure
that can help us better understand how undesired behavior emerges? And,
how does undesired behavior of individuals differ from behavior within or
by an entire organization? While these are relevant questions, surprisingly lit-
tle empirical evidence exist (Conrads et al., 2013; Sutter, 2009). This chapter
addresses these questions in a parsimonious setup that allows us to identify
some of the potential reasons for collective failure to follow a moral norm or
to comply with desired behavior.
Recent years have provided several prominent examples of unethical behav-
iors in groups and organizations. Fraudulent accounting methods and mal-
practice of groups of executive officers have led to the marked bankruptcies
of WorldCom and Enron. More recently, it has been discovered that inter alia
* This chapter is based on joint work with Martin G. Kocher and Simeon Schudy and is forth-
coming in Management Science.
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the German car producer Volkswagen has sold diesel cars with emissions cer-
tificates based on potentially faulty information.1 To improve emission test
results, Volkswagen has allegedly installed software in their diesel engines
that could detect when the cars were on the test stand and adjust the engine
performance accordingly. After investigations by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), newspaper articles say that "VW must have had a chain of
management command that approved fitting cheating devices to its engines".2
However, it is not only for-profit firms that are involved in unethical behav-
ior: There are cases of charities that commit embezzlement, sports organiza-
tions and executives that generate financial scandals or engage in morally and
legally questionable practices in the context of doping and sports teams that
violate established norms.3
This study provides a twofold contribution. First, we implement a parsimo-
nious laboratory setup to investigate whether groups (as our proxy for small
organizations) are indeed more inclined to engage in dishonest or unethical
behaviors than individuals, as casual observation and some previous results
in the literature suggest (e.g., Chytilova and Korbel, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013;
Gino et al., 2013; Muehlheusser et al., 2015; Sutter, 2009; Weisel and Shalvi,
2015). We find that the answer is affirmative. Individuals lie less frequently
when deciding alone as compared to groups. Second, we discuss and single
out explanations for the "dishonesty shift" in groups. There are several can-
didate explanations: (i) a simple aggregation of individual inclinations as a
consequence of aggregation rules (i.e. decision making procedures) within the
group; (ii) the incentive structure inherent to many group decisions (often-
times, all members share group payoffs equally and an individual deviation
from either of the strategies – behaving dishonest or honest – can sometimes
reduce payoffs for everyone dramatically); (iii) the decreased observability of
one’s actions within a group, potentially making the individual less account-
1 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/11880433/How-has-
Volkswagen-tricked-the-US-over-car-emissions.html, last downloaded: Feb 3,
2016.
2 See also http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772, last downloaded: Nov 29, 2015.
3 See e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/business/4-cancer-charities-accused-in-ftc-
fraud-case.html,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2015/09/fifa-corruption-scandal and
http://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/36542577, last downloaded: June 16, 2016.
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able for their actions when they are group members; and (iv) the deliberation
process inherent to group interaction involving, for instance, the exchange of
arguments and learning about the strength and prevalence of a norm.
Our laboratory experiment uses a variant of the die-rolling task introduced
by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Participants are asked to report the
result of a die roll and their payoffs depends on their reports.4 Hence partici-
pants face a trade-off between being honest by reporting the true number and
potentially forgoing a monetary profit (i.e. following the norm of honesty), on
the one hand, and being dishonest and potentially earning more (i.e. violating
the norm of honesty), on the other hand. We implement individual decision
making situations and group decision making situations using an experimen-
tal design that allows us to study behavioral change (within subjects) across
several (between subjects) treatments. Our setup reduces the effects from the
decreased observability of one’s actions as a member of a group and enables us
to assess whether the exchange of arguments and learning about the strength
and prevalence of a norm or whether incentive structures and preference ag-
gregation are the main drivers of the observed dishonesty shift.
In the die roll paradigm, a pure payoff maximizer would want to always
report the number that yields the highest monetary payoff, regardless of the
actual die roll. This is true for both the individual and the group decision
making situation. If one assumes sufficiently high moral costs of lying, indi-
viduals might want to report truthfully, and the group outcome then depends
on the aggregation of individual preferences. For instance, unanimity should
lead to less lying than other aggregation mechanisms. Adding social image
concerns, accountability considerations and changes in the perception of the
norm, group interaction can drag the comparison between the indidivual and
the group setting in any direction – towards more or less dishonest behavior
(Bénabou, 2013; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, 2011; M. Dufwenberg and M. A.
Dufwenberg, 2018; Falk and Tirole, 2016). Ultimately, the question of whether
groups or individuals are more or less dishonest (and the causes and conse-
4 Our variant of the task is computerized and allows the experimenter to observe whether indi-
viduals misreport (for a similar idea, see also Gneezy et al., 2018). We explain the variant and
the reasons for our design choice in more detail in Section 3.2.
88 experimental evidence on a dishonesty shift in groups
quences of any potential shift from the individual to the group setting) can
only be answered empirically.
A laboratory experiment has several advantages when it comes to the iden-
tification of the effects we are interested in: It allows us (i) to exogenously vary
group membership and incentives for the group members to behave dishon-
estly; (ii) to observe individual behavior before individuals become members
of a group as well as behavior/communication when the group decides; and
(iii) to elicit individual beliefs about dishonest behavior of others. Naturally,
there are limits to laboratory experiments. The task that we use is specific
in the sense that it implies a zero fine for violating the norm of honesty. In
bearing with the growing experimental literature on cheating and lying, this
enables us to compare our results to existing studies that focus on individual
decisions to lie. We implement group decisions in small groups with anony-
mous real-time chat interactions in order to keep as much experimental con-
trol as possible. These design choices lend themselves to extensions that bring
the experimental setup closer to existing organizations with their hierarchies
and with face-to-face interactions. Ultimately, field experiments are a desired
methodology. Our aim here is to establish a set of explanations in a rigorously
controlled environment that feeds into the design of future studies, relaxing
some of our restrictions systematically.
The results from our setup reinforce the conclusion from the small existing
literature: Groups are (much) more inclined to lie than individuals. Drawing
on the older psychology literature that detected a shift from individuals to
groups in terms of risky decisions making, coining it the "risky shift" (Pruitt
and Teger, 1969; Teger and Pruitt, 1967), we refer to our finding as the "dishon-
esty shift". However, our main contribution is providing an explanation for this
shift: The shift can neither be explained by a higher level of strategic sophistica-
tion of groups than individuals (Sutter, 2009), nor by a decreased observability
of one’s action as a group member. Both explanations are excluded by our de-
sign. Using appropriate treatment variations, we can also rule out that groups
lie more than individuals because the other group members benefit from lying
(Gino et al., 2013) or because group decisions require unanimity.
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Our findings provide strong evidence for the importance of two mechanisms
that drive the dishonesty shift and that are inherent to almost any group in-
teraction: communication and learning about norm compliance. Communica-
tion exposes group members frequently to arguments in favor of violating the
norm. The exchange of arguments and talking to people that argue in favor
of violating the norm also changes the norm perception. We show that the
expectation that other people (out-of-sample) lie increases significantly after
the group interaction. A detailed analysis of the protocols from the group in-
teraction suggests that groups lie more because communication enables them
to justify dishonest behavior in a different way than individuals. Further, we
find that the dishonesty shift in groups is very strong such that the group com-
position (in terms of the number of initially dishonest group members) only
weakly affects the extent of dishonesty in a group.
Understanding the mechanisms that contribute to the dishonesty shift is
essential as it is a prerequisite for designing institutions and incentives that
are conducive to norm compliance. Our results show that the availability and
exchange of arguments that justify norm violating behavior is an important
aspect. Such exchange is occurring naturally in groups where group members
discuss how they should act. A next step could be to analyze potential mecha-
nisms in the group interaction that are able to counterbalance this effect such
as reminders of the norm or other related interventions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes
the details of our experimental design and procedures, gives an overview of
the literature, and provides behavioral predictions. In Section 3.3, we present
the results from our experiment. Section 3.4 discusses our findings, and Sec-
tion 3.5 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 experimental design, related literature and predictions
3.2.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We use a variant of the die-rolling task introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013), in which a pure payoff maximizer would want to always report
the number that yields the highest monetary payoff (irrespective of the ob-
served die roll). Experimental participants see a video of a die roll on their
computer screen. The computer randomly chooses one out of six videos, each
showing one possible outcome. Participants are informed about this, i.e. they
know that the computer chooses each video with the same probability. The
outcome of the die roll in the video is clearly visible for about 10 seconds.
The participants’ task is to enter the outcome shown in the video on the next
screen, in a field stating "die number seen:____". Participants can enter any
number between 1 and 6. Importantly, payoffs depend on the number entered,
not on the number actually seen. We use the same payoff structure as the orig-
inal experiment, i.e. die numbers to yield one to five points respectively
and die number yields zero points. As participants can enter any number
between one and six, they have the possibility to report dishonestly. As we
explicitly asked participants to report the number seen, we refer to deviating
from truthful reporting as "dishonesty" or "lying" for the rest of the chapter.
Die rolls shown in the video are chosen randomly by the computer and
known by the experimenter such that participants cannot disguise their lies.5
Thus, in contrast to the original die-rolling task, misreporting the die number
in our experiment is clearly dishonest, but liars cannot disguise (for a similar
task with observability, see also Gneezy et al., 2018). This is a desirable fea-
ture for our purposes for at least two reasons. First, the paradigm ensures that
groups do not lie more than individuals because it is easier to disguise lies in
a group, as individual decisions are clearly observable by the experimenter in
individual and group treatments. Second, the paradigm allows us to study in
a within-subject design how individual behavior changes (i.e. when reporting
5 Note that participants are informed about the experimental procedures. Hence, incomplete
lying should occur rarely in our experiment.
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alone as compared to when reporting after communication in a group). Fur-
ther, the task is easy to understand and we can thus exclude that groups have
a significantly better understanding of the task. Nonetheless, full observability
may affect the level of lying (as compared to no observability). Our main anal-
ysis focuses therefore on the relative comparison between individual decision
making and group decision making (and not on the absolute levels of dis-
honest behavior). Interestingly, direct comparisons between situations of full
observability by the experimenter and full privacy (Gneezy et al., 2018) show
minor differences in the absolute extent of lying and similar conclusions can be
drawn from comparable experiments that introduce an anonymous observer
of the private die roll other than the experimenter (see, e.g., Baeker and Mech-
tel, 2015; Houser et al., 2016; Van de Ven and Villeval, 2015).
Figure 3.1: Experimental Design and Elicitation of Beliefs
Notes: Subjects are randomly allocated either to treatment Individual, GroupPC or GroupNoPC
(between-subject) and participate in all three parts (within-subject).
We implement a mixture of a within-subject and a between-subject design
with three different between-subject treatments (Individual, GroupPC and Group-
NoPC. Figure 3.1 illustrates the experimental design. Each treatment consists
of three independent parts, for which instructions are displayed on-screen at
the beginning of each part. One of the three parts is randomly determined to
be payoff-relevant at the end of the experiment and this is common knowledge.
In the Individual treatment, participants make the same decision in each of the
three parts: They see a video of a die roll on their screen and are asked to
enter the die number seen on the next screen. In the two group treatments, the
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first part and the third part are equivalent to the decision in the same parts
in Individual. In the second part of the group treatments, subjects decide in
groups of three participants that are randomly assembled. Each participant in
a group sees the same video (and this is common knowledge). After group
members have seen the video, they have five minutes’ time to discuss in a
group chat. The real-time chat allows for free-form communication without re-
vealing one’s identity (excluding the possibility of threats and side-payments).
All three group members see all messages that are sent in the chat. The three
members can also decide unanimously to leave the chat before its automated
ending. After the chat, each participant privately enters the number (as in Indi-
vidual), making each individual decision fully observable by the experimenter
in all treatments. The two group treatments reflect different organizational
structures as we vary whether or not group members earn a common payoff.
In GroupPC, participants face a decision with payoff commonality. Each mem-
ber of a group has to enter the same number to receive a payoff and each
participant receives the payoff that corresponds to the number entered. If en-
tered numbers differ within a group, all group members receive zero payoffs.
Such a protocol implements a strong unanimity component. In GroupNoPC,
participants face no payoff commonality, i.e. they receive payoffs according to
the number they enter, irrespective of the number entered by the other group
members. GroupNoPC is thus identical to Individual except for the group chat
after having seen the same video. It is important to notice that there is no
pressure to contribute to the chat and that the content of the chat is totally up
to the participants (i.e. they could talk about the weather, the weekend and
anything they wanted, except for revealing their identities in any way).
As the first part is identical in all treatments (and also decisions are very
similar), we can use the between-subject comparisons between Individual and
GroupPC as well as Individual and GroupNoPC in Part 2 to establish the dif-
ference in dishonest behavior between individual and groups (i.e. the poten-
tial existence of the dishonesty shift). The comparison between behavior in
GroupPC and GroupNoPC in Part 2 allows us to address the effect of payoff
commonality, i.e. the relevance of the other-regarding concerns argument in
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group decision making that involves a trade-off between payoff maximization
and norm compliance.6
To observe whether the group chat changes participants’ beliefs about oth-
ers’ behavior in terms of (dis)honesty, we elicit our participants’ beliefs about
the lying behavior in a past experiment (i.e. in the baseline condition of Fis-
chbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Following Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013), we elicit participants’ beliefs about the distribution of payoffs. We in-
form our participants that they have to guess the behavior of other participants
in a similar, previously run experiment (from now on "reference experiment").
Participants then guess the shares of participants that earned a specific pay-
off, i.e. 0 points, 1 point, 2 points, etc. Implicitly, the distribution provides the
belief about honesty of similar decision makers. Participants earn five euros
if they guessed all shares correctly. For every percentage point deviation from
the correct shares we reduce participants’ payoff by 0.04 euros. The minimum
payoff they can earn in the belief elicitation task is 0.50 euros. To avoid poten-
tial problems of hedging, we randomly selected one of the two belief elicitation
tasks at the end of the experiment to be payoff-relevant.7 Two aspects of the
belief elicitation are important: First, the way we elicit beliefs makes it clear
to participants that we ask them about past behavior of other participants,
which is exogenous to the current experiment. Second, we make clear that the
data from the reference experiment is exactly the same for Belief Elicitation 1
and Belief Elicitation 2. Hence, changes in elicited values indicate a change in
beliefs that can only be explained by the experience in our experiment.
During our experiment, each participant sat at a randomly assigned, sepa-
rated PC terminal and received a copy of printed general instructions upfront.8
These informed participants that the experiment consists of three independent
parts (one randomly determined to be payoff-relevant at the end) and that
the specific instructions for each part would be displayed at the beginning of
6 As our focus is on how lying behavior changes in groups as compared to individuals (Part 1
and 2) we do not provide a detailed analysis of the data from Part 3. Lying rates in Part 3 are
high (71.8 in Individual, 82.1 in GroupPC and 84.6 in GroupNoPC) and do not differ significantly
across treatment.
7 This random draw was independent of the random draw that determined payoffs for the lying
task.
8 The translated version of the instructions can be found in Appendix C.4.
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each part on the participants’ computer screen. A set of on-screen control ques-
tions ensured the understanding of the game in each part.9 Each part started
only after all subjects answered the control questions correctly. Participants
could fail the control questions repeatedly and were allowed to ask the exper-
imenter to provide an explanation. No form of communication was allowed
during the experiment (except through the computerized chat environment in
the group treatments). We conducted all sessions at the Munich Experimen-
tal Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at LMU Munich.
The MELESSA subject pool includes undergraduate and graduate students of
all fields of study. The data for the main treatments was collected over 14 ses-
sions between June and September 2015, with 273 participants in total (39 in
Individual, 117 in GroupPC and 117 in GroupNoPC).10 In the first two sessions,
the computer randomly selected for each group in each part one out of the
six possible videos of a die roll with equal probability. To increase statistical
power and simplify non-parametric comparisons between treatments, we used
these randomly determined sets of videos in the later sessions, such that in
each part, the same die rolls were observed in each treatment. This procedure
ensures that die rolls displayed are held constant across treatments and we
can compare the number of dishonest reports across treatments, holding the
monetary costs of being honest constant. In our main analysis we compare the
individual-level data of the control treatment to the collapsed data from the
group treatments.11 Hence, we have 39 statistically independent observations
in each treatment.
Participants received a show-up fee of four euros that was added to the earn-
ings from the experiment. Subjects could earn points, where one point was
equal to two euros. The experiment took about an hour. The average income
9 As Part 3 was identical to Part 1, we displayed the control questions in Part 3 again, but showed
the subjects the correct answers. The correlation between the number of times participants
failed to answer the control questions correctly and the extent of (dis)honesty is small and fails
to be statistically significant (individual level data, Spearman’s ρ, Part 1: -0.096, p=0.112; Part 2:
-0.027, p=0.663). Hence, problems in understanding the experimental procedures are unlikely
to explain variation in lying behavior between treatments in the experiment.
10 Two sessions (n=39) of an additional control treatment (IndividualDeliberation) that allows us
to look into one of the potential explanations were conducted in February 2016 (see also Sec-
tion 3.4).
11 We collapse the group treatment data on the behavior of the group median to ease applicability
of non-parametric tests. Using group averages (where applicable) yields very similar results.
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(including the show-up fee) amounts to 14.62 euros. The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We recruited partic-
ipants using the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and excluded
all subjects with previous experience in die rolling tasks or other similar exper-
iments.
3.2.2 Related Literature and Behavioral Predictions
In our task, a rational selfish individual would want to report a " ", regardless
of the actual die roll. This is true for both the individual and the group decision
making situation. The experimental literature in economics has shown that fre-
quently individuals are willing to forego monetary benefits to behave honestly
in such situations (see, e.g., Abeler et al., 2014; Cappelen et al., 2013; Erat and
Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Glätzle-Rützler and Lerget-
porer, 2015; Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy et al., 2018, 2013; Kröll and Rustagi, 2017;
Lundquist et al., 2009; Mazar et al., 2008). This contrasts behavior of purely
self-interested payoff maximizers but is in line with models that incorporate
moral costs of lying.
Recent work has started to investigate dishonesty in groups (e.g., Baeker and
Mechtel, 2015; Chytilova and Korbel, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013; Muehlheusser
et al., 2015; Sutter, 2009). The group decision making setup adds several di-
mensions to the problem. First, it adds the aggregation problem of individual
preferences in case they are not completely aligned. Second, the group setup
might make social aspects more relevant: hiding behind the other group mem-
bers (accountability), payoff commonality and the need to coordinate as well
as social imagine concerns. Based on existing work, we may expect groups to
lie more than individuals for at least three reasons: First, groups may generally
apply significantly higher levels of reasoning than individuals (Kocher et al.,
2006; Kocher and Sutter, 2005). Thus, groups may lie more as they have a bet-
ter understanding of the game (Sutter, 2009). Second, groups may lie more, as
it can be easier to disguise lying in groups than individual lies (Conrads et al.,
2013). Both arguments should play a minor role in the context of our exper-
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imental design. The task is easy and individual choices are perfectly observ-
able by the experimenter in all treatments. Third, recent work suggests that
groups could lie more because others may benefit as well from dishonest behav-
ior (Gino et al., 2013; Weisel and Shalvi, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011). The compar-
ison between treatments GroupPC and GroupNoPC will address this argument
explicitly. However, there are also good arguments against a stronger preva-
lence of lying among groups than among individuals or arguments that do
not provide a signed prediction. First, social image concerns could be stronger
when deciding in a group (see e.g. Bénabou, 2013; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006,
2011; M. Dufwenberg and M. A. Dufwenberg, 2018).12 Second, changes in the
perception of the norm in the course of the group interaction can drag the
comparison between the individual and the group setting towards more or
less dishonest behavior. To be conservative, we formulate the following null
hypotheses:
H1: The shares of dishonest reports in Part 2 in Individual and GroupPC
do not differ.
H2: The shares of dishonest reports in Part 2 in GroupPC and
GroupNoPC do not differ.
3.3 results
We structure the results section as follows. First, in Section 3.3.1, we present
results on whether groups lie more than individuals and if so, whether dishon-
esty becomes more prevalent in groups due to payoff commonality and how
group communication affects beliefs about norm compliance (out-of-sample).
Then we analyze the effect of group composition in terms of Part 1 liars on
group decisions (in Section 3.3.2). In Section 3.3.3, we provide a content analy-
sis of the group chat. Section 3.3.4 provides additional robustness tests for our
main results, controlling for personal characteristics of group members.
12 Any effects from social image concerns may however be less pronounced in our setting, as
the group interaction is anonymous and the experimenter observes individual behavior in all
treatments.
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3.3.1 Dishonesty Shift and Payoff Commonality
Figure 3.2 illustrates participants’ reporting behavior in Part 1, 2 and 3 by
showing the numbers subjects reported (y-axis) conditional on the number
they have seen (x-axis). Note that the figure organizes the axis based on points,
which means that the " " is shown at the origin. It is clear that we observe ei-
ther honest reporting (dots along the 45° line) or dishonest reporting by stating
the number that yields the highest returns, i.e. " ".13 The fraction of subjects
misreporting in Part 1 ranges from 31 to 41 percent and – as Part 1 is identical
for all treatments – does not differ significantly between treatments (Fisher’s
exact tests, GroupPC vs. Individual: p=0.810; GroupNoPC vs. Individual: p=0.479;
and GroupPC vs. GroupNoPC: p=0.816). In Part 2, we observe significantly more
lying in GroupPC than in Individual. The fraction of dishonest reports amounts
to 89.7 percent in GroupPC whereas in Individual, 61.5 percent of participants
misreport their number (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.007). The results are quali-
tatively similar and remain statistically significant if we exclude participants
who saw a " " in Part 1 (who had no monetary incentive to lie).14 We thus
reject H1.
In GroupNoPC, the fraction of dishonest reports amounts to 86.3 percent
which is also significantly larger than the 61.5 percent in Individual (Fisher’s
exact test, p=0.007), but does not differ significantly from the median of misre-
ports in GroupPC (Fisher’s exact test, p=1.00). Hence, we cannot reject H2. We
summarize our findings in Result 1.
Result 1: Groups lie significantly more than individuals, irrespective of payoff com-
monalities.
13 The absence of incomplete lying is in line with the fact that there is nothing to disguise in our
experiment (in contrast to Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). It also confirms the findings of
a similar individual treatment in Gneezy et al. (2018) that uses an "observed game".
14 As a robustness test, we conducted all analyses reported in this chapter also for a subsample
that excludes participants who have seen a " " in Part 1. All results remain unchanged, i.e. they
are qualitatively similar and differences remain significant, except for one result concerning
the influence of the group composition on misreporting (which we discuss in Section 3.3.2).
Appendix C.2.1 provides more details.
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Figure 3.2: Numbers Seen and Numbers Reported across Treatments and Parts
Notes: In Individual, each dot represents one participant’s reported number. In the group
treatments, each dot represents the median number reported in a group. For readability, the
figure is jittered and shows points (i.e. a die role of " " is shown as 0 points).
Both payoff commonality and mere communication in GroupNoPC strongly
foster coordination. In GroupPC, all 39 groups coordinate, i.e. all members en-
ter the same number (see Table 3.1). In GroupNoPC, group members do not
have to enter the same number to receive a positive payoff and, as compared
to GroupPC, slightly less members do so (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.025). Still,
33 out of 39 groups coordinate after the group chat. In five out of the six re-
maining groups, two out of three members report dishonestly. To compare
coordination in the group treatments with a benchmark, we simulate "coor-
dination" behavior in Individual based on participants’ actual reporting from
Part 2 in Individual.15
As can be seen in Table 3.1, actual coordination rates in both GroupPC and
GroupNoPC are significantly higher than coordination in simulated groups in
15 Following the literature on peer effects (Falk and Ichino, 2006), we randomly place three differ-
ent individuals who have seen the same number (i.e. have similar costs of lying) into a group
and repeat this procedure until we have generated the same number of groups that have seen
the particular number in each of the two group treatments. For this set of groups, we check
how many groups coordinate. In total, we simulate 500 sets of groups in this way and take the
average over how many groups coordinate in each simulated set.
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Table 3.1: Coordination among Group Members in Part 2
Coordination
Number
of
dishonest
reports
Simulated
groups Group PC
Group
NoPC
Lying
decision
of indi-
viduals
Part 2
Yes (all honest) 0 2 4 3
No 1 11 0 1
No 2 17 0 5
No (all dishonest) 3 3 0 0
Yes (all dishonest) 3 6 35 30
Σ 39 39 39
Coordination rate 20.5% 100% 84.6%
Notes: Simulated groups are based on Part 2 decisions in Individual. Note that for three simu-
lated groups all group members lie, but they still do not coordinate (due to partial lying by one
member.)
Individual (Fisher’s exact tests, p<0.001 for the two comparisons). We summa-
rize our findings in Result 2.
Result 2: Communication increases coordination.
Next, we focus on how the group interaction affects participants’ beliefs
about reporting behavior of subjects in a reference experiment. We elicited
these beliefs once before Part 2 and once after Part 3. Figure 3.3 shows how
participants’ beliefs about reporting behavior of subjects in the reference ex-
periment changed from Part 1 to Part 3 for the three treatments. In Individual,
the expected share of subjects reporting a " " in the reference experiment in-
creases from Part 1 to Part 3 by 12.8 percentage points in Individual whereas
the expected fractions of subjects reporting " " and " " decrease. In contrast,
when participants interacted in a group, their beliefs change to a much larger
extent. The expected share of subjects reporting a " " in the reference experi-
ment increases by 35.7 (31.3) percentage points in GroupPC (GroupNoPC). We
thus observe a significant change in the skewness of beliefs on the reported
numbers in the reference experiments for group treatments (Wilcoxon signed-
rank exact test, GroupPC: p=0.002; GroupNoPC: p<0.001) but not for Individual
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(Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p=0.735).16 Consequently, the difference in
the belief changes is larger in the group treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov ex-
act test, GroupPC vs. Individual: p=0.090, GroupNoPC vs. Individual: p=0.006).
We conclude with Result 3.
Result 3: Group communication decreases beliefs about honest behavior of other par-
ticipants in a reference experiment.
Figure 3.3: Change in Beliefs
Notes: Change in beliefs about reported payoffs in a reference experiment in terms of the share
of participants that reported a payoff pi  {0;1;2;3;4;5}.
3.3.2 The Role of (Dis)honest Individuals in Groups
We document a strong dishonesty shift in both group treatments casting doubt
on the idea that behavior in groups is a simple result of individual preference
16 We calculate the non-parametric skewness measure Sit = (µ− υ)/σ for each individual’s belief
distribution and compare this measure for Part 1 and Part 3, where µ represents the mean, υ
the median and σ the standard deviation. The tests for the group treatments uses group-level
data (collapsed on the median).
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aggregation due to payoff commonalities. Our experimental design allows us
to shed more light on how dishonesty evolves in groups, by studying how
the group composition (in terms of participants’ individual tendency to report
dishonestly in Part 1) affects the propensity to lie in Part 2. Figure 3.4 displays
the share of group members reporting dishonestly in Part 2 conditional on the
number of group members who misreported in Part 1.
Figure 3.4: Dishonest Reporting in Groups Conditional on Previous Reporting
Notes: Reporting conditional on the number of group members who misreported in Part 1.
Surprisingly, the group composition does (if at all) play a weak role for
dishonest reporting in Part 2 of the group treatments (Spearman’s ρ=0.135,
p=0.237; Fisher’s exact test p=0.489). Even in groups consisting of three previ-
ously honest individuals, the vast majority decides to report dishonestly after
the group interaction. Only when excluding those participants who have seen
a in Part 1, i.e. those for whom we do not know whether they would have re-
ported dishonestly if they had seen a different number, we find weak evidence
for differences in lying levels across different group compositions (Spearman’s
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ρ=0.253, p=0.040, Fisher’s exact test p=0.213).17 We summarize this finding in
Result 4.
Result 4: Group composition in terms of lying in Part 1 affects lying in groups
in Part 2 only weakly. It does not matter for GroupPC and it matters weakly for
GroupNoPC.
3.3.3 The Impact of Arguments Used in the Group Chat
Results 1 to 3 show that communication has a detrimental effect on honest
reporting behavior as well as on beliefs about others’ honesty. To understand
how the group chat affected reporting behavior, four research assistants (to
whom the purpose of the study was unknown) independently coded each of
the chats using a codebook with a predefined set of variables of interest.18
Naturally, some coders interpreted the chat protocols differently than others.
To obtain reliable values for our variables of interest which, on the one hand,
reflect the majority opinion of coders and are, on the other hand, not systemat-
ically biased to extreme values, we used the median value for each variable of
interest if coders disagreed.19 We observe on average 17.45 (SD=8.76) messages
in our 78 groups and chats last about 162 seconds (SD=85.7).20 First, we exam-
ine which arguments are used and whether their use is intended to encourage
honest or dishonest behavior. Then, we analyze the impact of these arguments
on participants’ actions.
In 51 percent of our groups (40 out of 78) arguments for dishonesty are ex-
plicitly mentioned, whereas only 19 groups make arguments for honesty (see
Table 3.2). Thus, dishonest arguments are made more frequently than honest
arguments (χ2-test, p=0.086). The average share of messages containing argu-
17 For a more detailed analysis, see the Appendix C.2.1.
18 The codebook including the complete list of variables can be found in Appendix C.3.
19 Note that in 83 percent of cases at least three coders agreed on a value of a variable. Our results
are robust to using average ratings instead of medians.
20 Chats in GroupNoPC are longer than in GroupPC, both in terms of messages and duration
(Wilcoxon ranksum exact tests, p=0.003 and p<0.001, respectively). Otherwise we find only
minor differences in the structure and the content of the chats (as discussed below).
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ments for dishonest behavior (i.e. the number of messages using arguments
for dishonest reporting in a group divided by the number of messages includ-
ing arguments for honest and dishonest reporting in the group) amounts to
43.4 percent and is significantly higher than the share of honest messages (15.6
percent; within-group comparison, Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p<0.001).
Table 3.2: Number of Groups Using Honest and Dishonest Arguments
Arguments for Dishonesty
mentioned
Arguments for
Honesty mentioned
Yes No Σ
Yes 13 6 19
No 27 32 59
Σ 40 38 78
First suggestions on which number to report are made by both honest and
dishonest individuals (classified according to their behavior in Part 1) in equal
proportion. Comparing whether groups make no argument for (dis)honesty or
at least one argument we do not observe any significant differences between
GroupPC and GroupNoPC concerning dishonest arguments (χ2-test, p=0.365).
More groups without payoff commonality send, however, at least one argu-
ment for honesty (p=0.065). We summarize our findings in Result 5.
Result 5: Arguments for dishonesty occur significantly more frequently than argu-
ments for honesty, irrespective of payoff commonality.
Let us now turn to what arguments are made in favor of honest and dishon-
est reporting and how these arguments relate to actual reporting behavior. Fig-
ure 3.5 illustrates the share of groups in which specific arguments were made
to encourage dishonest (Panel A) and honest reporting (Panel B) for GroupPC
and GroupNoPC separately. We refer to Money if the argument made related to
the monetary consequences of reporting (e.g. "we will earn more if we choose
to report a higher number than the number shown"). Honesty arguments di-
rectly refer to honesty as a norm or value (e.g "there is no need to be honest"
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or "it is important to be honest"). Insecurity refers to insecurity concerning the
task (e.g. "I am uncertain about the task" or "I thought we should enter the
number we want to enter"). Rules refer to explicit arguments that include (non-
)compliance with the rules (e.g. "we should stick to the rules" or "there is no
need to stick to the rules"). Others’ behavior refers to honesty of others outside
the group (e.g., people’s behavior in general or other participants’ behavior).
The majority of arguments refer to Money, Honesty and Insecurity (see Fig-
ure 3.5). In both GroupPC and GroupNoPC, participants use Money mainly to
encourage dishonest reporting and they do so to a similar extent (Fisher’s ex-
act test, p=0.233). Explicitly referring to Honesty is the main argument used in
favor of honesty, being raised significantly more often in GroupNoPC (Fisher’s
exact test, p=0.008).21 Insecurity is used to encourage both dishonest and honest
behavior.
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Figure 3.5: Arguments to Encourage (Dis)Honest Reporting
21 Notice that reporting in Part 1 is related to the use of arguments in expected ways: Honest
behavior in Part 1 relates positively to the use of honest arguments in Part 2 (Spearman’s
ρ=0.144, p=0.027) and dishonest behavior in Part 1 relates positively to the use of dishonest
arguments (Spearman’s ρ=0.112, p=0.088).
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As the use of arguments relating to Insecurity does not correlate with wrongly
answered control questions in Part 2 (Spearman’s ρ, referring to honesty: -0.05,
p=0.65; referring to dishonesty: -0.06, p=0.59), participants may use this type
of arguments in particular as a justification for their preferred behavior, i.e. as
an excuse for dishonest behavior or as support for honest reporting.
We further find that the group composition affects the use of arguments.
Groups composed of none or one participant who behaved dishonestly in
Part 1 use a large variety of arguments (but more dishonest than honest ar-
guments). Groups with two previously dishonest participants use fewer argu-
ments and focus mainly on arguments relating to money. Groups with three
previously dishonest people use only arguments relating to money.22
Models (1) – (3) in Table 3.3 regress the probability of a dishonest report on
arguments used for encouraging both honest and dishonest behavior. Model (1)
shows that, given the high lying rates we observe, arguments that encourage
honest reporting explain variation in lying best. We find that arguments in
favor of honest reporting that refer to Money, Honesty, Insecurity, and Rules
reduce the probability of dishonest reporting significantly. In Model (2), we in-
troduce the treatment dummy GroupPC, which does not significantly influence
dishonest reporting (compared to GroupNoPC). In Model (3) we additionally in-
clude whether or not an individual has misreported in Part 1. Misreporting in
Part 1 significantly increases the probability of reporting dishonestly in Part 2.
Introducing this additional control does not strongly affect the magnitude of
the other coefficients much. However, the coefficient for Honesty (Honest Use)
and Rules (Honest Use) becomes statistically insignificant in Model (3).23 We
summarize these findings in Result 6.
Result 6: Arguments encouraging honesty significantly reduce lying behavior.
22 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
23 Adding the number seen in Part 2 as an explanatory variable (proxy for the monetary gain from
a lie) in Models (1) to (3) leaves the results qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 3.3: Lying Behavior and Arguments Used
Probit (ME)
Misreporting in Part 2
(1) (2) (3)
GroupPC -0.00245 0.00225
(0.0579) (0.0545)
Money (Dishonest Use) 0.0629 0.0631 0.0572
(0.0549) (0.0560) (0.0532)
Money (Honest Use) -0.291*** -0.291*** -0.320***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.134)
Honesty (Dishonest Use) 0.0437 0.0429 0.0475
(0.0984) (0.0949) (0.0845)
Honesty (Honest Use) -0.0773* -0.0777* -0.0526
(0.0382) (0.0401) (0.0353)
Insecurity
(Dishonest Use)
0.0187
(0.0763)
0.0179
(0.0750)
0.00132
(0.0532)
Insecurity (Honest Use) -0.375*** -0.376*** -0.343***
(0.125) (0.131) (0.126)
Rules (Dishonest Use)
Rules (Honest Use) -0.266** -0.268** -0.215
(0.132) (0.138) (0.133)
Others’ Behavior -0.162 -0.163 -0.127
(Dishonest Use) (0.151) (0.151) (0.149)
Others’ Behavior
(Honest Use)
Misreporting in Part 1 0.0869**
(0.0364)
Observations 234 234 234
Cluster 78 78 78
Pseudo-R2 0.422 0.422 0.450
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the individual has misreported
in Part 2. Arguments relating to others being honest and arguments referring to rules to encour-
age dishonest reporting have been dropped due to multicollinearity. Robust standard errors
clustered on group level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.3.4 Individual Characteristics and Lying
In addition to our treatment effects, individual characteristics may play an
important role for the decision to report dishonestly. As a robustness test,
we report results from a series of probit regressions on dishonest reporting
including additional controls for individual characteristics (e.g. Machiavelli
Scores, Big 5, Risk attitudes, Religiousness, Political attitudes, Gender, Age) in
Tables C.1-C.3 of Appendix C.1. Our treatment effects remain robust and we
find no significant effect of any control variable except for gender.24 The gen-
der effect that we observe is in line with most previous studies: Females tend
to be less likely to lie as individuals (see, e.g., the survey by Rosenbaum et al.,
2014). Regression model (1) in Table 3.4 shows that females tend to misreport
less in Part 2. The gender effect persists when controlling for our treatments
in Model (2). However, the treatment effect on females is larger than on males
(see Model (3) and (4), showing separate regressions for females and males).
The coefficient for males is still positive but not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels (p=0.140 for GroupPC and p=0.314 for GroupNoPC).
Table 3.4: Lying and Gender
Probit (ME) - Misreporting in Part 2
All All Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GroupPC 0.205*** 0.266*** 0.116
(0.0585) (0.0781) (0.0744)
GroupNoPC 0.169*** 0.231*** 0.0763
(0.0576) (0.0770) (0.0745)
Female -0.0878** -0.0824**
(0.0381) (0.0366)
Observations 273 273 167 106
Cluster 117 117 100 76
Pseudo-R2 0.017 0.079 0.0829 0.031
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on group level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
24 Note that other controls do not systematically affect lying behavior in Part 1.
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3.4 discussion and alternative explanations
Our results document that communication in groups can have a detrimental
effect on honest reporting behavior. One rationale for this result is that com-
municating in a group provides possibilities for individuals to deliberate and
formulate justifications for dishonest behavior (see also Gino and Ariely, 2012;
Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2012). Another rationale is that exchanging jus-
tifications enables group members to coordinate and establish the validity of
a norm regarding honesty and to what extent it is shared among others. In or-
der to address these two aspects, we conduct an additional control treatment
which allows for deliberation but not for communication; IndividualDelibera-
tion (n=39). Part 1 and 3 of IndividualDeliberation are identical to the Individual
treatment described in Section 3.2. In Part 2, IndividualDeliberation offers partic-
ipants the possibility to deliberate before entering the number seen in Part 2:
After observing the die roll, participants have five minutes to write down their
thoughts and only afterwards enter their number. As in the group treatments
(where participants could leave the chat), participants in IndividualDeliberation
were allowed to leave the entry screen before its automated ending. Thus Indi-
vidualDeliberation allows participants to deliberate and formulate justifications
for dishonest behavior but excludes establishing the validity arguments and
sharing of the norm among group members.
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Figure 3.6: Lying in Part 2, by Treatment
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Figure 3.6 illustrates the fraction of liars in Part 2 which is significantly
smaller in both individual treatments as compared to the group treatments
(Fisher’s exact test, p=0.026 for both IndividualDeliberation vs. GroupPC and
IndividualDeliberation vs. GroupNoPC; p=0.007 for both Individual vs. GroupPC
and Individual vs. GroupNoPC; p=0.814 for Individual vs. IndividualDeliberation).
That is, lying with deliberation is not significantly different from lying in In-
dividual but does significantly differ from lying behavior in groups.25 Also
(and again in contrast to group communication), deliberation does not signifi-
cantly change the skewness of beliefs about other participants’ honesty in the
reference experiment (Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p=0.164). One may ex-
pect individuals in IndividualDeliberation deliberate less than individuals in the
group treatments. However, the number of individuals in IndividualDeliberation
coming up with at least one dishonest argument is not statistically different
from the number of groups who do so in GroupNoPC (χ2-test, p=0.352) and
it is even larger than the number of groups in GroupPC (χ2-test, p=0.068).26
Hence, we are confident that deliberation alone does not explain the increase
of lying behavior in groups. In combination with Result 1, we conclude that
it is the exchange of arguments and moral views within the group that shift
group members’ expectations and behavior.27
Finally, let us briefly discuss other potential explanations for the observed
dishonesty shift. First, one may suspect that experimenter demand effects could
play a role in our setting. For instance, groups might be more susceptible to
experimenter demand effects than individuals and thereby lie more (or less).
Identifying such demand effects is usually difficult and there is no existing
evidence for a difference in susceptibility between individuals and groups. As
we are able to observe communication of our participants, we analyzed group
chats with regard to any signs of experimenter demand effects. We find that
only four out of 78 groups (five percent) mention that the "honesty – money
trade-off" might be part of the research question and one group considered
25 Note that levels of lying in Part 1 and Part 3 in IndividualDeliberation (48.7 and 76.9 percent) do
not significantly differ from levels of lying in Individual (30.8 and 71.8 percent, Fisher’s exact
test, Part 1: p=0.165 and Part 3: p=0.796).
26 This also holds true for the absolute number of dishonest arguments. Appendix C.2.3 provides
further results from the content analysis of IndividualDeliberation.
27 This conclusion is further supported by decision times which we analyze in Appendix C.2.2.
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that the experimenter may be interested in the effect of the group chat on
the decision. Also in IndividualDeliberation, only five percent (two participants)
refer to the research question. Hence, we find little (direct) evidence for an
experimenter demand effect that interacts with our group treatments. Such a
demand effect is thus unlikely to explain the observed dishonesty shift.
Second, we observe increasing lying rates in the Individual treatment over
the three parts. One may suspect that subjects learn over time that any con-
sequences of dishonest behavior are absent. If so, there is the possibility that
communication in groups facilitates this "learning" and thereby increases ly-
ing rates faster. However, three empirical facts cast doubt on this interpreta-
tion. First, 74 percent of our groups do not address the potential consequences
(positive or negative) of dishonest behavior and the discussion of potential
consequences does not significantly correlate with the group decision to lie
(Spearman’s ρ: positive consequences -0.069, p=0.550; negative consequences
-0.129, p=0.260). Second, we do not observe a statistically significant correla-
tion between incorrectly answered control question and lying behavior. Third,
faster learning in the group treatments in Part 2 is unable to explain the signifi-
cant increase in beliefs about others’ dishonesty in a reference experiment that
we observe only for participants who communicated in a group. While par-
ticipants in Individual have also learned about the consequences of lying, they
do not change their beliefs about others’ lying behavior much. Thus, we are
confident that group communication indeed changes how people rationalize
morally questionable behavior, i.e. it is learning about the norm that mainly
drives our results, not about the consequences of lying.
Third, "hiding behind the group" as an individual (accountability argument)
is a potential explanation for the dishonesty shift. However, this argument is
hard to sustain in an environment with perfect observability by the experi-
menter, which we implemented on purpose to address this aspect. Further,
if hiding behind the group was a main driver, lying in the group treatments
should decrease significantly in Part 3 (which we do not observe).
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3.5 conclusion
Our results substantially improve the understanding of (dis)honest behavior
in groups. First, complementing recent evidence on the role of collaboration
opportunities for dishonesty when communication is absent (see Weisel and
Shalvi, 2015), we observe that groups lie significantly more than individuals
when group members face payoff commonality and have to coordinate on
an action. Second, we show that the payoff commonality is not a necessary
condition for groups to behave more dishonestly than individuals. If individ-
uals communicate within a group but do not have to coordinate to receive
a payoff, their behavior is very similar to the behavior of groups facing pay-
off commonality. Hence, we provide evidence that communication itself can
have a detrimental effect on ethical behavior of small groups. We term this
increased inclination to lie dishonesty shift. Evidence from our additional con-
trol treatment (IndividualDeliberation) shows that the dishonesty shift is not due
to the fact that communicating in a group provides possibilities for individ-
uals to deliberate or simply justify their actions to themselves. Instead, it is
the exchange of justifications that enables group members to coordinate on
dishonest actions and change their beliefs about moral behavior. The content
analysis of our chat protocols backs up this interpretation, as it documents
that group members indeed use the chat primarily to formulate and exchange
arguments in favor of dishonest behavior. Additionally, we find that commu-
nication shifts group members’ beliefs about the prevailing honesty norm in
a reference experiment, suggesting that group members indeed established a
new norm regarding (dis)honesty.
Our findings also provide important insights for the design of institutions.
We document a new argument for the prevalence of dishonesty in groups:
Groups tend to lie more because they are able to communicate and thereby
to rationalize morally wrong behavior in a different way than individuals. In
turn, organizations fostering interaction and communication within groups
are likely to provide room for group members not only to coordinate their
actions, but also to adjust their beliefs and thus the norms they follow. Conse-
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quently, members of a group or unit within an organization may hold different
beliefs about ethically acceptable behavior than individuals outside the group.
While communication is obviously important and necessary to provide effi-
cient coordination which can be beneficial in many organizational contexts, it
may also have detrimental effects on the evolution of norm perceptions within
groups. Therefore, organizational structures that foster communication might
require to be paired with strong codes of conduct or exogenous monitoring
(and punishment) to avoid the erosion of honesty norms. While reminders ap-
pealing to morality or religious beliefs have been shown to be effective in the
short run (Mazar et al., 2008), long run impacts of such interventions are less
well understood. More research is also needed to investigate how scrutiny (see
e.g., Baeker and Mechtel, 2015; Houser et al., 2016; Van de Ven and Villeval,
2015) and efficient reporting mechanisms can be designed (Friesen and Gan-
gadharan, 2013). Our results hint at the fact that such designs need to take into
account how dishonest behavior evolves in groups and raises many interesting
questions for future research, e.g. on the role of hierarchies in organizations,
heterogeneity in the benefits from lying, monitoring and punishment as well
as self-selection of honest and dishonest individuals in leading roles.
Over and above the analysis of potential organizational design features that
are able to countervail the dishonesty shift, our results highlight a more gen-
eral fact: Communication in groups and organizations changes group mem-
bers’ beliefs about moral behavior of others and increases coordination of
group members’ behavior. While we observe a strong shift towards violating
the honesty norm in groups, it remains an open question whether group mem-
bers may coordinate on moral actions, depending on the original strength of
the norm.
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a.1 additional tables and figures
Table A.1: Balance
CA300 CiH300 CA500 CiH500 R2 F-test
Self-Reports
Age 43.19 0.986 0.535 -1.532 0.001 0.945
Education (yrs) 8.712 -0.164 -0.102 0.450 0.003 0.718
Financial literacy (0-1) 0.514 0.027 0.077* -0.073 0.018 0.229
SR attention to finances (y/n) 0.274 -0.0685 -0.0792 0.146 0.008 0.471
MR attention to finances (y/n) 0.301 -0.0822 -0.0936 0.121 0.007 0.337
HH size 5.288 0.466 0.024 -0.687 0.011 0.529
HH earners 2.151 0.178 0.018 -0.165 0.005 0.569
Owns business (y/n) 0.658 0.082 0.109 -0.095 0.009 0.617
Cash income (y/n) 0.918 0.014 0.017 0.0123 0.004 0.577
Currently saving (y/n) 0.753 0.082 0.078 -0.108 0.007 0.473
Savings at home ( P ) 1,034 441.8 318.7 -662.1 0.005 0.606
Savings in account ( P ) 662.3 -16.17 364.5 -267.1 0.010 0.630
Travel cost to center ( P ) 0.685 -0.397 0.419 0.280 0.007 0.270
Travel time to center (min) 5.658 -0.164 0.680 0.489 0.006 0.788
Banks untrustworthy (0-1) 0.336 0.00685 -0.0694 0.00614 0.008 0.465
Savings in ASHI are safe (0-1) 0.932 0.0274 -0.0386 0.0408 0.018 0.297
Decision making power (0-2) 1.023 0.104 0.001 -0.169* 0.013 0.155
Would like a private account (0-1) 0.616 0.0548 0.0394 -0.00285 0.006 0.611
Continued on next page
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Balance continued
CA300 CiH300 CA500 CiH500 R2 F-test
Self-Reports (0-1)
Saving less due to...
...claims from husband 0.538 -0.00905 -0.00861 -0.0246 0.002 0.939
...claims from family & friends 0.168 0.0137 0.0108 -0.0689 0.006 0.589
...claims from clients 0.432 0.0411 0.0490 -0.0508 0.002 0.894
...overoptimistic wrt saving 0.260 0.0685 0.00271 -0.0912 0.007 0.614
Administrative Data
Savings balance ( P ) 771.3 50.65 -23.87 -6.604 0.000 0.975
Loan amount ( P ) 20,903 916.7 -5,396** 632.8 0.045 0.105
PPI score (0-100) 46.79 2.667 0.797 -4.115 0.005 0.916
Main income: Enterprise (y/n) 0.767 0.0137 0.0548 -0.123 0.009 0.656
Electricity (y/n) 0.556 0.0278 -0.0898 0.0558 0.008 0.992
Water (y/n) 0.264 4.02e-16 -0.0721 0.0899 0.006 0.426
Landline (y/n) 0.0139 0.0139 -0.0139 -0.0139 0.013 .
House size (0-2) 0.528 -0.0417 0.143 -0.0521 0.016 0.344
House strength (0-2) 0.750 -0.0417 -0.0240 0.0339 0.001 0.913
Membership (months) 60.07 0.153 -17.62 -6.056 0.044 0.153
Notes: The upper panel presents results for variables elicited during the experiment and
the lower panel variables from pre-experimental administrative data. Higher values in-
dicate larger agreement/better outcomes. Mean of the CA group and coefficients from
OLS regressions with treatment dummies as independent variables and clustered SE (not
shown) at the center level. The last column shows p-values of the F-test of joint significance
of the treatment dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4: Present Bias, CiH and Savings
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Amount Saved Share Saved Present Bias
CiH*Present Bias 64.50* 0.150*
(36.84) (0.0846)
[-5.896 - 133.2] [-0.0066 - 0.307]
High Deposit 0.103***
(0.0250)
[0.055 - 0.151 ]
High Fin. Lit. 38.93*** 0.0620**
(11.91) (0.0297)
[16.62 - 61.30] [.0057 - 0.119]
Interviewer 2 41.22** 0.122***
(16.71) (0.0431)
[9.475 - 72.16] [0.0412 - 0.203]
Large HH 41.98** 0.108***
(18.84) (0.0352)
[6.730 - 77.89] [0.0423 - 0.175]
CiH -13.32 -0.0338 0.0685
(15.25) (0.0368) (0.0512)
[-41.71 - 16.16] [-0.103 - 0.0366] [-0.0246 - 0.162]
Present Bias -16.72 -0.0317
(21.96) (0.0583)
[-57.67 - 25.36] [-0.141 - 0.0758]
Endowment 500 0.0340
(0.0507)
[-0.0609 - 0.129]
CiH x 500 0.00943
(0.0870)
[-0.158 - 0.170]
Constant 131.0*** 0.284*** 0.0959***
(14.58) (0.0356) (0.0336)
[103.9 - 158.7] [0.218 - 0.350] [0.0340 - 0.158]
Observations 300 300 300
Adj. R2 0.088 0.119 0.014
Clustered SEs yes yes yes
Notes: OLS estimates, robust SE clustered on center level in parentheses,
wild cluster bootstrapped 95% CIs accounting for small number of clusters
(centers) in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CiH*Present Bias High Fin. Lit. Interviewer 2 Large HH
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Figure A.2: Density of Selected Effects on Share Saved
Notes: LASSOplus using linear estimation and allowing for interactions with the CiH
dummy. Binary indicators (for above median value where applicable) included: Age,
education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money left, decision mak-
ing power, time to center, travel cost to center, narrow bracketing in both questions,
narrow bracketing in one question, risk aversion, loss aversion, present bias, future
bias, high savings balance, high deposit, regular deposit, equally-sized deposits as
well as type dummies and interviewer dummies.
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CiH*Present Bias High Fin. Lit. Interviewer 2 Large HH
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Figure A.3: Density of Selected Effects on Amount Saved
Notes: LASSOplus using linear estimation and allowing for interactions with the CiH
dummy. Binary indicators (for above median value where applicable) included: Age,
education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money left, decision mak-
ing power, time to center, travel cost to center, narrow bracketing in both questions,
narrow bracketing in one question, risk aversion, loss aversion, present bias, future
bias, high savings balance, high deposit, regular deposit, equally-sized deposit as well
as saver type dummies and interviewer dummies.
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Table A.5: Representativeness
Sample Mean
Non-Participant in
Sample Center
Non-Participant in
Non-Sample Center
R2 F-test
Savings balance ( P ) 782.7 -12.85 155.3 0.002 0.220
Loan amount ( P ) 21,551 -3,098*** -1,905 0.002 0.001
PPI score (0-100) 43.53 -0.0249 -2.195 0.002 0.505
Main income: Enterprise 0.831 0.0102 -0.0324 0.002 0.272
Electricity (y/n) 0.463 -0.0135 0.0828 0.006 0.159
Water (y/n) 0.159 0.0537 0.0567 0.001 0.133
Landline (y/n) 0.00676 -0.000652 0.00449 0.000 0.343
House size (0-2) 0.527 0.0468 0.0585 0.001 0.411
House strength (0-2) 0.591 0.0523 0.0907* 0.002 0.131
Membership (months) 49.03 -7.193** 3.567 0.005 0.018
Age 43.94 -1.211 0.570 0.003 0.011
N 300 819 3735
Notes: Mean of the sample and coefficients from OLS regressions (N= 4854) with dummies for non-
participants and non-sample centers as independent variables and clustered SE (not shown) at the
center level. The last column shows p-values of the F-test of joint significance of the non-participant
dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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a.2 additional manipulation checks
The manipulation check presented in Chapter 1 is further supported by Ta-
ble A.6 that shows the same effects plotted in Figure 1.1 in a regression analysis
of the mean effects.1
The coefficient on the treatment dummy CiH in Column (1) shows that
treated individuals report about 28 percent higher money today than in CA.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of a set control variables (Column (2)).
Column (3) shows that in terms of assets, both groups are the same. Since
this feeling of endowment might also be visible in other income questions,
Columns (2) and (3) of Table A.7 provide suggestive evidence that CiH influ-
ences reporting behavior more generally: For cash income, a variable that pools
all income that respondents report to receive in cash, the CiH dummy indicates
somewhat higher reports (p=0.13), whereas in terms of non-cash income, par-
ticipants appear to be the same (p=0.81).2 While this is only suggestive, the
tendency is also reflected in the differences in coefficient size and R2.
1 For regressions, I use log of money today as the variable is very skewed.
2 Given the relevance of cash, I ask for each income source how this income is received (in cash,
via check/ deposit or wire transfer). All these questions are asked in Part 1. For more details,
see also Appendix A.7.
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Table A.7: Manipulation Check: Other Income Measures
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Cash Income (ln) Non-Cash Income (ln) PPI Score
CiH 0.314 0.0853 0.367
(0.201) (0.351) (1.861)
[-0.0529-0.693] [-0.5778-0.740] [-3.141-3.920]
Constant 7.521*** 0.251 21.19**
(1.506) (1.925) (9.623)
[5.694-10.90] [-4.521-2.346] [5.675-39.79]
Observations 300 300 296
Adj. R2 0.205 0.111 0.121
Clustered SEs yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes
Notes: "Cash Income" ("Non-Cash Income’") comprises all income that the re-
spondent reports to receive in cash (other means of payment). OLS estimates,
robust SE clustered on center level in parentheses, wild cluster bootstrapped
95% CIs accounting for small number of clusters (centers) in brackets. Controls:
age, education, financial literacy, household size, business owner, money left,
decision making power, time to center, travel cost to center, interviewer FE. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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a.3 preference elicitation
To keep the decision as simple as possible, all preferences are elicited via mul-
tiple price lists (MPL).
Risk Aversion
The MPL for risk preferences asks participants to make nine choices between
a riskier and a safer option, similar to Holt and Laury (2002). To avoid safety
bias, both options are lotteries and for simplicity, the payoffs of the two lotter-
ies remain constant throughout all choices, such that lottery A is always the
less risky one. Only the probability of winning the larger amount increases in
both lotteries from 10 percent to 90 percent (see Table A.8). Each screen only
shows one lottery pair that is illustrated with two urns containing 10 differ-
ently colored balls (see Figure A.4 for an example).3
Table A.8: Risk Preference Choices
Screen Lottery A Lottery B E[A]-E[B]
1 10% P 150 90% P 100 10% P 250 90% P 10 71
2 20% P 150 80% P 100 20% P 250 80% P 10 52
3 30% P 150 70% P 100 30% P 250 70% P 10 33
4 40% P 150 60% P 100 40% P 250 60% P 10 14
5 50% P 150 50% P 100 50% P 250 50% P 10 -5
6 60% P 150 40% P 100 60% P 250 40% P 10 -24
7 70% P 150 30% P 100 70% P 250 30% P 10 -43
8 80% P 150 20% P 100 80% P 250 20% P 10 -62
9 90% P 150 10% P 100 90% P 250 10% P 10 -81
3 Only displaying one pair at a time reduces the concerns of respondents choosing the midpoint
in MPLs, see also (Harrison and Rutström, 2008).
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(a) Risk Screen 3 (b) Risk Screen 4
Figure A.4: Example Risk Elicitation
Loss Aversion
The MPL eliciting loss aversion is presented in a similar manner as the risk
elicitation task (see Figure A.5 for an example), similar to e.g. Liu et al. (2014).
Both lotteries consist of possible outcomes in the gain and the loss domain,
with lottery A always entailing a lower loss ( P 35) than lottery B ( P 40-65; see
Table A.9). In all choices, both lotteries keep the winning probability constant
at 50 percent and vary one of the possible outcomes.
Table A.9: Loss Aversion Chocies
Screen Lottery A Lottery B E[A]-E[B]
1 50% P 60 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -65 7.5
2 50% P 55 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -65 5
3 50% P 50 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -65 2.5
4 50% P 45 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -65 0
5 50% P 40 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -50 -10
6 50% P 40 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -45 -12.5
7 50% P 35 50% P -35 50% P 75 50% P -40 -17.5
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(a) Loss Screen 1 (b) Loss Screen 2
Figure A.5: Example Loss Elicitation
Time Preferences
Time preferences are elicited with MPLs presenting choices between a (smaller)
sooner and a (larger) later reward for three time horizons: Today vs. 2 weeks,
2 weeks vs. 4 weeks and today vs. 4 weeks.4 The sooner amount is always
P 50, whereas the later amount increases from P 40 to P 200 as shown in Ta-
ble A.10. To avoid differences in transaction costs for today’s vs. later options,
all earnings from the time preference elicitation were transferred as mobile
phone credit. Trust in payments was established by giving all participants a
certificate that listed their earnings from the time preference task, the date of
the transfer as the phone number of the head RA. Payments for the same day
were only made once the team had left the center to keep trust constant across
immediate and later choices.
4 This time span has been chosen to increase trust that the payment will be made as the research
team will come back to the center four weeks after the session. The span also lies within the
rage of other studies: for instance, Tanaka and Camerer (2006) vary the time span from three
days to three months and in Chapter 2, we use one month and two months.
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Table A.10: Time Preferences Choices
Choice Sooner Payment Later Payment
1 P 50 P 40
2 P 50 P 50
3 P 50 P 60
4 P 50 P 75
5 P 50 P 100
6 P 50 P 125
7 P 50 P 150
8 P 50 P 200
Blocks of preferences (risk, time I, time II, time III and loss) would appear
in random order, but without two blocks of time preference questions directly
following each other. For the first block containing lottery questions (either
risk or loss), the lottery urns were explained in detail and a test question was
asked to ensure understanding. In total, each participant made 9 risk choices,
7 loss choices and 24 time preference choices. With a 1/6 chance, participants
would receive the payouts from one randomly drawn experimental decision.
At the very end of the interview, participants rolled a die to determine whether
they would be paid. If eligible, they drew a card that indicated the choice
number for which they would be compensated. Lotteries were implemented
with colored chips and paid out in cash.5
Attention and Bracketing
In addition to these incentivized preference measures, I ask hypothetical ques-
tions as in Stango et al. (2017) in Part 3 of the interview to address atten-
tion and bracketing. Attention to finances is divided into one short and one
medium run question, whereas two bracketing questions ask participants to
make two lottery choices each (A vs. B and C vs. D) after jointly examining all
four payoffs. The two lotteries that should be considered jointly are displayed
5 There was no extra endowment for the preference elicitation part. The few participants who
lost money needed to pay this from their initial endowment ( P 300 or P 500).
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on the same screen using the same and thus familiar representation as in the
risk and loss preference elicitation (see Figure A.6 for an example). The two
bracketing question screens were separated by questions regarding the savings
stock and savings goals (see also Appendix A.9.2).
Figure A.6: Example Bracketing Question
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a.4 comparison of effect sizes
To put the magnitude of my minimal detectable effect (MDE) sizes into per-
spective, I compare them to related studies. Since stake sizes and decision
differ across studies, I calculate Cohen’s d
d =
m1 −m2
σ
(1)
where m1(2) is the mean of the treatment (control) group and σ is the pooled
standard deviation,
σ =
√
(σ21 + σ
2
2/2. (2)
Most studies in the endowment effect literature focus on the ratio m1/m2
or WTA/WTP, but for the comparison with my experiment, the difference
between the two means provides a better benchmark.6 Taking the MDE of 10
percentage points in mean shares saved into account, I set the effect size in
the treatment group to 0.32 and assume that the SD would be the same as the
observed one. In Table A.11, I include all endowment effect studies (excluding
surveys) cited in this paper that provide the necessary information to calculate
Cohen’s d.
6 Comparing the savings decision in absolute terms naturally comes with a larger SD than the
other studies. Scaling the ratio of control and treatment with the large SD would thus result in
very small MDEs by construction.
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Table A.11: Comparison of Effect Sizes in Endowment Effect Experiments
Control (WTP) Treatment (WTA)
Comparison Mean SD N Mean SD N Cohen’s d
Svirsky (2014) Money holding in baseline and money 6.56 2.17 21 5.43 2.53 18 -2.10
Money holding in money and chocolate 4.55 3.07 40 5.43 2.53 18 1.62
Bateman et al. (2005) WTA/WTP chocolate with money 4.66 2.82 40 9.95 4.58 40 8.80**
WTP and equivalent gain, chocolate with money 4.66 2.82 40 8.17 5.05 40 5.43**
Morewedge et al. (2009) Owner-buyers vs. nonowner-pair buyers 2.22 1.7 22 4.52 2.8 22 4.66**
Plott and Zeiler (2005) Replication of Kahneman et al. (1990) 1.74 1.46 29 4.72 2.17 29 8.68***
Pooled data from WTA/WTP mugs 6.62 4.2 36 5.56 3.58 38 -1.65
Isoni et al. (2011) Replication Plott and Zeiler (2005) (Panel B) 3.70 1.53 33 2.75 1.76 33 -1.11
WTA/WTP for large stakes lottery (Panel C) 4.86 1.59 36 4.81 1.48 36 3.71***
Bushong et al. (2010) Bid in picture vs. real 0.71 0.53 17 1.13 0.61 20 3.17***
Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) Those with always mug to those who receive it later 4.32 0.41 37 5.26 0.39 48 15.14*
Those with always mug to those who had it 3.36 0.27 34 5.26 0.39 48 36.86
This study Share saved in CiH vs. CA 0.42 0.30 150 0.32 0.31 150 4.02
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance of the treatment difference as tested in the paper.
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a.5 classification of saver types
Types of savers are classified along three dimensions that reflect different as-
pects of savings behavior: First, making regular or irregular deposits, deposit-
ing large or small amounts and depositing equally-sized or variable amounts.
Data come from all centers of the three study branches and comprises weekly
deposits (and withdrawals) of savings, starting from July 2016 up to and in-
cluding the week in which the first announcement letters were sent (the last
day included is February 17, 2017).7 This leaves me with 4749 clients (300 sam-
ple clients, 676 clients from the same centers, but not participating and 3773
clients from different centers).8
Regular deposits averages the number of positive net deposits (deposits - with-
drawals) within each client and compares this average to the median value of
all clients’ averages. The dummy variable regular deposits equals one if a given
client’s average is the same or above the median value of making positive de-
posits in 84.4 percent of weeks.
Large deposits indicates above median deposit sizes ( P 33.13). In this calcu-
lation, I only include positive net deposits to avoid the influence of weeks in
which no deposit was made or money was withdrawn, as no (or negative)
deposit is already accounted for in regular deposits.
Equally-sized deposits indicates a below median value of the deposit variance
to average deposit ratio (1.03).9 The variance is standardized with the average
7 Excluding all later sessions prevents any spill-over effects from the experiment on subsequent
savings behavior. In addition, using deposits rather than the savings stock accounts better for
behavior than the stock as the latter is highly correlated with membership length.
8 Some clients joint later than July 2016, for them, fewer weekly observations are available. To
account for this, I use within-client averages before computing median values.
9 An alternative measure would be to count the number of weeks in which the same amount was
deposited as in the previous week.
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deposit to take care of the size of deposits, which is already measured in large
deposits.
Table A.12: Saver Types
% in Sample % in same Center % in same Branches
N=300 N=676 N=3773
Irregular-small-variable 9.67 10.65 7.05
Irregular-small-equal 13.00 10.80 12.24
Irregular-large-variable 11.00 20.27 20.91
Irregular-large-equal 12.67 9.17 7.34
Regular-small-variable 12.00 12.13 11.77
Regular-small-equal 12.00 13.02 18.37
Regular-large-variable 12.67 9.76 11.93
Regular-large-equal 17.00 14.20 10.39
Notes: Regular vs. irregular deposits; small vs. large deposits; equally-sized vs.
variable deposits (all based on median sample splits). "Sample" comprises all in-
terviewees, "in same Center" are non-participants in sample centers and "in same
Branches" are non-sample centers in the study branches.
Table A.13: Balance of Saver Types in Experimental Sample
CA300 CiH300 CA500 CiH500 R2 F-test
Saver Types
Regular deposit 0.452 0.110* 0.119 -0.123 0.009 0.331
High deposit 0.479 0.0411 0.0660 -0.00213 0.006 0.606
Equally sized deposits 0.589 -0.0685 -0.0566 0.0815 0.003 0.833
Irregular-small-variable 0.178 -0.0959** -0.113 0.0959* 0.025 0.133
Irregular-small-equal 0.178 -0.0548 -0.0742 0.0678 0.007 0.430
Irregular-large-variable 0.0548 0.0822 0.0621 -0.0692 0.011 0.313
Irregular-large-equal 0.137 -0.0411 0.00587 0.0281 0.003 0.795
Regular-small-variable 0.0822 0.0274 0.0737 -0.0534 0.007 0.657
Regular-small-equal 0.0822 0.0822 0.0477 -0.108 0.009 0.408
Regular-large-variable 0.0959 0.0548 0.0340 -0.0548 0.003 0.777
Regular-large-equal 0.192 -0.0548 -0.0359 0.0938 0.004 0.631
Notes: Mean of the CA300 group and coefficients from OLS regressions with treat-
ment dummies as independent variables and clustered SE (not shown) at the center
level. The last column shows p-values of the F-test of joint significance of the treat-
ment dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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a.6 reliability of survey responses
The reliability of partipants’ responses during the interview ("interview data")
can be evaluated based on administrative data that cover savings, characteris-
tics of the person (e.g. age) and the house (e.g. connected to running water).
While reports of age in the administrative and the interview data should be
highly correlated, the correlation might be weaker for savings reports due to
e.g. inattention or social concerns when reporting. Indeed, as Table A.14 shows,
age is nearly perfectly correlated in self-reported and administrative data. Re-
ports of savings in the account (interview data) are also positively correlated
with actual savings (administrative data). Being composed of ten questions
regarding household wealth, the PPI score from the administrative data is
comparable to the asset index in the interview data and the two are positively
correlated. Comparing single questions that are part of both indices, however,
I find significantly higher asset possessions in the interview data (electricity,
running water and landline phones).10 Overall, it seems that participants re-
spond consistently regarding the most important aspects of this study.
Table A.14: Correlation of Self-Reported and Administrative Data
Self-reported Data Administrative Data Correlation
Savings balance 767.4 (1494) 790.3 (1230) 0.734***
Total savings/savings balance ( P ) 6108.7 (11175) 790.3 (1230) 0.454***
Age 43.57 (12.35) 43.94 (12.31) 0.979***
Assets/PPI score 0.486 (0.166) 43.53 (19.65) 0.370***
Electricity 0.95 (0.218) 0.468 (0.499) 0.047
Landline 0.056 (0.232) 0.00676 (0.082) -0.020
Water 0.69 (0.463) 0.158 (0.366) 0.072
Notes: Means of raw data, SD in parentheses and Spearman’s ρ. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
10 This could either be due to at least two reasons. First, living conditions might have improved
since that the administrative data was last collected. Second, participants might underreport
their assets via-à-vis the MFI in order to appear "needy". In theory, the organization committed
to only serving the very poor as assessed by a progression out of poverty index. However, from
discussions with the management, it appears that this rule is not strictly enforced, especially
once the member has been accepted as a borrower.
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a.7 description of variables
Variables from the interview
• Part 1
– Cash income: Sum of all income that respondents report to receive
in cash, measured in P . This can include business income, farm in-
come, labor wages, pension, remittances, government aid and other
income.
– Non-cash income: Sum of all income that respondents report to re-
ceive in means other than cash (e.g. transfer, check), measured in P .
This can include business income, farm income, labor wages, pen-
sion, remittances, government aid and other income.
– Money today: Answer to "All in all, how much money will you per-
sonally be able to take home at the end of today?", measured in
P .
– Assets: Equally weighted index ranging from zero to one and indi-
cating whether the household has the following: electricity, running
water, radio, television, landline telephone, mobile phone, personal
computer, refrigerator, washing machine, CD/DVD player, bicycle,
motorcycle and animal-drawn cart.
– Decision making power: Similar to Ashraf et al. (2010), eight ques-
tions are asked regarding "who decides" in the following situations:
What to buy at the market, making expensive purchases, giving as-
sistance to family members, recreational use of money, personal use
of money, saving, number of children, schooling of children. If the
husband decides, the item takes the value of zero, one if it is a joint
decision and two if the respondent decides herself. An index is con-
structed by using the equally weighted mean of all answers.
– Education: Indicates the level of education completed. Ranging from
zero (no formal education) to eleven (beyond high school educa-
tion).
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– Household size: Number of persons living in the household.
– Business owner: Indicator variable taking the value one if the respon-
dent runs her own business.
– Time to center: Travel time to center in minutes.
– Travel cost to center: Amount in P that is spent one-way to attend the
center meeting.
• Part 2
– Present bias: Indicator variable taking the value one if choices in the
present (today vs. 2 weeks) are less patient than in the future (in 2
weeks vs. 4 weeks).
– Future bias: Indicator variable taking the value one if choices in the
present (today vs. 2 weeks) are more patient than in the future (in 2
weeks vs. 4 weeks).
– Risk aversion: Index scaled on the interval [0,1] with higher values
indicating higher risk aversion (higher risk aversion implies later
switches from lottery A to B).
– Loss aversion: Index scaled on the interval [0,1] with higher values
indicating higher loss aversion (higher loss aversion implies later
switches from lottery A to B).
• Part 3
– Money left: "Does your household have money left over at the end
of the week after you have paid for food and other necessities?"
encoded as follows: 1-yes, regularly; 2-yes, sometimes; 3-no
– Attention to finances: Two questions from Stango et al. (2017) whether
finances would improve with more attention given to a) day-to-
day finances, routine expenses such as food (short-run attention)
and b) medium-run finances, periodic expenses such as school fees
(medium-run attention). Binary indicators are constructed for short-
run attention and medium-run attention that are one if the house-
hold is paying attention to the respective finances.
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– Financial literacy: Equally weighted index of correctly answered fi-
nancial literacy questions (Questions 1, 2, 3 and 6 from the World
Bank’s Financial Literacy Quiz), scaled to the interval [0,1].
– Narrow bracketing: Two questions adapted from Stango et al. (2017)
that are coded as two indicator variables: "bracketing some" indi-
cates narrow bracketing in at least one question and "bracketing
both" indicates narrow bracketing in both questions.
– Total savings: Sum of the following variables (all measured in P ):
savings at home, savings with the family, formal savings, saving by
lending money, savings in the savings account, savings in the cur-
rent account (money that remains because the loan has not yet been
fully spent) and savings at cooperatives and other organizations.
– Savings in ASHI are safe*: Agreement to "Saving at ASHI is not safe".
– Banks untrustworthy*: Agreement to "Banks cannot be trusted".
– Would like private account*: Agreement to "I wish I had a savings
account where I could hide my money from others".
– Saving less due to...*:
* ...claims from husband: Agreement to "I would save more but my
husband needs the money."
* ...claims from family & friends: Agreement to "If I save, I will only
end up giving the money to my family and friends."
* ...claims from clients: Agreement to "If I have savings with ASHI,
I will need to spend it on abonohan [in-lieu payments] for oth-
ers."
* ...being over optimistic regarding saving: Agreement to "I always
think I would save the next week, but then I keep postponing
it."
* denotes a five-point likert scale agreement to a specific question. All answers
have been recoded such that higher values represent higher agreement and lie
in the interval [0,1].
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Variables from administrative data
• PPI score: Ten questions that are being asked when applying for a new
loan, e.g. "Do all children in the family of ages six to 14 go to school?"
Answers are converted into points (e.g. no-0, yes-2, no children in this
age range-4) and all points are added. The total score lies between zero
and 100. Country-specific tables allow mapping the score to a probability
of falling below a given poverty line. For instance, a PPI score of 47.5
(sample mean) indicates a 27 percent chance of being below the US$
2.50/day/2005 PPP poverty line and a 77 percent chance of living with
less than US$ 3.75 per day in 2005 PPP.
• Main income: Enterprise: Is an indicator variable that takes the value one if
the main income source is an enterprise. Other income sources registered
in the data are employment, farming and fishing.
• House size: is encoded as follows: 0-small, 1-medium, 2-large.
• House strength: is encoded as follows: 0-poor, 1-medium, 2-strong.
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Figure A.7: Study Area
 
 
 
CHAIR FOR BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
LMU · Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1 · 80539 Munich · Germany   
 
    
   Munich, February 1, 2017 
           
 
 
Dear ASHI member, 
 
You are cordially invited to take part in a survey on household finances.  
 
We are a team of independent researchers from the University of Munich in Germany and 
we would like to learn more about your needs and the way you use microfinance products. 
As a member of ASHI, you can provide us with valuable information that might help improve 
existing microfinance products. 
 
We would like to interview several members of ASHI individually. The involvement in the 
interview will require about 30 minutes and interviews will be in Tagalog. Interview 
participants will receive at least 300 pesos as a token of appreciation and every member of 
the center has the same chance to participate in an interview. 
 
The interviews will take place during the center meeting on [DATE] and all answers will be 
treated confidentially, i.e. we will not share your answers with ASHI. All interviews will be 
conducted in private by the team of independent researchers. 
 
We would be very happy if many of you were interested in taking part in the survey and 
came to the center meeting on that day. 
 
I am looking forward to meet you soon.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Lisa Spantig 
Researcher at the University of Munich, Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lisa Spantig, M.Sc. 
 
Telephone +49 (0)89 2180-9793 
 
 
lisa.spantig@econ.lmu.de  
 
 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München 
Chair for Behavioral and 
Experimental Economics 
Giselastr. 10 
D-80802 Munich 
GERMANY 
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a.9 instructions
a.9.1 Announcement Letter
The announcement letter was distributed via the loan officer one week before
the session. The loan officer announced the visit and each member received
her individual copy.
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a.9.2 Interview Questionnaire
The survey was implemented in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and run on tablets.
The formatted questionnaire thus only serves to display all questions in this
document. Before each interview, I set the parameter of the zTree program
such that all instructions would be shown according to the pre-determined
treatment allocation. This enabled all surveyors to interview in both CiH and
CA treatments without confusion, as the program would give detailed instruc-
tions on what to do and when.
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Oral Informed Consent (survey) 
My name is _______ and I work with a research team from the University of Munich in Germany. 
The University of Munich is a public university and one of the leading research universities in 
Europe.  
1. Purpose: We are conducting a research study to learn about financial products in 
Laguna province, Philippines. The purpose of this study is to better understand how 
people manage their household finances and what could help them to make 
managing household finances easier. We will put the collected information you give us 
to good use for improving existing microfinance products as best as possible. 
2. Invitation and Procedures: I’d like to ask you some questions about your financial 
experiences. We anticipate that your involvement will require about 30 mins. 
3. Compensation: As a small token of appreciation, you will receive 300/500 pesos.  
4. Confidentiality: All of your responses will be kept confidential. Only the university 
researchers involved in this study and those responsible for research oversight will have 
access to all the information you provide.  
5. Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to 
decline to participate, to end participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to 
answer any individual question without penalty or loss of compensation. We will still give 
you the 300/500 pesos even if you don’t want to answer some questions. However, if you 
decide to terminate the interview early, we might not be able to give you the money. 
6. Contact: If you have any questions or concerns about this study, you may contact the 
researcher Lisa Spantig 09952305531. 
7. Agreement to Participate: By agreeing to participate, you agree that all information 
which you voluntarily share may be used purely for research purposes by the research 
team or other researchers. This includes financial information you provide and 
information that ASHI shares with us. All data is confidential and none of the information 
you provide will be used in connection with your name. Your decision to participate 
does not affect your ASHI membership in any way, because we do not work for ASHI. We 
are independent researchers. 
 
Are you willing to participate? ____YES 
 ____NO 
 
IF NO: You decided not to participate. If you decide to confirm this choice we will not ask you 
any questions, but you will also not receive the participation fee. What will be your decision? 
IF YES: Thank you for agreeing to participate. 
TREATMENT: You will receive the 300/500 pesos for your participation now. [COUNT THE MONEY AND 
HAND IT OVER].  
V0: WHERE DID THE PARTICIPANT PUT THE MONEY? IN HER POCKET; 2 – IN HER BAG/PURSE; 3 – 
KEEPS IT IN HER HAND, 4 – OTHER, SPECIFY: ____. 
CONTROL: You will receive the 300/500 pesos for your participation later during the survey. 
Let’s start with the survey. Most of the questions can be answered with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ and you do 
not need to give an explanation. 
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I1. What is your name? [FIRST, MIDDLE, LAST] _______________________________________ 
I2. Did you receive an announcement letter that this interview would take place?  
1 Yes 2 No 
 
I3. Are you single, married/living with partner, separated or widowed? 
1 Single 2 Married/living with partner 
3 Separated/divorced 4 Widowed 
5 DON´T READ: REFUSED   
 
I4. How many persons including yourself live in your household? (exclude guests, visitors, 
household members who do not sleep at home at least once a week) _________________________ 
 
I5. How many persons in your household including yourself earn money? ___________________ 
I6. How many persons in your household are currently attending school? ___________________ 
The following questions are about yourself. 
I7. How old are you? ___________________ 
I8. What is the highest formal education level you have completed? ___________________ 
Education codes 
0 No schooling 1 Grade 1 2 Grade 2 3 Grade 3 4 Grade 4 
5 Grade 5 6 Elementary 
Graduate 
7 High school 1 8 High school 2 9 High school 
3 
10 High school 4 11 High school 
graduate 
12 Vocational 
Incomplete 
13 Vocational 
Complete 
14 Some 
College 
15 College 
graduate or 
higher 
    
 
 
1 Government official 2 Professional or technical (non-
production) 
3 Administrative or clerical (public) 4 Administrative or clerical (private) 
5 Sari-sari store owner 6 Tricycle, jeepney, taxi, or other transport 
7 Farmers, fisherman, hunters, loggers and 
related workers 
8 Miners, quarrymen and related workers 
9 Craftsman or production-process 10 Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
11 Wage laborers 12 Entrepreneur  
(>5 employees): Service 
13 Entrepreneur  
(>5 employees): Buy/Sell 
14 Microentrepreneur  
(>5 employees): Service 
15 Microentrepreneur  
(>5 employees): Buy/Sell 
16 Retired personnel  
(GO & private org) 
17 Houseworker (without wage), student 
unemployed 
 
18 Other 
19 No household income at all  
Survey 
 
 
I - Identification  
 
H - Household income 
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H1. What is your household’s main source of income? [SOURCE THAT GIVES THE MOST INCOME] 
 
H2a.Please let me know, does your household have any income from the following sources? 
1 Yes 2 No 
 
Net business income  
Farm income  
Labor wages  
Pension  
Remittances  
Government aid/income subsidy  
Rental  
Other income source (specify)  
 
[IF H2a = YES, PROCEED WITH H2b FOR THIS CATEGORY] 
 
 H2b. Amount H2c. Time unit 
1 – Daily 
2 – Weekly 
3 – Monthly 
4 – Other 
specify 
H2d. How is this 
income 
received? 
1  – Cash 
2  – Check 
3  – Deposit  
4  – Other, 
specify 
H2e. Is it easy to 
estimate how 
much income 
you will receive 
in the next 
month? 
1 – Yes 
2 – No 
3 – DON´T READ: 
DON´T KNOW 
4 – DON´T READ: 
REFUSED                                                                                    
Net business 
income 
    
Farm income     
Labor wages     
Pension     
Remittances     
Government 
aid/income 
subsidy 
    
Rental     
Other income 
source (specify) 
    
 
 
H3a. This next question is about household budgets. A household budget is used to decide what 
        share of your household income will be used for spending, saving or paying bills.  
        Does your household have a budget?     
1 Yes 2 No 
 
H3b. [If H3a. = yes]: Do you usually stick to the budget? 
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
H4. All in all, how much money will you personally be able to take home at the end of today? 
___________________ 
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Now I`ll ask you some questions about your expenses.  
 
E1. About how much did you and your household spend on everything in the last 7 days? Please 
      think about all bills such as rent, loan payments, utility and other bills, as well as all expenses 
      such as food, clothing, transportation and any other expenses you and your household may 
      have. _________________ pesos 
 
E2. In a typical week, how much of your own money do you spend food and beverages? 
      _________________ pesos 
 
E3. In a typical week, how much of your own money do you spend on non-food items such as  
      personal products, cleaning products or textiles? _________________ pesos 
 
E4. In a typical month, how much of your own money do you spend on bills? 
      _________________pesos  
 
E5. In a typical month, how much of your own money do you spend on medicine and medical    
      equipment? _________________ pesos 
 
E6. In a typical month, how much of your own money do you spend on education? 
      _________________ pesos 
 
E7. During the last week, how much of your own money did you spend on something and 
      afterwards regretted spending the money? _________________ pesos 
 
E8. Which ONE of the following best describes the extent to which you personally monitor your 
      regular expenses? [READ OUT ALL OPTIONS] 
 
1 I don't keep an eye on expenses at all  2 I keep my eye on expenses a bit 
3 Without keeping written records, I 
keep a fairly close eye on expenses 
4 I use written records to keep a close eye 
on expenses 
5 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
  
 
A1. Please let me know whether your household has the following  
 
1 Yes 2 No 
 
 
 
A1a. Electricity  A1h. Refrigerator/freezer   
A1b. Running water  A1i. Washing machine  
A1c. Radio/radio cassette  A1j. CD or VCD or DVD player  
A1d. Television  A1k. Bicycle or trisikad/pedicab  
A1e. Landline telephone  A1l. Motorcycle or tricycle  
A1f. Cellular phone  A1m. Animal-drawn cart/sledge  
A1g. Personal computer or 
laptop 
   
 
 
 
E - EXPENDITURES 
A - Assets 
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A2. Who in the household makes the following decisions, you, your husband/partner or you and 
your husband/partner jointly?  
0 Husband 1 Joint 
2 Self 4 Others make the decision 
 
A2a. What to buy at the market  
A2b. Whether to make an expensive purchase such as TV  
A2c. Whether to give assistance to family members  
A2d. The recreational use of money  
A2e. How the money you personally earned will be used  
A2f. Put money aside for savings  
A2g. Number of children  
A2h. Schooling of children  
 
 
 
 
I will now ask you some questions regarding your own business.  
 
O1. Do you currently run your own business? [IF NO -> SKIP TO NEXT SECTION] 
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
O2a. Do you plan your business cash flow?   
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
O2b. IF O2a=yes: On which basis do you plan your business cash flow? 
1 Daily 2 Weekly 
3 Bi-weekly 4 Monthly 
5 Bi-monthly 6 I don’t plan 
7 Other, specify: 8 DON´T READ: REFUSED 
 
 
O3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
      1 strongly agree, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree     
      [SHOW SCALE] 
 
O3a. It is easy to plan how much money I can make in one week from my business. [USE SCALE] 
 
O3b. What do you think: How high will your personal gross business income in the next week be? 
 
O3c. It is easy to plan how much money I will need to spend on my business in one week. [USE    
         SCALE] 
 
O3d. What do you think: During the next week, how high will the expenditures for your business  
          be? _________________ pesos 
 
O4. How much cash do you typically need to hold for your business to run smoothly? For  
       example, if you have a sari-sari store, how much money do you need to hold?  
       _____________ pesos 
 
O - Own business 
148 appendix to chapter 1
Page 6 of 15 
 
 
Now, I have some very general questions for you. 
M1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be  
       very careful in dealing with people? [READ OUT OPTIONS AND ENTER 1 OR 2] 
1 Most people can be trusted 2 Need to be very careful 
 
M2. How long does it take you to get to the ASHI center meeting? (one-way, in minutes) 
       ____________________ minutes 
M3. How much does it cost you (e.g. fares) to get to the ASHI center meeting?  
       (one-way, in Peso) ___________________ pesos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M - Misc 
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TREATMENT: For participation in this survey, you have received 300/500 pesos. If you decide 
to save some of this money now in your ASHI personal savings account and the amount you 
deposited today is still in your account in four weeks’ time, I will add 20% of this amount to 
your savings account. For example, if you decide to save 100 pesos and in four weeks you 
still have at least 100 pesos in your savings account, I will add 20 pesos in four weeks’ time to 
your account. This additional payment is guaranteed and you will receive this confirmation 
[SHOW CONFIRMATION SHEET]. If, instead, there is less than the 100 pesos you decided to save 
today in your savings account in four weeks, I will add nothing to your savings account. If 
you want to save some money, you hand it to me and I will put it in this envelope and seal 
the envelope. We will give the envelope to the DO still during the center meeting once we 
have finished all interviews. You can save any amount you want between 0 and 300 pesos 
in multiples of 1 peso. 
You keep all the money that you do not want to save. Do you have any questions? [IF YES, 
CLARIFY]. Please now hand me the money you want to save. [DO NOT PRESSURE HER TO GIVE YOU 
ANY MONEY. IF THE NANAY OFFERS YOU SOME MONEY, COUNT IT AND PLACE IT IN THE ENVELOPE, WRITE HER NAME 
ON THE ENVELOPE. NOTE THE AMOUNT SAVED ON THE SCREEN. IF SHE DECIDED TO SAVE: FILL IN ONE 
CONFIRMATION SHEET] 
D: Amount Saved: _________________ 
   20 peso bills: __________ 
   50 peso bills: __________ 
   100 peso bills: ___________ 
 
CONTROL: For participation in this survey, you will receive 300/500 pesos. If you decide to 
save some of this money now in your ASHI personal savings account and the amount you 
deposited today is still in your account in four weeks’ time, I will add 20% of this amount to 
your savings account. For example, if you decide to save 100 pesos and in four weeks you 
still have at least 100 pesos in your savings account, I will add 20 pesos in four weeks’ time to 
your account. If, instead, there is less than the 100 pesos you decided to save today in your 
savings account in four weeks, I will add nothing to your savings account. The additional 
payment after four weeks is guaranteed, you will receive this written confirmation [SHOW 
CONFIRMATION SHEET]. If you want to save some money, I will put it in this envelope and seal the 
envelope. We will give the envelope to the DO still during the center meeting once we 
have finished all interviews. You can save any amount you want between 0 and 300 pesos 
in multiples of 1 peso. 
I will give you all the money that you do not want to save after preparing the envelope. Do 
you have any questions? [IF YES, CLARIFY] Please now tell me whether and if yes, how much 
money you want to save. [TAKE OUT ALL THE CASH, COUNT IT, PLACE THE SUM THE NANAY WANTED TO SAVE 
IN THE ENVELOPE, WRITE HER NAME ON THE ENVELOPE AND HAND THE REST OF THE MONEY TO HER. NOTE THE 
AMOUNT SAVED ON THE SCREEN. IF SHE DECIDED TO SAVE: FILL IN ONE CONFIRMATION SHEET] 
D: Amount Saved: _________________ 
 
  
D - Decision 
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The following set of questions form part of a game in which you can earn additional money. 
Approximately 1 out of 6 people will actually be paid for one of these questions at the end of 
the interview. We will make a lucky draw at the end of the survey to determine whom of the 
participants will be paid. You don’t know whether you will be one of the lucky ones and 
which question you might be paid for. Therefore, you should make all of your choices as if you 
are going to get each reward. So please really think about which reward you prefer for each 
question. 
The following questions will ask you whether you want P50 now, or a different amount of 
money in two weeks. All amounts will be paid with mobile phone load. If you are paid, we will 
record your mobile phone number at the end of the survey. If you don’t have a mobile 
phone, you can give us the number of a family member or friend.  
If a question is selected where you chose P50 now, then we will transfer P50 of load today. If a 
question is selected where you choose an amount in 2 weeks, then we will transfer that 
amount in 2 weeks. This payment is guaranteed. We will also give you a paper voucher 
(SHOW VOUCHER) which states your name, the amount, and the date when we send the 
load. We will also give you a number you can contact if your phone number changes. Do 
you have any questions on this before I start? 
[INSTRUCTORS: 
- ASK EACH QUESTION SEPARATELY. LET THEM THINK ABOUT EACH ONE. 
- DO NOT SHORTEN OR ABBREVIATE THE QUESTIONS IN ANY WAY 
- AVOID SWITCHING BACK AND FORTH. IF RESPONDENT SWITCHES BACK AND FORTH; CHECK 
THEY UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTION.] 
Which option do you prefer? 
1 Now 2 Later 
 
Ex1a. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P40 pesos in 2 weeks?     
Ex1b. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P50 pesos in 2 weeks?     
Ex1c. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P60 pesos in 2 weeks?     
Ex1d. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P75 pesos in 2 weeks?     
Ex1e. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P100 pesos in 2 weeks?    
Ex1f.  Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P125 pesos in 2 weeks?    
Ex1g. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P150 pesos in 2 weeks?   
Ex1h. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P200 pesos in 2 weeks?    
 
I will now ask you to compare different kinds of lotteries. There will always be a lottery A and a 
lottery B. If you decide to play lottery A and this question is selected, we will actually play 
lottery A and you will win the money from that lottery. All lotteries can be selected for 
payment, so think hard about which lottery you prefer.  
Let me give you an example of such a lottery. Here, you can see one lottery A. Each lottery 
will consist of 10 balls and balls can be of two different colors and of different value. Here, we 
have three yellow balls, that are each worth 100 pesos and seven red balls worth 50 pesos. 
So, the chance of winning 100 pesos is three in ten and the chance of winning 50 pesos is 
seven in ten. If this question is selected for payment and you want to play lottery A, then we 
will draw one ball from an opaque bag. If it is yellow, you will receive 100 pesos, if the ball is 
red, you will receive 50 pesos. Do you have any questions? 
Now let's compare the first two lotteries. This is only for practice and there will be no payment 
for this comparison. Lottery A has a three in ten chance of winning 100 pesos and a seven in 
ten chance of winning 50 pesos. Lottery B has a five in ten chance of winning 100 pesos and 
a five in ten chance of winning 50 pesos. 
 
 
 
PART 2: Experimental Preference  
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Ex2a. Which lottery do you prefer?  A or  B 
Now let's compare the first two lotteries that you may play at the end of the survey. Here, there 
is no right or wrong. 
Lottery A has a one in ten chance of winning 150 pesos and a nine in ten chance of winning 
100 pesos. Lottery B has a one in ten chance of winning 250 pesos and a nine in ten chance of 
winning 10 pesos. 
Ex2b. Which lottery do you prefer?  A or  B 
Now chances for winning the high price increase in both lotteries. 
Lottery A has a two in ten chance of winning 150 pesos and an eight in ten chance of winning 
100 pesos. Lottery B has a two in ten chance of winning 250 pesos and an eight in ten chance 
of 10 pesos. 
Ex2c. Which lottery do you prefer?  A or  B 
[CONTINUES UNTIL CHANCE OF WINNING THE HIGH AMOUNT IS 9 IN 10] 
The following questions ask you to choose between 50 pesos now, and a different amount in 4 
weeks from now. As before, you might get paid for one of these questions in load. The 
payment is guaranteed. So please really think about which reward you prefer for each 
question.  
1 Now 2 Later 
 
Ex3a. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P40 pesos in 4 weeks?    
Ex3b. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P50 pesos in 4 weeks?    
Ex3c. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P60 pesos in 4 weeks?     
Ex3d. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P75 pesos in 4 weeks?    
Ex3e. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P100 pesos in 4 weeks?    
Ex3f.  Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P125 pesos in 4 weeks?   
Ex3g. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P150 pesos in 4 weeks?   
Ex3h. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed today or P200 pesos in 4 weeks?  
 
I will now ask you whether you are willing to play different kinds of lotteries. In each lottery, you 
can lose some money or you can win some money. If you decide for lottery A and this question 
is selected, we will play lottery A. If you win a lottery, I will give you the additional money. If you 
lose a lottery, I will ask you to pay for it from your participation fee. All lotteries can be selected 
for payment, so think hard which one you prefer.  
Now let's compare the first two lotteries that you may play at the end of the survey. Again, 
there is no right or wrong. 
Lottery A has a five in ten chance of winning 60 pesos and a five in ten chance of losing 35 
pesos. Lottery B has a five in ten chance of winning 75 pesos and a five in ten chance of losing 
65 pesos. 
 
 
 
 
Ex4a. Which lottery do you prefer?  A or  B 
Now the amounts that you can win or lose change. Chances stay the same as before. 
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Lottery A has a five in ten chance of winning 55 pesos and a five in ten chance of losing 35 
pesos. Lottery B has a five in ten chance of winning 75 pesos and a five in ten chance of losing 
65 pesos. 
Ex4b. Which lottery do you prefer?  A or  B 
 [CONTINUES WITH  
- LOTTERY A: +50, -35; LOTTERY B: +75, -65 
- LOTTERY A: +45, -35; LOTTERY B: +75, -65 
- LOTTERY A: +40, -35; LOTTERY B: +75, -50 
- LOTTERY A: +40, -35; LOTTERY B: +75, -45 
- LOTTERY A: +35, -35; LOTTERY B: +75, -40] 
The following questions ask you to choose between 50 pesos in two weeks from now, and a 
different amount in 4 weeks from now. As before, you might get paid for one of these questions 
in load. The payment is guaranteed. So please really think about which reward you prefer for 
each question. 
Which option do you prefer? 
2 Weeks 4 Weeks 
 
Ex5a. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P40 pesos in 4 weeks?  
Ex5b. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P50 pesos in 4 weeks?     
Ex5c. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P60 pesos in 4 weeks?    
Ex5d. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P75 pesos in 4 weeks?  
Ex5e. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P100 pesos in 4 weeks?   
Ex5f.  Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P125 pesos in 4 weeks?   
Ex5g. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P150 pesos in 4 weeks?    
Ex5h. Do you prefer P50 guaranteed in 2 weeks or P200 pesos in 4 weeks?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
I will now ask you some questions about your household's finances, whether you sometimes 
encounter difficulties and how you deal with them. 
 
EM1a. Does your household have money left over at the end of the week after you have paid  
           for food and other necessities?   
1 Yes, regularly   2 Yes, sometimes  
3 No 4 DON´T READ: REFUSED 
 
EM1b. IF YES: What does your household do with this left over money? [DON`T READ; MAX. 3  
           ENTER 1-3 IN ORDER OF MENTIONING] 
1 Spend on utility bills 2 Spend on food 
3 Spend on school fees 4 Spend on treats (sweets, Jollibee, toys) 
5 Spend on appliances 6 Lend to relative 
7 Lend to friend 8 Lend to neighbor 
9 Donate to relative/friend/neighbor 10 Invest in business 
11 Pay off loan 12 Save at home 
13 Save in ASHI 14 Save in institution (other than ASHI) 
15 Other, specify:   
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EM2. Does your household ever run short of money for food or other necessary items? 
1 Yes, regularly   2 Yes, sometimes  
3 Seldom 4 No 
5 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
EM3a. Do you believe that your household's day-to-day finances' (dealing with routine expenses  
           for example for food and other necessities, loan repayment, school allowance,  
           transportation etc.) would improve if your household paid more attention to them? [READ  
              OUT ANSWER POSSIBILITIES] 
1  Yes, and I/we often regret not paying 
greater attention 
2 Yes, but paying more attention would require 
too much time/effort  
3 No, my household finances are set up so 
that they don't require much attention 
4 No, my household is already very attentive to 
these matters 
 
EM3b. Do you believe that your household's medium-run finances' (dealing with periodic  
           expenses like house repair, school fees etc.) would improve if your household paid more  
           attention to them? 
1  Yes, and I/we often regret not paying 
greater attention 
2 Yes, but paying more attention would require 
too much time/effort  
3 No, my household finances are set up so 
that they don't require much attention 
4 No, my household is already very attentive to 
these matters 
 
 
 
I will now ask you about different hypothetical situations and what you would do in these 
situations.  
Q1. Imagine you have 3000php in cash. What would you do with the money? [DON`T READ;  
       MAX. 3 ORDER 1-3 IN ORDER OF MENTIONING] 
1 Spend on utility bills 2 Spend on school fees 
3 Spend on food 4 Spend on treats (sweets, Jollibee, toys) 
5 Spend on appliances 6 Lend to relative 
7 Lend to friend 8 Lend to neighbor 
9 Donate to relative/friend/neighbor 10 Invest in business 
11 Pay off loan 12 Save at home 
13 Save in ASHI 14 Save in institution (other than ASHI) 
15 Other, specify:   
 
Q2. I will now ask you to make two decisions. There is no right or wrong and there is no payment  
       involved. Please examine both decisions and then let me know which of the options you  
       prefer.  
 
       Decision 1: A winning 100 for sure OR B a 5 in 10 chance of losing 300 and a 5 in 10 chance  
       of winning 700 
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Decision 2: C losing 400 for sure OR D a 5 in 10 chance of losing 900 and a 5 in 10 chance 
of winning 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q2a. Decision 1:  A  or  B  Q2b. Decision 2: C or  D 
 
 
The next set of questions will concern your savings, where and how much you save. 
 
SI1. Do you have cash savings held at home for safe keeping? If yes, how much do you have in  
       savings right now in the form of cash at home? [WRITE 00 IF NONE] 
       _________________ pesos 
SI2. Do you keep money with your friends/family or employer for safekeeping? If yes, how much?   
      [WRITE 0 IF NONE] 
      ______________ pesos 
SI3. Do you currently have any money lent out to others? If yes, how much? [WRITE 0 IF NONE,   
       DO NOT COUNT MONEY GIFTS TO FRIENDS/FAMILY IF THE WILL NOT GET IT BACK. DO NOT  
       COUNT MONEY GIVEN TO OTHERS ONLY FOR SAFEKEEPING] 
       _______________ pesos 
SI4a. How much money do you currently have in your AHSI personal savings? 
       ___________ pesos 
SI4b. How much money from your last loan do you still have in your electronic card? 
       ________________ pesos 
SI5. Do ho have savings at a bank, MFI, coop or other formal institution other than ASHI? If yes,   
       how much? 
       ________________ pesos 
SI6. Are you currently a member of any savings organization with member coming from your  
       church, neighbors, or friends? If yes, how much money do you currently have in savings in  
       these organizations? [WRITE 0 IF NONE] 
       _________________  
SI7. Do you have savings in the form of gold (or jewelries made of gold) at home? 
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: DON´T KNOW 4 DON´T READ: REFUSED 
 
SI9. If you want to save at home or at your place of work, do you have a safe place where no  
      one will take it away?   
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
SI10. In general, are you able to save as much as you want?    
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
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SG1a. Do you currently save money?  
1 Yes 2 No 
3 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
SG1b. If SG1a=Yes: What is the main reason you save? [MAX 3, RANK 1-3] 
1 Capital for business 2 Christmas, birthdays (regular celebrations) 
3 Weddings, baptisms, town fiestas, and 
functions 
4 Unexpected Emergencies (illness, sudden 
loss of income etc) 
5 Repay another debt 6 School fees/education 
7 Personal use (entertainment, clothes, 
etc) 
8 Health/Medical Costs 
9 Cell phone, appliance, TV, etc 10 Utility bills (gas, water, electricity etc) 
11 Future needs, e.g. retirement 12 For natural disaster (e.g. typhoon) 
13 House Construction/repair 14 Other (specify): 
 
If SG1a=NO: Why don’t you safe? [MAX 1-3, RANK 1-3] 
1 Not enough money to save 2 I don’t need it 
3 There are too many documentary 
requirements 
4 I had a bad experience in the past 
5 It is too expensive 6 I don’t have knowledge about savings 
7 Other, specify:  
 
SG2. I will now ask you to make two decisions. There is no right or wrong and there is no payment  
         involved. Please examine both decisions and then let me know which of the options you  
         prefer. 
         Decision 1: winning 850 for sure OR a 5 in 10 chance of winning 100 and a 5 in 10 chance of        
         winning 1600 
         Decision 2: losing 650 for sure OR a 5 in 10 chance of losing 1550 and a 5 in 10 chance of  
         winning 100 
 
SG2a. Decision 1:  A  or  B  SG2b. Decision 2: C or  D 
 
 
I will now ask you a set of questions concerning your opinion and experiences with savings. 
 
Please let me know how much you agree or disagree with the following statements and 
questions. Do you fully agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or fully disagree?  
[CODE: 1 FULLY AGREE, 2 AGREE, 3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4 DISAGREE, 5 FULLY DISAGREE] 
AS1. Keeping money aside for a purpose is important for me  
AS2. Saving at home is not safe  
AS3. Banks cannot be trusted  
AS4. If I have savings with ASHI, I will need to spend it on abonohan for others.  
AS5. Savings are not useful  
AS6. Saving at ASHI is not safe  
AS7. I would save more but my husband needs the money   
AS8. I would like to save more but cash creates needs  
AS9. I would like to save but I forget to keep money aside  
AS10. I would like to save but then unforeseen expenditures are needed  
AS11. I would save more if my ASHI group members saved more  
AS12. Using my ASHI savings account takes too much time  
AS13. I have experienced problems with my savings in ASHI  
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AS14. If I have savings with ASHI, I will not receive abonohan from others.  
AS15. I cannot access my savings when I need them as the center meeting is only once 
a week. 
 
AS16. If I save, I will only end up giving the money to my family and friends.  
AS17. When I have some savings, I will to soon take the money and spend it.  
AS18. If I have cash, I think about what I can buy but I don’t think about savings.  
AS19. I wish I had a savings account where I could hide my money from others  
AS20. I always think I would save the next week, but then I keep postponing it.  
 
 
 
K1. What is the safest place to keep your savings? 
 
1 At home 2 With friends/family 3 With employer 
4 At ASHI 5 At Bank 6 Savings are never safe 
 
K2. What is the most profitable place to keep your savings? 
1 At home 2 With friends/family 3 With employer 
4 At ASHI 5 At Bank 6 Savings are never 
profitable 
 
K3. How large is this interest rate you can get in your AHSI personal savings account? 
      ______________ % 
K4. How much money do you need to keep in your ASHI personal savings account to receive  
      some interest?  
      ____________________ pesos 
K5. How many people in your ASHI group save? ________________ 
K6. How many people in your AHSI center save? ________________ 
K7. In the last four weeks, how often were savings used for abonohan in your center? 
1 Never 2 Once 3 Twice 
4 Three times 5 Four times 6 More than four times 
7 Don´t know 8 DON´T READ: REFUSED  
 
K8. Do your group members know how much money you currently keep in your AHSI personal  
      savings account? 
1 They do not now 2 They have a vague idea 3 They know exactly 
4 DON´T READ: REFUSED    
 
 
The next set of questions concern different financial concepts that you migh be familiar with. 
Please take your time to think about each question. 
 
FL1. Imagine that five brothers are given a gift of 1,000 PHP. If the brothers have to divide the 
money equally, how much does each one get? ______________ 
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FL2. Now, imagine that the five brothers have to wait for one year to get their part of the 1,000 
PHP and inflation stays at 10%. In one year’s time will they be able to buy: 
 
1 More with their share of money than 
they could today 
2 The same amount 
3 Less than they could buy today 4 It depends on the types of things that 
they want to buy [DO NOT READ OUT THIS 
OPTION] 
5 DON`T READ: EXPLAIN INFLATION  6 DON`T READ: REFUSED 
 
[IF FL2=”EXPLAIN INFLATION”, READ “INFLATION MEASURES THE AVERAGE PRICE INCREASE OF 
COMMODITIES”, THEN ASK THE QUESTION AGAIN] 
FL3. Suppose you put 100 PHP into a savings account with a guaranteed interest rate of 2% per 
year. You don’t make any further payments into this account and you don’t withdraw any 
money. How much would be in the account at the end of the first year, once the interest 
payment is made? _______________ 
 
FL4. Which of the following statements best describes the primary purpose of insurance 
products? 
1 To accumulate savings 2 To protect against risks 
3 To make payments or send money 4 Other 
5 DON´T READ: DON´T KNOW 6 DON´T READ; REFUSED  
 
FL5. How high is inflation currently in the Philippines? _________________% 
 
This is the end of the survey. We will now determine whether you receive additional payment 
for one of your paid game choices in the survey. Please roll this die. If it shows a “6”, you will be 
paid for one of your choices. [ENTER NUMBER IN SCREEN AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS] 
[IF SELECTED FOR PAYMENT] We will now decide which one of the paid game questions we will 
pay you for. Please draw a number from this bag. [ENTER NUMBER IN SCREEN AND FOLLOW 
INSTRUCTIONS] Your [xth] question has been selected. The questions was [READ FROM SCREEN] 
and you selected [READ FROM SCREEN]. 
[IF SELECTED LOTTERY]: we will now play the lottery you have selected. I place [X] white chips in 
this bag, symbolizing the [COLOR1] balls and [Y] blue/red chips to symbolize the [COLOR2] 
balls. Please now draw a chip from the bag. [ENTER CHIP COLOR] you win an additional [X] 
pesos/ you lose [X] pesos. 
[IF SELECTED LOAD QUESTION]: you will receive [x] pesos in load [now/in 2 weeks/in 4 weeks]. 
[FILL IN THE VOUCHER ACCORDINGLY, NOTE PHONE NUMBER IN TABLET] 
[FOR EVERYONE] Your total earnings are [READ FROM TABLET], 300/500 pesos for your 
participation and [X] pesos from the games. Please sign here that you have received this 
amount [USE RECEIPT; EVERYONE NEEDS TO SIGN A RECEIPT, ALSO THOSE WHO DID NOT WIN 
ADDITIONAL MONEY].  
We will now go back to the center meeting.  
IF APPLICABLE: I will hand your envelope with your savings to Lisa who will give it to the DO 
once we have finished all interviews.  
Please do not talk to any nanay about the survey before the end of the center meeting. 
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b.1 additional tables and figures
Table B.1: Individual Repayment (Share Repaid) and Beliefs
Share of tokens repaid (JL)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
belief: partner repays 0.215*** 0.210*** 0.279
(0.0587) (0.0574) (0.282)
belief: partner punishes
non-repayment
0.241**
(0.104)
0.227**
(0.0886)
0.269
(0.194)
belief: partner punishes
repayment
0.0198
(0.0532)
0.0165
(0.0506)
0.0171
(0.0507)
belief: partner repays x
punishes non-repayment
0.472**
(0.181)
Mean of DV in JL 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.769
Observations 231 231 231 231
Adj. R2 0.122 0.083 0.148 0.149
Fixed effects session session session session
Notes: OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level in parenthe-
ses. All belief variables are binary indicators. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B.2: Heterogeneity in Repayment (Share Repaid)
Share of tokens repaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AGAP 0.0383
(0.0350)
JL x AGAP -0.0163
(0.0724)
ILflex x AGAP 0.0720
(0.0526)
JLflex x AGAP 0.127
(0.121)
Present biased -0.0246 -0.0505
(0.0261) (0.0348)
Present biased x JL -0.0218
(0.0810)
Present biased x ILflex 0.0886
(0.0528)
Present biased x JLflex 0.0420
(0.0750)
Risk averse 0.0182 0.000357
(0.0244) (0.0354)
Risk averse x JL -0.00281
(0.0543)
Risk averse x ILflex 0.0177
(0.0510)
Risk averse x JLflex 0.0842
(0.0558)
Mean of DV in IL 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
Observations 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373
Adj. R2 0.002 0.038 0.029 0.036 0.029 0.036
Fixed effects session session session session session
Notes: OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level in parentheses. Columns (2), (4)
and (6) include treatment dummies that are omitted for ease of presentation. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.3: Heterogeneity in Misuse of Flexibility in Period 1
Misuse of Flexibility in Period 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Present bias 0.105* 0.0760
(0.0548) (0.0648)
Present bias x JLflex 0.0158
(0.0879)
Risk aversion 0.0972 0.0112
(0.0637) (0.0809)
Risk aversion x JLflex 0.121
(0.0998)
JLflex -0.259*** -0.306***
(0.0931) (0.107)
Mean of DV in ILflex 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.549
Observations 564 564 564 564
Adj. R2 0.007 0.073 0.010 0.077
Notes: OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.4: Randomization and Comprehension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share Repaid
in IL
Repayment per
period in IL
Paid after
default
Paid after
default
Paid after
default
JL-session -0.000389 0.0112
(0.0445) (0.0428)
Period 2 -0.0525***
(0.0177)
Period 3 -0.0393**
(0.0192)
JL-session x Period 2 -0.0165
(0.0297)
JL-session x Period 3 -0.0181
(0.0277)
JL 0.000501 -0.00766 -0.00766
(0.0496) (0.0456) (0.0591)
ILflex -0.0394 -0.0168 -0.0138
(0.0280) (0.0291) (0.0367)
JLflex -0.00146 -0.0147 -0.0124
(0.0569) (0.0400) (0.0515)
Mean of DV in IL 0.763 0.763 0.233 0.233 0.233
Observations 566 1,698 1,349 1,349 1,349
Adj. R2 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.134 0.628
Fixed effects session individual
Notes: OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table B.6: Inclusion of All Participants: Punishment in Case of a
Shock
Extensive Intensive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flex No Flex Flex No Flex
JLflex -0.223* 0.223* -0.397** 0.304*
(0.119) (0.108) (0.165) (0.159)
Mean of DV in JL 0.516 0.516 0.778 0.778
Observations 553 553 553 553
Adj. R2 0.659 0.650 0.667 0.675
FE individual individual individual individual
Notes: OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.7: Choice Reversals: Share Repaid, Misuse and Repayment of Flexibility
Share Repaid Misuse of Flexibility Repayment of Flexibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All All All
Revision -0.0529*** 0.152*** -0.0684*
(0.0191) (0.0512) (0.0400)
JL 0.00291
(0.0250)
ILflex -0.0742**
(0.336)
JLflex -0.0705 -0.221*** 0.0499
(0.0478) (0.0628) (0.0558)
IL in revision -0.0686**
(0.0262)
JL in revision -0.0492
(0.0526)
ILflex in revision -0.0925* 0.103** -0.0163
(0.0479) (0.0425) (0.0433)
JLflex in revision -0.507*** -0.238*** -0.335***
(0.168) (0.0472) (0.0558)
Mean of DV in IL 0.763 0.763
Mean of DV in ILflex 0.603 0.603 0.703 0.703
Observations 1,848 1,848 1,173 1,173 621 621
Adj. R2 0.036 0.044 0.017 0.071 0.003 0.020
Fixed effects session session
Notes: The treatment dummies indicate the decision in the main treatment, whereas the treatment
"in revision" dummies indicate revised choices. OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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b.2 repayment choices per period
Table B.8 examines repayment choices in more detail. Column 1 shows repay-
ment choices per period, pooling across all treatments.
As compared to Period 1, participants repay slightly less in Periods 2 and
3, but repayment remains above 70 percent. Column 2 compares repayment
across treatments. The coefficient of JL reflects the non-parametric finding that
liability does not influence average repayment choices. Reassuringly, this holds
also true for the two flexibility treatments as all coefficients are very small and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Column 3 shows the full interaction
of period and treatment dummies. The dynamics of slightly decreasing re-
payment in Periods 1 and 2 seems to be mainly driven by the IL treatment.
For the other treatments, we do not find consistent dynamics across periods.
Columns 4-6 replicate the first three columns but only using within-session
variation. All coefficients are quantitatively simila;, an additional indication
for successful randomization.
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Table B.8: Repayment Choices per Period
Repayment in a given period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period 2 -0.0268* -0.0601*** -0.0267* -0.0601***
(0.0137) (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0147)
Period 3 -0.0856*** -0.0477*** -0.0850*** -0.0477***
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139)
JL 0.00618 -0.00931 0.00639 -0.00910
(0.0266) (0.0268) (0.0275) (0.0297)
ILflex 0.00962 0.0534 0.00959 0.0533
(0.0237) (0.0331) (0.0287) (0.0361)
JLflex -0.00481 -0.0332 -0.00364 -0.0331
(0.0366) (0.0452) (0.0421) (0.0517)
Period 2 x JL 0.0103 0.0103
(0.0256) (0.0257)
Period 2 x ILflex 0.0365 0.0366
(0.0317) (0.0318)
Period 2 x JLflex 0.125*** 0.125***
(0.0350) (0.0351)
Period 3 x JL 0.0362* 0.0362*
(0.0212) (0.0213)
Period 3 x ILflex -0.169*** -0.168***
(0.0342) (0.0344)
Period 3 x JLflex -0.0456 -0.0423
(0.0390) (0.0364)
Mean of DV in t1 0.802 0.802 0.802 0.802
Mean of DV in IL 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763
Observations 4,154 4,154 4,154 4,154 4,154 4,154
Adj. R2 0.007 0.000 0.018 0.047 0.040 0.057
Fixed effects session session session
Notes: OLS regressions with SE clustered on session level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table B.9: Choice Reversals: Repayment per Period
Repayment in a given period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All IL JL ILflex JLflex
Revision -0.0453** -0.0904*** -0.0302 0.0697** -0.141
(0.0296) (0.0732) (0.0282) (0.196)
Period 2 -0.0601*** -0.0498** -0.0237 0.0654*
(0.0147) (0.0231) (0.0324) (0.0356)
Period 3 -0.0477*** -0.0115 -0.216*** -0.0921**
(0.0140) (0.0174) (0.0319) (0.0363)
Revision x Period 2 0.0401* 0.0290 -0.124*** -0.0321
(0.0225) (0.0277) (0.0391) (0.126)
Revision x Period 3 0.0211 0.0323 -0.0615 -0.00792
(0.0211) (0.0471) (0.0453) (0.0874)
Mean of DV 0.765 0.799 0.789 0.852 0.765
Observations 5,818 2,601 927 1,436 854
Adj. R2 0.039 0.071 0.051 0.087 0.100
Fixed effects session session session session session
Notes: Mean of DV is the mean of the respectively omitted category. OLS regres-
sions with SE clustered on session level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
170 appendix to chapter 2
b.3 discrete choice experiments
Participants were presented with eleven pairs of loans that each contained a
loan A and a loan B. Loans varied across the following four dimensions:
1. the loan amount ( P 5.000, P 10.000, P 15.000 or P 20.000)
2. the interest rate (10 - 40 percent nominal on loan amount over 50 weeks)
3. the repayment schedule: this could be either regular repayment, a pass
token, or a "repayment pause"
4. a loan administration fee ( P 0, P 500, or P 1000)
We used a fractional factorial design of all possible combinations of the
attribute levels and applied the D-efficiency criteria to pre-select a set of 32
hypothetical loan contracts for the comparison in our experiment. We verified
the orthogonality of attribute level compositions ex-post. Based on the 32 con-
tracts, we formed all possible binary comparisons of two contracts each. We
eliminated all choices where one loan contract clearly dominated the other
or that were too complex (i.e. where loan schemes differed in three or more
attributes). The latter point is important to facilitate choices and ensure consis-
tent decisions. We then selected 34 binary comparisons that we split into three
blocks such that each participant only made eleven or 12 choices.
We analyze the choice between the loan contracts with a discrete choice
model between alternatives and estimate expected utilities using a conditional
logit model in reference to a loan contract that represents the ASHI general
loan for new members: P 5000, with zero administration fees, a regular re-
payment schedule, 50 weeks loan duration and an interest charge of P 1000
(20 percent nominal interest rate). We use the following model:
U = β1interest
+ δ2amount10000 + δ3amount15000 + δ4amount20000
+ γ1schedulepass + γ2schedulepause
+ λ1fee500 + λ2fee1000
+ constant
(1)
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where interest is the only non-binary variable. With the results from (1) we
estimate the willingness to pay:
WTP(coefficient X) = −
coefficient X
β1
(2)
The coefficients in Table B.11 show changes in utility with changes in the
standard loan contract characterized by a loan amount of P 5000, a regular re-
payment schedule, 20 percent interest (p.a.; P 1000), loan duration of 50 weeks
and no fees. As utility does not have an absolute interpretation, it can only be
interpreted in relation to a reference state. Apart from the coefficient for the
interest, all other coefficients indicate the change of utility due to a change of
the attribute level in relation to the baseline alternative. For instance, increas-
ing the loan amount from P 5000 to P 10000, raises the utility of that contract
by 0.763. Table B.10 shows the corresponding WTP estimates in P .
Table B.10: Willingness to Pay for Contract Fea-
tures
Coeff SE
Amount P 20,000 2610.811*** 489.3555
Amount P 15,000 2225.76*** 449.0226
Amount P 10,000 1104.262*** 372.8101
Pass -189.84 437.8428
Pause 551.6475** 270.631
Fee P 1,000 -2071.629*** 571.0117
Fee P 500 -914.5384* 526.6332
Notes: Baseline loan: P 5000 loan amount, regular re-
payment schedule, no administrative fee. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.11: Choice of Credit
(1)
Interest -0.000691***
(9.80e-05)
Loan amount P 20,000 1.804***
(0.467)
Loan amount P 15,000 1.538***
(0.386)
Loan amount P 10,000 0.763***
(0.287)
Schedule: Pass -0.131
(0.294)
Schedule: Pause 0.381*
(0.202)
Fee P 1,000 -1.431***
(0.342)
Fee P 500 -0.632*
(0.340)
Constant -0.632**
(0.256)
Observations 5,270
Notes: Dependent variable: Choice of loan.
Conditional logit maximum likelihood esti-
mation, robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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b.4 details on decision making procedures and the analysis
b.4.1 Elicitation of Choices
flexibility As with all other choices, we elicited decisions on the use of
flexibility using the strategy method. First, subjects were asked whether they
wanted to use their flexibility token in period 1 when there is no shock. If
they decided to use it, they were subsequently asked about their repayment
decisions in period 2 and 3. If they chose not to use it, they had the choice to
use their flexibility token in period 2: first, when there is no shock and second,
in case of a shock in period 2. Last, all participants decided whether to use
their flexibility token in period 1 in case of a shock. This procedure lays out
nearly the complete strategy on flexibility use.
punishment In total, we elicited punishment decisions in JL-flex for eight
different choices of the partner: repayment, non-repayment, flexibility use in
case of a shock, misuse of flexibility, double repayment (repaying flexibility),
non-repayment of flexibility, not using flexibility in case of a shock and non-
repayment of flexibility due to a shock.
b.4.2 Share of Tokens Repaid vs. Repayment per Period
Comparing repayment choices across periods and all treatments comes with
two difficulties. First, in the two flexibility treatments, we elicit repayment
choices conditional on shock realizations in the first two periods as this is rele-
vant for the use of flexibility. In contrast to IL and JL, active choices (regarding
the use of flexibility) can still be made in case of a shock. We thus have more
choices for different scenarios than in IL and JL. Hence, we analyze the choices
that are the most comparable across all four treatments in the main analysis, re-
payment choices absent a shock. Second, when classifying the use of flexibility
as repaying in a given period, the comparison of the flexibility treatments with
IL and JL entails decisions both regarding repayment and the use of flexibility.
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This might lead to mechanical effects such as higher repayment in period 1 al-
though the strategy of the participant in a flex treatment is actually defaulting
(but they use flexibility in the first period to ensure early consumption).
The share of tokens repaid circumvents these problems. The main difference
to repayment per period is that in the latter, the use of flexibility is counted
as repayment in the period it is used, independent of whether flexibility is
actually repaid.
b.5 description of variables
Repayment
• Share repaid: tokens repaid divided by tokens to be repaid over all periods
(three). The variable ranges from zero to one.
• Repayment choice per period: binary indicator taking the value one if the
repayment obligation has been met in a given period (either by repaying
or using flexibility).
Flexibility
• Use of flexibility: binary indicator taking the value one if flexibility has
been used in a given scenario (e.g. period 2 without shock). Four indica-
tors exist, one for each scenario.
• Repayment of flexibility: binary indicator that takes the value one if the
double repayment obligation has been met in a given scenario (e.g. repay
the double installment in period 3 after having misused it in period 2).
Four indicators exist, one for each scenario.
• Double default: indicator variable taking the value one if the double re-
payment of flexibility has not been made. The simulation of this variable
includes both defaults due to a shock and due to non-repayment.
– due to a shock: indicator variable taking the value one if the double
repayment has not been made due to a simulated shock.
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– due to non-repayment: indicator variable taking the value one if the
double repayment has not been made by choice.
Punishment
Punishment has been elicited in terms of punishment points in the two joint-
liability treatments. Up to two punishment points can be used. At the extensive
margin, we analyze how many participants use at least one point; at the in-
tensive margin, we examine how many punishment points are allocated in a
given scenario. All extensive punishment variables are thus binary indicators,
whereas intensive variables can take the value zero, one or two.
Punish if partner chooses...
• Repay: allocation of punishment points for simple repayment. (JL and
JL-flex)
• Don’t repay (no shock): allocation of punishment points for not repaying
(the single installment) and consuming more instead. Here, an active
choice against repayment was made by the partner. (JL and JL-flex)
• Don’t repay (shock): allocation of punishment points for not repaying due
to a shock. Here, the partner had no choice. (JL)
• Flex (shock): allocation of punishment points for using flexibility as self-
insurance in case of a shock. (JL-flex)
• No flex (shock): allocation of punishment points for not using flexibility as
self-insurance in case of a shock. (JL-flex)
• Flex (no shock): allocation of punishment points for misusing flexibility.
(JL-flex)
• Repay double: allocation of punishment points for repaying the double
installment after having used flexibility. (JL-flex)
• Default double (no shock): allocation of punishment points for choosing not
to repay the double installment after having used flexibility. (JL-flex)
• Default double (shock) allocation of punishment points for not repaying
the double installment due to a shock. (JL-flex)
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Other data elicited during the sessions
• Present biased: indicator variable taking the value one if the choices be-
tween money today and in one month are more impatient than the
choices between money in one and in two months. For instructions of
the elicitation, see Section B.7.7.
• Risk averse: indicator variable taking the value one if participant’s risk
choice is less risky than the median. For instructions of the elicitation,
see Section B.7.7.
• JL-session: indicator variable taking the value one if the session contained
the treatments IL, JL and JL-flex (as compared to IL and IL-flex).
Administrative data
• AGAP: indicator variable taking the value one if borrowers have an indi-
vidual (agricultural) loan.
• Education of female head: no secondary graduate: binary indicator taking the
value one if participants have not completed secondary education.
• Electricity: binary indicator taking the value one if borrowers live in a
house with access to the electricity grid.
• House size: takes values zero (small), one (medium) or two (large).
• House strength: takes values zero (weak), one (medium) or two (strong).
• Landline: binary indicator taking the value one if the house is connected
to the telephone network.
• Loam Amount: Size of the current loan.
• Main income: Enterprise: binary indicator taking the value one if the main
household income source is the own business.
• Main income: Farming: binary indicator taking the value one if the main
household income source is farming.
• Monthly income below P 5000: binary indicator taking the value one if the
monthly household income is below P 5000.
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• Probability of living below NPL: Probability of living below the national
poverty line, based on the Progress out of Poverty Indicator.
• Water: binary indicator taking the value one if the house has running
water.
b.6 experimental setup
Figure B.2: Consumption Table
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Figure B.3: Study Area
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b.7 experimental instructions
b.7.1 Introduction
Good day,
we are a team of independent researchers and we study the possibility for
improving the design of loans in the Philippines. In today’s meeting, you will
take a set of decisions because we are very interested in your opinions and
decisions. For all these the decisions, there is no "right" or "wrong". You can
take your decisions freely and your decisions are very valuable for us.
We will provide you a fee for participation of P 70. With the decisions that you
make, you can earn more money in the games and receive small gifts. Some of
your decisions may also affect your participation fee, but you will at least get
P 30. What you earn depends on the decisions you have made and luck. It also
may depend on the decisions other participants have made.
All of your responses will be kept confidential. Only the researchers involved
in this study and those responsible for research oversight will have access to all
the information you provide. Your responses will be numbered and the code
linking your number with your name will be stored in a separate locked file
cabinet. You receive a participant ID to protect your privacy.
If you have any questions, please ask any one of the instructors. We kindly
ask you not to talk to your neighbours. If you do have questions, please talk
directly to one of the instructors. Also, in order not to disturb any other partic-
ipant, please do not share your decisions with anybody else, unless explicitly
asked to by one of the instructors.
By agreeing to participate, you consent that all information which you volun-
tarily share may be used purely for research purposes by the research team or
other researchers. This includes financial information you provide and infor-
mation that ASHI shares with us. All data is confidential and none of the infor-
mation you provide will be used in connection with your name. By agreeing
to participate, you also agree that the anonymized data set may be provided to
other researchers. Your decision to participate does not affect your ASHI mem-
bership in any way, because we do not work for ASHI. We are independent
researchers.
The session today lasts for two to three hours. We will calculate your earnings
at the end of the session. Your earnings can be influenced by your decisions
and decisions made by other participants. If you cannot stay the full time,
please let us know now. We will not be able to pay you if you do not stay until
the end of the session.
In order to understand the game fully, we request that you do not use your
phones. We really appreciate that you are here today and we would already
like to thank you very much!
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General Instructions: Loan Repayment Game
We start with a basic decision making game. Some things may not be familiar,
so please listen very carefully to the explanations we will provide. Some things
may seem familiar, but this may mislead you in the game. All the information
that you need to make the decisions will be provided in the explanations. We
will clearly lay out which actions you can take in this game and which not.
These may be different from the actions you can take in reality, so please re-
member at all times that we play a game now and that we have to stick to the
rules of the game. We will have a quiz at the end of the explanations, so please
pay close attention.
b.7.1.1 Explanation of the Game
We will play different variants of the game. For each variant that we play, we
will place one token in a bag. At the end of the meeting, we do a lucky draw
and select one of these tokens and from there, we will calculate how much you
will receive.
[INSTRUCTOR: SHOW THE TOKENS THAT WE HAVE FOR EACH TREAT-
MENT AND THE BAG IN WHICH YOU WILL PLACE THEM]
Each variant of the game will last for three terms. In each term you have to take
decisions. Each decision that you take is equally important as each decision
may determine how much money you will earn at the end of the game.
general setup - individual-liability & no flexibility (pass to-
ken) In this game, you got a loan from a bank. You have invested this loan
and you will receive an income of two green tokens from your investmen-
t/business in each of the three terms. You can use these two green tokens of
income to repay your loan installment and for your own consumption.
In each term, the repayment due is one green token.
You can also use your green tokens to go shopping at the consumption table.
There are different items in the table worth different amounts. The more green
tokens you have, the more items you can pick from the consumption table.
You have already seen the shopping catalog that presents all the items and
their prices available at the shopping table.
[INSTRUCTOR SHOW LAMINATED CATALOGUE]
[USE POSTER "REPAYMENT AND CONSUMPTION CHOICE" (See Figure B.4)]
You have to simultaneously decide how you want to split the income of two
green tokens between repaying your loan and consuming from the consump-
tion table. The tokens used for repayment are marked on the sheets with the
bundle of cash. The tokens used for consumption are marked on the sheets
with a cupcake. You can either repay one token and consume one token, to go
shopping at the consumption table; or you do not repay your loan repayment
and consume two tokens, to go shopping at the consumption table. You can
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Figure B.4: Repayment and Consumption Choice
take home your shopping immediately after the game.
[USE POSTER IL]
You have to take this decision in every term. That is, in each of the three terms
of the game, you get the income of two tokens, you have a repayment due of
one token, and you have to decide how to split up your two tokens between
repayment and consumption.
The value of a consumption token changes in each term. In the 1st term, each
consumption token is worth P 40. In the 2nd term, each consumption token is
worth P 30 , and in the 3rd term, each consumption token is worth P 20.
[USE POSTER "VALUE CONSUMPTION TOKEN"]
If you repay your loan in every term, you will receive a voucher of P 100. In
one month’s time, one of the instructors will come to visit your center again
and distribute the P 100 to everyone who received this voucher. If you do not
repay in at least one term, you will not receive the voucher of P 100 . This
implies that if you do not repay in one term, it is your best strategy to also not
repay in the following terms.
In each term, there is the possibility that you are robbed by a thief. The thief
will come and steal all the money that you have earned in this term. It will
not affect the income that you will receive in the next term and it will also not
affect your prior consumption decisions. If the thief steals your income, you do
not have any money left in this term. That is, you can neither repay your loan
nor consume anything in this term. Only when the thief does not rob you, you
can decide how to split your income between repayment and consumption.
In order to determine whether the thief has robbed you, we will place four
cards in a bag. On three cards, there is no thief, on one card there is a thief.
You take a draw from this bag, if you draw the thief, you will be robbed, if you
don’t draw the thief, you will be spared.
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If the thief comes, how many green tokens of income do you have left?
[ASK THE PARTICIPANTS; STATE CORRECT ANSWER]
So if you do not have any income, can you repay your loan?
[ASK THE PARTICIPANTS; STATE CORRECT ANSWER]
How many tokens can you consume?
[ASK THE PARTICIPANTS; STATE CORRECT ANSWER]
Only you know whether you have been robbed by a thief. The bank will never
know whether you have been robbed or not and you do not have any possibil-
ity to explain your situation to the bank.
Do you have any questions?
example a : repay in all periods
Let me give you examples on your total earnings in the game depending on
your repayment decisions.
[USE POSTER "DECISION SHEET IL" (See Figure B.5)
GO THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE CORRECT LAMINATED
GREEN TOKENS ON EACH DECISION THAT YOU ARE DEMONSTRAT-
ING. USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH NUMBER 2
FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH TO PUT
THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER]
no thief realization
Let’s consider a situation where you decide to repay your loan installment
in all three terms. That is, you repay one token and you consume one token,
that is you go shopping at the consumption table for one token. In total, after
three terms, you can go shopping at the consumption table for three tokens.
Remember that the token loses value over time. Remember that we only look
at the situation now where the thief did not rob you.
In addition, since you did not default in any term, you get the voucher of P 100
to use in one month’s time. In total, you get all your shopping items you got
for 3 tokens + plus the voucher of P 100.
[INSTRUCTOR:
DEMONSTRATE THE EXAMPLE AS YOU DO IN THE PRACTICE ROUND
WHEN CALCULATING THE PAYMENTS:
1. REPAYMENT CHOICE
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Figure B.5: Decision Sheet IL: Example A
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SHOW THE CHOICE BY PLACING BOTH GREEN TOKENS ON
"REPAY" IN T1, T2, AND T3
2. CALCULATE THE PAYOFF WITHOUT A THIEF
– 1. TERM:
* "You have two tokens "1" worth P 40"
* "You decide to repay"⇒ TAKE AWAY REPAYMENT TOKEN
– 2. TERM:
* "You have two tokens "2" worth P 30"
* "You decide to repay"⇒ TAKE AWAY REPAYMENT TOKEN
– 3. TERM:
* "You have two tokens "3" worth P 20"
* "You decide to repay"⇒ TAKE AWAY REPAYMENT TOKEN
– "In total, you have T1+T2+T3 consumption tokens= P 90 for con-
sumption"
– "Will you get the P 100?"⇒ ASK AUDIENCE
– "Yes, you repay in every period, so you get the voucher of P 100."
⇒ PUT P 100 SIGN ON THE POSTER]
draw thief realization
Now let’s draw the thief to see what happens.
[DEMONSTRATE THE EXAMPLE AS YOU DO IN THE PRACTICE ROUND
WHEN CALCULATING THE PAYMENTS:
1. REPAYMENT CHOICE
– SHOW THE CHOICE BY PLACING BOTH GREEN TOKENS ON
"REPAY" IN T1, T2, AND T3
2. DRAW THE THIEF FOR EACH TERM. BEFORE CONTINUING, CAL-
CULATE PAYOFF IN THIS TERM
– DRAW THIEF FOR 1ST TERM
– TAKE AWAY THE TOKENS REPAID OR STOLEN FOR 1ST TERM
– DRAW THIEF FOR 2ND TERM
– TAKE AWAY THE TOKENS REPAID OR STOLEN FOR 2ND TERM
– DRAW THIEF FOR 3RD TERM
– TAKE AWAY THE TOKENS REPAID OR STOLEN FOR 3RD TERM
3. CALCULATE THE PAYOFF AND WHETHER THE P 100 WILL BE
RECEIVED
⇒ MAKE THIS AN INTERACTIVE EXERCISE]
example b : not repay in any term
[USE POSTER "DECISION SHEET IL" (See Figure B.6) GO THROUGH EACH
EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE CORRECT LAMINATED GREEN TOKENS ON
EACH DECISION THAT YOU ARE DEMONSTRATING. USE TOKENS WITH
NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS
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WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN
POSTER]
no thief realization
Let’s consider a situation where you decide not to repay in all three terms. In
each term, you do not repay your loan, and you consume two tokens, that is go
shopping at the consumption table for two tokens and default with the bank.
As soon as you do not repay in the 1st term, it is your best strategy strategy to
also not repay in the following terms, since you have lost the voucher of P 100
anyway and there are no other consequences to not repaying in this game.
In total, after three terms, you can go shopping at the consumption table for
two tokens in each term if this variant of the game is chosen for your payment.
Remember that we only look at the situation now where the thief did not rob
you.
Since you default in all terms, you will not get the voucher of P 100. In total,
you get all your shopping items you got for two tokens in each term.
[DEMONSTRATE THE EXAMPLE AS YOU DO IN THE PRACTICE ROUND
WHEN CALCULATING THE PAYMENTS:
1. REPAYMENT CHOICE
– SHOW THE CHOICE BY PLACING BOTH GREEN TOKENS ON
"CONSUME 2" IN T1, T2, AND T3
2. CALCULATE THE PAYOFF WITHOUT A THIEF
– 1. TERM:
* "You have two tokens "1" worth P 40"
* "You decide to consume two tokens"
– 2. TERM:
* "You have two tokens "2" worth P 30"
* "You decide to consume two tokens"
– 3. TERM:
* "You have two tokens "3" worth P 20"
* "You decide to consume two tokens"
– "In total, you have 2T1+2T2+2T3 consumption tokens= P 180 for
consumption"
– "Will you get the P 100?"⇒ ASK AUDIENCE
– "No, you did not repay in every period, so you do not get the
voucher of P 100."
draw thief realization
Now let’s draw the thief to see what happens.
1. REPAYMENT CHOICE
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Figure B.6: Decision Sheet IL: Example B
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– SHOW THE CHOICE BY PLACING BOTH GREEN TOKENS ON
"CONSUME 2" IN T1, T2, AND T3
2. DRAW THE THIEF FOR EACH TERM. BEFORE CONTINUING, CAL-
CULATE PAYOFF IN THIS TERM
– DRAW THIEF FOR 1ST TERM
– TAKE AWAY THE TOKENS REPAID OR STOLEN FOR 1ST TERM
– DRAW THIEF FOR 2ND TERM
– TAKE AWAY THE TOKENS REPAID OR STOLEN FOR 2ND TERM
– DRAW THIEF FOR 3RD TERM
– TAKE AWAY THE TOKENS REPAID OR STOLEN FOR 3RD TERM
3. CALCULATE THE PAYOFF AND WHETHER THE P 100 WILL BE
RECEIVED
⇒ MAKE THIS AN INTERACTIVE EXERCISE]
Do you have any questions?
Let’s summarize the game: you get a loan that gives you a regular income of
two green tokens in each of the three terms. In each term, you may get robbed
by a thief who steals all your income.
If you are spared by the thief, you have to decide how you want to spend your
two tokens of income: repay your loan and consume items from the consump-
tion table. If you repay your loan in all three terms, you get a voucher of P 100
that you can cash in one month after the game. If you do not repay in any of
the three terms, that is if you default in any term, you do not get P 100.
[INSTRUCTOR SHOW VOUCHER]
If you are robbed by the thief, you cannot repay your loan installment, that is
you default in this term.
b.7.1.2 Test questions - General
Now, we will ask you a few test questions. It is very important that you under-
stand the game we have just presented, so we would like to test your under-
standing in this quiz. Please do not talk to your neighbors now and only tell
the answer to the instructor or note it yourself on the sheet. Are you ready to
take the quiz?
For all the answers, please encircle your answer choice:
1. When you consume two tokens in this term, can you repay your loan? -
Yes/ No [NO]
2. You do not repay in one term: Do you get voucher of P 100? - Yes/No?
[NO]
3. You are robbed by the thief: Do you get the voucher of P 100? - Yes/No?
[NO]
4. How much is one token for consumption at the consumption table worth
in the 2nd term? – P 50 / 30 / 20 [ P 30]
[INSTRUCTION TEST QUESTIONS:
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⇒ ONLY ASK TEST QUESTIONS ONCE!
⇒ CHECK WHETHER MOST PARTICIPANTS HAVE UNDERSTOOD
THE EXPLANATIONS AND ANSWERED THE TEST QUESTIONS COR-
RECTLY
⇒ IF TOO MANY PARTICIPANTS DID NOT ANSWER THE TEST QUES-
TION CORRECTLY, EXPLAIN THE POSTER 100 AGAIN
HOW TO IDENTIFY "TOO MANY":
⇒ LEAD INSTRUCTOR: ASK INSTRUCTORS IF WE NEED TO
REPEAT EXPLANATIONS.
⇒ INSTRUCTORS; RAISE YOUR HAND IF MORE THAN 2 PEOPLE
IN YOUR GROUP ANSWERED 2 OR MORE QUESTIONS WRONGLY
⇒ IF MORE THAN 2 INSTRUCTORS RAISE THEIR HANDS; REPEAT
THE EXPLANATION]
b.7.1.3 Practice Term - General
It is really important that you understand the consequences of your decisions
very well because at the end you will earn real money based on the decisions
that you have made. So before you will make the real decisions that count for
calculating your earnings we will have a practice term.
[USE DECISION SHEET IL- no pass Decision 1/2, SHOW THIS DECISION
SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH
DECISION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION
SHEET]
Each term you have to decide between two options:
Option A: repay one token and consume one token; and Option B: repay zero
tokens and consume two tokens.
b.7.1.4 Repayment Decision in Term T1, T2, T3
Decision term 1
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 1st term when
you are not robbed by the thief. You can either
A) Repay one token and consume one token
or
B) Not repay and consume two tokens.
Please indicate your choice by distributing your two green tokens between op-
tion A and B
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PRACTICE
PERIOD FOR TERM 1]
Decision term 2
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term when
you are not robbed by the thief so far.
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Please indicate your choice by distributing your two green tokens between Op-
tion A and Option B.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PRACTICE
PERIOD FOR TERM 2]
Decision term 3
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term when
you are not robbed by the thief so far.
Please indicate your choice by distributing your two green tokens between Op-
tion A and Option B.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PRACTICE
PERIOD FOR TERM 3; LET SHE DRAW WHETHER SHE WAS ROBBED BY
A THIEF OR NOT; CALCULATE CONSUMPTION ITEMS AND P 100 FOR
EACH PARTICIPANT AND STATE THEM TO PARTICIPANTS. NOTE RE-
SULT ON TEST ROUND DECISION SHEET. CONTINUE WITH SECOND
PARTICIPANT IN YOUR GROUP; THEN THIRD AND FOURTH PARTICI-
PANT; USE SHEET "PRACTICE TERM" TO NOTE ALL DECISIONS AND
REALIZATIONS OF SHOCK VS. NO SHOCK]
You have now played the game one time. We will practice the game for two
more rounds. None of your decision will determine your pay-off. We will tell
you when we play the game for real money. You can use these terms to test
how changes in your decision affect your earnings. You will also better under-
stand how often a thief will rob you.
Practice Rounds 2 and 3
[RE-START PRACTICE PERIOD HERE FOR PRACTICE ROUND 3]
Each term you have to decide between two options:
Option A: repay one token and consume one token; and Option B: repay zero
tokens and consume two tokens.
Please indicate your choice by distributing your two green tokens between op-
tion A and B.
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
term when you are not robbed by the thief. A) Repay one token and consume
one token or B) Not repay and consume two tokens.
[REPEAT PRACTICE ROUND ONE MORE TIME (3 ROUNDS IN TOTAL);
GO TO "RESTART PRACTICE PERIOD"]
Now that you have finished the practice term, you have a good understanding
of the consequences of your decisions.
Do you have any questions?
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Treatment Games
[NOTE: WE WILL EITHER PLAY IL-NOFLEX + IL-FLEX (TYPE 1) OR IL-
NOFLEX + JL + JL-FLEX (TYPE 2). CHECK THE SCHEDULE FOR EACH
SESSION ON WHICH TYPE IS PLAYED IN THIS SESSION]
We will now play different variants of the game. For each variant that we will
play, we place one token in this bag.
[SHOW BAG AND TOKEN]
At the end of the session, we will draw one token with closed eyes. Your earn-
ings in this game depend on the decisions made in this variant. All decisions
that you make have the same chance of determining your final earnings. It is
very important that you take all the decisions in this session. Otherwise we
will not be able to pay your earnings.
b.7.2 Individual-Liability (FOR TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2)
b.7.2.1 Explanation IL
[USE POSTER 2) IL-NO FLEX]
In this variant of the game, you get an individual loan that gives you a regular
income of two green tokens in all three terms. In each term, you may get
robbed by a thief who steals all your income.
If you are spared by the thief, you have to decide how you want to spend your
two tokens of income.
You have to simultaneously decide how you want to split up the income of two
green tokens on repaying your loan and on consuming from the consumption
table. You can either repay one token and consume one token, to go shop-
ping at the consumption table; or you do not repay your loan repayment and
consume two tokens, to go shopping at the consumption table. You can take
home your shopping immediately after the game. Remember that the token
loses value over time.
If you are robbed by the thief, you cannot repay your loan installment, that is
you default in this term. The bank does not care why you defaulted, because
she cannot observe this.
If you repay your loan in all three terms, you get the voucher of P 100 after the
game. If you do not repay in any of the three terms, that is if you default in any
term, you do not get P 100. There are no other consequences of not repaying
in this game.
b.7.2.2 Decisions IL
Now we will play the game for real. All decisions will determine your payment
when this variant is selected in the lucky draw.
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repayment decision in term t1 ,t2 ,t3
[USE DECISION SHEET IL- no flex decision sheet 1/1, SHOW THIS DECI-
SION SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.]
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
term when you are not robbed by the thief.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM T1, T2,
AND T3]
repayment decision after thief
[USE DECISION SHEET IL- no pass decision 2/2, SHOW THIS DECISION
SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.]
Since you lose the voucher of P 100 as soon as you are robbed by the thief in
one term, and there are no other consequences of not repaying your loan in
this game, you may want to change your decision in the 2nd term when you
have been robbed by a thief in the 1st term.
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term when
you have been robbed by the thief in the 1st period.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR "AFTER THIEF"]
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b.7.3 Joint-Liability (FOR TYPE 2 ONLY)
b.7.3.1 Explanation JL
In this variant of the game, you will be paired with one other participant. To-
gether, you will form a team. You both play the same game and you and your
partner will make the decisions at the same time. You do not know who will
be your partner; you only know it will be somebody from today’s meeting.
Your partner will also not know who you are; she just knows that her partner
is somebody from today’s meeting.
[USE POSTER JL]
You and your partner get a loan that gives you both a regular income of two
green tokens in all three terms. In each term, you, your partner or both of you
may get robbed by a thief who steals all your income.
If you are spared by the thief, you and your partner have to decide how you
want to split your two tokens of income:
You can either repay one token and consume one token, to go shopping at the
consumption table; or you do not repay your loan repayment and consume
two tokens, to go shopping at the consumption table. You can take home your
shopping immediately after the game. Remember that the token loses value
over time.
Your team is jointly responsible for the two loans you have.
If one of the team partners does not repay her loan, the joint responsibility in
the group will be applied automatically. This means, if you decide to repay
one token and consume one token, you will only consume one token if you
do not have to repay the loan for your partner. In the case you repay your
loan, you will also repay the loan of your partner if she does not repay. In the
case that you do not repay, and your partner repays, she will cover your loan
installment. Your team loan is repaid in both cases. If you do not repay and
your partner does not repay her loan, your team will default on the loan.
As long as the team loan is repaid in every term, you both will get the voucher
of P 100 after the game. As soon as your team loan is not repaid in one term,
you both will not receive the P 100. There are no other consequences to team
default in this game. This implies that if your team defaults in one term, it is
your best strategy to also not repay in the following terms.
If you or your partner or both of you are robbed by the thief, you cannot
repay your loan installment. In this case you default in this term. The bank
cannot observe this. Also, the bank does not know who repaid and who did
not; she can only observe the total repayment of the team. As long as neither or
only one of you is robbed by the thief, the joint responsibility will be applied
automatically if you chose to repay. In this case you will not default.
b.7.3.2 Examples JL
[INSTRUCTOR: USE THE DECISION SHEETS AND THE LAMINATED GREEN
TOKENS FOR YOU AND YOUR PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXAM-
PLE]
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Now, your repayment, consumption and default does not only depend on your
choices but also on the choices of your partner. I will now give you examples of
different situations that can arise. For now, we only consider the cases where
the thief does not rob you, because these are the cases when you can take a
decision.
[USE POSTER "EXAMPLE A - JL" (See Figure B.7)
GO THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE CORRECT LAMINATED
GREEN TOKENS ON EACH DECISION THAT YOU ARE DEMONSTRAT-
ING – USE SCOTCH TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER]
example a : both repay in all periods
[INSTRUCTOR: GO THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE COR-
RECT LAMINATED GREEN TOKENS ON EACH DECISION FOR YOU AND
YOUR PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXAMPLE. USE TOKENS WITH
NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS
WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN
POSTER]
Figure B.7: Example A - JL
no thief realization
Let’s consider a situation where you decide to repay the loan installment in all
three terms. That is, in each term you repay one token and consume one token
if you do not have to pay for your partner. In total, in each of the three terms,
you can go shopping at the consumption table for one token. Remember that
we only look at the situation now where the thief did not rob you.
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Let’s assume your partner also decides to repay the loan installment in all
three terms. That is, in each term she repays one token and consumes one
token. Your partner can go shopping at the consumption table in each of the
three terms for one token. Remember that we only look at the situation now
where the thief did not rob her.
In addition, since your team did not default in any term, you both get the
voucher of P 100. In total, you and your partner get all your shopping items
you got for three tokens each plus the voucher of P 100.
draw thief realization
Now let’s draw the thief to see what happens.
1) DRAW THE THIEF FOR THE PLAYER (BLUE)
2) DRAW THE THIEF FOR THE PARTNER (YELLOW)
3) DETERMINE WHO IS REPAYING; WHO IS NOT REPAYING; WHO
PAYS ABONO FOR THE OTHER
– TAKE AWAY A TOKEN FOR INDIVIDUAL REPAYMENT
– TAKE AWAY A TOKEN FOR ABONO REPAYMENT FOR THE
GROUP PARTNER; DEPENDING ON THIEF REALIZATION
4) CALCULATE PAYOFFS OF BOTH PLAYERS
– CONSUMPTION TOKENS AND P 100 VOUCHER
example b : repay in all periods , partner does not repay
[USE POSTER EXAMPLE B - JL (See Figure B.8): GO THROUGH EACH EX-
AMPLE AND PLACE THE CORRECT LAMINATED GREEN TOKENS ON
EACH DECISION FOR YOU AND YOUR PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE
THE EXAMPLE. USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH
NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH
TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER]
no thief realization
Let’s consider a situation where you decide to repay the loan installment in all
three terms. That is, in each term you repay one token and consume one token
if you do not have to pay for your partner. In total, after three terms, you can
go shopping at the consumption table for one token in each of the three terms.
Remember that we only look at the situation now where the thief did not rob
you.
Let’s assume your partner decides not to repay the loan installment in all three
terms. That is, in each term she repays zero token and consumes two tokens.
Your partner can go shopping at the consumption table for two tokens each
term. Remember that we only look at the situation now where the thief did
not rob her.
Since you choose to repay, your joint responsibility is automatically enforced
and you have to repay the team loan for your partner who does not repay.
Your team does not default in any term. The bank does not know who repaid
and who did not; she can only observe the total repayment of the team. So you
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Figure B.8: Example B - JL
both get the voucher of P 100. In total, you get zero consumption tokens plus
the P 100. Your partner gets 6 consumption tokens plus the P 100.
draw thief realization
Now let’s draw the thief to see what happens.
[USE POSTER EXAMPLE JL
1) DRAW THE THIEF FOR THE PLAYER (BLUE)
2) DRAW THE THIEF FOR THE PARTNER (YELLOW)
3) DETERMINE WHO IS REPAYING; WHO IS NOT REPAYING; WHO
PAYS ABONO FOR THE OTHER
– TAKE AWAY A TOKEN FOR INDIVIDUAL REPAYMENT
– TAKE AWAY A TOKEN FOR ABONO REPAYMENT FOR THE
GROUP PARTNER; DEPENDING ON THIEF REALIZATION
4) CALCULATE PAYOFFS OF BOTH PLAYERS
– CONSUMPTION TOKENS AND P 100 VOUCHER]
Do you have any questions?
Let’s summarize the game: You and your partner are jointly liable for your
loans. Each of you has a repayment obligation of one token per term. If both
partners repay, you, individually, have one token left for consumption in that
term.
If your partner defaults or the thief robs her, you have to automatically abono
for your partner. That is, you have to repay two tokens and you cannot con-
sume in this term.
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b.7.3.3 Test Questions - JL
Now, we will ask you a few test questions. It is very important that you under-
stand the game we have just presented, so we would like to test your under-
standing in this quiz. Please do not talk to your neighbors now and only tell
the answer to the instructor or note it yourself on the sheet. Are you ready to
take the quiz?
For all the answers, please encircle your answer choice:
1. You repay and your partner repays: How many tokens can you person-
ally consume in this term? – None/1/2 [one token]
2. You repay and your partner does not repay. Will the team default? – No
default/ default [NO DEFAULT]
3. You are robbed by the thief and your partner does not repay: Will the
team default? – No default/ default [DEFAULT]
4. You repay and your partner has been robbed: How many tokens will you
consume? – None/1/2 [NONE]
b.7.3.4 Dislike - JL
dislike introduction
In each term, you have the possibility to express your feelings about your part-
ner’s decision by choosing to tell her that you dislike her decision. Remember
that you do not know who will be your partner; you only know it will be some-
body from today’s meeting. Your partner will also not know who you are; she
just knows that her partner is somebody from today’s meeting. If you decide
to tell your partner you dislike her decision, she will know that her partner
dislikes her decision, but she cannot connect it to you personally. The same
holds true for your partner. She also can express that she does not like your
decision; you will only know that your partner dislikes your decision but you
do not know who your partner is.
[POSTER 1: DISLIKE OVERVIEW]
To show your partner you dislike her decision, you have eight red dislike
tokens available each term. If you do not use your red tokens, you will thus
have eight tokens. Each token is worth P five. In total you have a dislike budget
of P 40. This is part of the participation fee that we will pay you.
You can choose to either use one red token or two red tokens to dislike your
partner’s decision. For each red token you assign to your partner, she will lose
three red tokens. That is, if you use one red token, your partner loses three red
tokens; you pay P five from your dislike tokens and your partner loses P 15
from her dislike tokens. If you use two red tokens, your partner loses six red to-
kens; you pay P 10 from your dislike tokens and your partner loses P 30 from
her dislike tokens. Each dislike decision may influence your final payment if
this variant of the game is chosen for payouts.
[POSTER 2: DISLIKE DETAIL – TABLE ON LEFT SIDE]
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So you have the choice to use 1, 2 or 0/ no dislike token. If you use one, you
will keep seven tokens, and your partner five. If you use two tokens, you will
keep six and your partner two tokens. If you use zero tokens, both you and
your partner will keep eight tokens.
[POSTER 2: DISLIKE DETAIL – TABLE ON RIGHT SIDE]
[INSTRUCTOR: USE THE LAMINATED RED TOKENS FOR YOU AND YOUR
PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXAMPLE]
Your partner also has the possibility to express her feelings about your decision
by choosing to tell you that she dislikes your decision. Remember that she does
not know that you will be her partner; she only knows it will be somebody
from today’s meeting who will receive the message. Your partner has eight
red tokens available each term to tell you that she dislikes your decision. Each
token is worth P five.
Your partner also can choose to either use one red token or two red tokens to
dislike your decision. For each red token your partner assigns to you, you will
lose three red tokens.
Let me give you one example: you and your partner both have eight dislike
tokens. In this example, you use one token so your partner loses three tokens.
Your partner uses partner uses two tokens, so you lose six tokens. You are left
with one token and your partner is left with 3 tokens.
[INSTRUCTOR: DEMONSTRATE THE EXAMPLE USING THE RED LAMI-
NATED TOKENS]
For each dislike token that you send or that is destroyed by your partner, we
will subtract P 5 from your participation fee.
Do you have any questions?
test questions - dislike
Now, we will ask you a few test questions. It is very important that you un-
derstand the decision we have just presented, so we would like to test your
understanding in this quiz. Please do not talk to your neighbors and only tell
the answer to the instructor or note it yourself on the sheet. Are you ready to
take the quiz?
For all the answers, please encircle your answer choice:
1. How many red tokens can you maximal use to show your dislike? –
None/1/2 [two tokens]
2. If you decide not use any red tokens, how many tokens will your partner
lose in this term? - None/1/2/3/4/6 [NONE]
3. If your partner decides to use one red token, how many tokens will you
lose in this term? - 1/2/3/4/5/6 [3 TOKEN]
4. How many red tokens do you use if you like the decision of your partner?
None/1/2 [NONE]
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b.7.3.5 Repayment Decisions JL
Now we will play the game for real. All decisions will determine your payment
when this treatment variant is selected in the lucky draw.
If this game is selected, we will randomly match you with an anonymous
partner from today’s meeting. You do not know who will be your partner; you
only know it will be somebody from today’s meeting. The same holds for your
partner. You and your will determine the money that you earn if this variant
is selected.
You have to take this decision in every term. Your partner has to take the same
decision at the same time, so you do not know the decision of your partner
and she does not know your decision.
repayment decision term t1 , t2 , t3 - repayment
[USE DECISION SHEET JL- NO PASS DECISION 1/2, SHOW THIS DECI-
SION SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.]
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
term when you are not robbed by the thief. Remember that you are in a group
with your partner.
Your partner has the same decisions but you both decide at the same time, so
you do not know what your partner chooses.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM T1, T2,
and T3]
repayment decision after team default
[USE DECISION SHEET JL- no pass decision 2/2, SHOW THIS DECISION
SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.]
Since you lose the voucher of P 100 as soon as your team defaults in one term,
and there are no other consequences to not repaying your loan in this game,
you may want to change your decision in the 2nd term when your team has
defaulted in the 1st term.
Please take your repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term when
your team has defaulted in the 1st period.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR "AFTER THIEF"]
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b.7.3.6 Beliefs About Partner’s Repayment - JL
You are paired with somebody from today’s meeting but you do not know her
exact identity. What do you think will your partner chose?
Will she
A) Repay one token and consume one token
Or
B) Not repay and consume two tokens?
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
b.7.3.7 Dislike - JL
You have the possibility to express your feelings about your partner’s decision
by choosing to tell her that you dislike her decision. Your partner can also
express that she does not like your decision. You both will only receive the
message, but you do not know who sent it.
dislike decisions
[USE DECISION SHEET JL- NO PASS-DISLIKE INFO 1/1, SHOW THIS DE-
CISION SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.
FOR EACH DECISION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE
DECISION SHEET]
Before you take your dislike decisions, remember that you do not know who
your partner is and she does not know who you are. You only know you are
paired with someone from today’s meeting.
Please make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor. Please
take your decision to tell your partner you dislike her decisions for the follow-
ing cases :
[DECISION SHEET DISLIKE (See Figure B.9), COLUMNS 1-3]
1) Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She repays her loan and earns
one consumption token. How many dislike tokens do you assign?
2) Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She does not repay her loan and
earns two consumption tokens. How many dislike tokens do you assign?
3) Your partner is robbed by the thief and she cannot repay. You have to
repay for her and if you repay, the team will not default. How many dislike
tokens do you assign?
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DISLIKE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
IN YOUR GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS. USE THE
DECISION SHEET AND THE RESPECTIVE COLUMNS.]
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Figure B.9: Decision Sheet Dislike
beliefs about partner’s dislike
You are paired with somebody from today’s meeting but you do not know
her exact identity. Your partner can assign you dislike points to tell you she
does not like your decision. Please indicate your choice between option A and
option B. Please make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[USE THE SAME DECISION SHEET AS ABOVE, DECISION COLUMN 1, 2
and 3]
How many red tokens do you think will your partner send you in the follow-
ing cases:
1) You repay your loan and earn one consumption token. How many dis-
like tokens will your partner assign you?
2) You do not repay your loan and earn 2 consumption tokens. How many
dislike tokens will your partner assign you?
3) You have been robbed and cannot repay your loan and earn zero con-
sumption tokens. How many dislike tokens will your partner assign you?
Now you have taken all the decisions in this variant of the game. I will take
this token and put it in this bag for the lucky draw at the end.
[LEAD INSTRUCTOR: PLACE TOKEN FOR THIS VARIANT INTO BAG]
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b.7.4 Individual-Liability - With Pass Token (FOR TYPE 1 COMPLETE SECTION;
TYPE 2 ONLY B.7.4.1)
b.7.4.1 Explanation IL - Pass
[USE POSTER IL-PASS]
In this variant of the game, you get an individual loan that gives you a regular
income of two green tokens in all three terms. In each term, you may get
robbed by a thief who steals all your income.
If you are spared by the thief, you have to decide how you want to spend your
two tokens of income.
You have to simultaneously decide how you want to split up the income of two
green tokens on repaying your loan and on consuming from the consumption
table. You can either repay one token and consume one token, to go shopping
at the consumption table; or you do not repay your loan repayment and con-
sume two tokens, to go shopping at the consumption table. You can take home
your shopping immediately after the game.
If you are robbed by the thief, you cannot repay your loan installment, that is
you default in this term. The bank does not care why you defaulted, because
she cannot observe this.
If you repay your loan in all three terms, you get the voucher of P 100 after the
game. If you do not repay in any of the three terms, that is if you default in any
term, you do not get P 100. There are no other consequences of not repaying
in this game.
description pass token
[USE POSTER IL- PASS – OVERVIEW PASS TOKEN]
In this variant of the game you are offered a pass token by the bank presented
by a yellow token.
[INSTRUCTORS: TAKE THE YELLOW CHIP FROM THE PARTICIPANT BAG
AND SHOW THEM THAT THEY JUST HAVE ONE YELLOW TOKEN.]
You have only one pass token and you can use it to officially pass one repay-
ment amount due to the next term. That is, if you use the pass token in one
term, your repayment amount due in this term is reduced to zero, but you
have to make-up this repayment installment in the next term, that is you have
to repay two tokens in the next term. In the term in which you use the pass
token, you do not default. If you are robbed by the thief, your non repayment
does not count as default. If you are not robbed by the thief, you consume two
tokens without defaulting.
Remember that you only have one pass token, you can only use the pass token
in the 1st or the 2nd term. You cannot use it in the 3rd term.
There are three options to use the pass token:
1. you do not use the pass token in any term. In this case, your repayment
amount due remains one token in each term.
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2. you use the pass token in the 1st term. In this case, your repayment
amount due in the first term is reduced to zero, but you have to repay
two tokens in the 2nd term. In the 3rd period you have to repay one
token.
3. you use the pass token in the 2nd term. In this case, your repayment
amount due in the 1st term is one token. In the 2nd term you pass your
repayment to the 3rd period. That is you have a repayment amount due
of 0 in the 2nd term and a repayment amount due of two tokens in the
3rd period.
examples - il - pass
I will now give you examples on the use of the pass token.
example a - use pass token in t1 - no thief Let’s consider the case
where you are not robbed by a thief, but you decide to use the pass token in
the 1st term.
[USE POSTER DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 1/ 4 (See Figure B.10)
USE THE LAMINATED TOKENS TO VISUALIZE THE EXAMPLE AS DE-
PICTED BELOW GO THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE COR-
RECT LAMINATED GREEN TOKENS ON EACH DECISION THAT YOU
ARE DEMONSTRATING. USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS
WITH NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE
SCOTCH TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER]
You have only one pass token and you can use it to officially pass one repay-
ment amount due to the next term. That is, if you use the pass token in one
term, your repayment amount due in this term is reduced to zero, but you
have to make-up this repayment installment in the next term, that is you have
to repay two tokens in the next term. In the term in which you use the pass
token, you do not default. If you are robbed by the thief, your non repayment
does not count as default. If you are not robbed by the thief, you consume two
tokens without defaulting.
Your repayment amount due in the 1st term is zero and you can consume two
tokens.
Your repayment amount due in the 2nd term is two tokens, you have to pay
double because you passed the repayment from the 1st to the 2nd term.
Your repayment amount due in the 3rd term is one token.
If you are not robbed by the thief in any term and you repay in each term. You:
• Repay zero token, and consume two tokens in T1
• Repay two tokens, and consume zero token in T2
• Repay one token, and consume one token in T3
Since you do not default in any term, you get the voucher of P 100 in one
month. You get two T1 tokens, zero T2 tokens and one T3 token, that is you
can go shopping for P 100 and you get the voucher of P 100 in one month.
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Figure B.10: Example A - IL-Pass
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example b - use pass token in t1- no thief in t1 , thief in t2
Let’s consider the case where you are not robbed by a thief, but you decide to
use the pass token in the 1st term. [USE DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 1/4 (See
Figure B.11)
USE THE LAMINATED TOKENS TO VISUALIZE THE EXAMPLE AS DE-
PICTED BELOW. GO THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE COR-
RECT LAMINATED GREEN TOKENS ON EACH DECISION THAT YOU
ARE DEMONSTRATING. USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS
WITH NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE
SCOTCH TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER]
Figure B.11: Decision Sheet IL-Pass: Example B
Your repayment amount due in the 1st term is zero and you can consume two
tokens.
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Your repayment amount due in the 2nd term is two tokens, you have to pay
double because you passed the repayment from the 1st to the 2nd term.
Your repayment amount due in the 3rd term is one token.
Now you are robbed by the thief in T2. You cannot repay after the thief has
robbed you.
• Repay zero token, and consume two tokens in T1
• Are robbed by the thief and cannot repay in T2. Default in T2
• Repay zero token, and consume two tokens in T3.
Since you do default in T2, you do not get the voucher of P 100 in one month.
You get two T1 tokens, zero T2 tokens and two T3 tokens, that is you can go
shopping for P 120.
example c : use pass token in t2
Let’s consider the case where you are not robbed by a thief in the first two
terms and you decide to use the pass token in the 2nd term. The thief robs you
in the third term.
[USE DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 2/4 (See Figure B.12)
USE THE LAMINATED TOKENS TO VISUALIZE THE EXAMPLE AS DE-
PICTED BELOW. GO THROUGH EACH EXAMPLE AND PLACE THE COR-
RECT LAMINATED GREEN TOKENS ON EACH DECISION THAT YOU
ARE DEMONSTRATING. USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS
WITH NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE
SCOTCH TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER]
Your repayment amount due in the 1st term is one token.
You use the pass token in the 2nd term. Your repayment amount due in the
2nd term is zero and you can consume two tokens.
Your repayment amount due in the 3rd term is two tokens. You have to pay
double because you passed the repayment from the 2nd to the 3nd term.
Now you are robbed by the thief in T3. You:
• Repay one token, and consume one token in T1
• Repay zero token, and consume two tokens in T2
• Repay zero token, and consume zero token in T3
Since you default in the third term, you do not get the voucher of P 100 in one
month.
You get one T1 tokens, two T2 tokens and zero T3 tokens, that is you can go
shopping for P 100.
Let’s summarize the game: You have one pass token, that you can use in the
first or in the second term. Using the pass token saves you from default, even
if the thief came. In the term after using the pass token, you have to decide
between repaying two and consuming two, as you have passed the repayment
of one token to the next term.
b.7.4.2 Test Questions - IL - Pass
Now, we will ask you a few test questions. It is very important that you un-
derstand the decisions we have just presented, so we would like to test your
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Figure B.12: Decision Sheet IL-Pass: Example C
B.7 experimental instructions 207
understanding in this quiz. Please do not talk to your neighbors now and only
tell the answer to the instructor or note it yourself on the sheet. Are you ready
to take the quiz?
For all the answers, please encircle your answer choice:
1. In which terms can you use the pass token? Circle all that apply – Term
1/Term 2/Term 3 [Term 1 and Term 2]
2. When you use the pass token, will the bank consider you as being in
default when the thief robs you? – No default/ default [NO DEFAULT]
3. Can you use the pass token when the thief did not rob you? – Yes/No
[YES]
4. When you have used the pass token in one term, how many tokens is
your repayment amount due in the next term? – None/1/2 [two tokens]
b.7.4.3 Decision IL - Pass
Now we will play the game for real. All decisions will determine your payment
when this treatment variant is selected in the lucky draw.
In this game you have 1 yellow pass token that you can use it to officially pass
one repayment amount due to the next term.
You can only use the pass token in the 1st or the 2nd term, but not in the 3rd
term.
decision sheet 1 - not robbed by the thief in t1
[USE DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 1 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET IL 1/ 4]
First, let’s consider the situation in which you have not been robbed by the
thief.
Do you want to use the pass token in the 1st term? Please make your choices
in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR, NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PASS TO-
KEN USE IN TERM 1 WHEN PARTICIPANT HAS NOT BEEN ROBBED BY
THE THIEF.
INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 1.
PREPARE THE RIGHT DECISION SHEET TO FOLLOW.]
We first look at only participants who chose to use the pass token in the 1st
period when they are not robbed by a thief.
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You have decided to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have not
been robbed by the thief, you automatically consume two tokens in the 1st
period. In the 2nd period, you have to repay two tokens since you passed
your repayment with the pass token. When you are not robbed by the thief
in the 2nd term, you have to decide whether to repay or consume. Please
indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your choices
in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
In the 3rd term, you have to take your standard repayment and consumption
decision. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please
make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 2 - not used pass token in t1 – no thief in t1
We now look at only participants who chose to not use the pass token in the
1st period when they are not robbed by a thief.
[USE DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 2 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET IL 2/ 4]
You have decided not to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have not
been robbed by the thief, you have to take your repayment and consumption
decision. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please
make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 1]
Since you have not used the pass token in the 1st term, you can still use it in
the 2nd term. Let’s first consider the situation when you are not robbed by
a thief in the 2nd term. Do you want to use the pass token in the 2nd term?
Please take your decision now by placing the pass token on the respective field.
[INSTRUCTOR, NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PASS TO-
KEN USE IN TERM 1 WHEN PARTICIPANT HAS NOT BEEN ROBBED BY
THE THIEF.
INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2.
PREPARE THE RIGHT DECISION SHEET TO FOLLOW.]
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We first look at only participants who chose to use the pass token in the 2nd
period when you are not robbed by a thief.
You have decided to use the pass token in the 2nd period. Since you have not
been robbed by the thief, you automatically consume two tokens in the 2nd
period. In the 3rd period, you have to repay two tokens since you passed your
repayment with the pass token. When you are not robbed by the thief in the 3rd
term, you have to decide whether to repay or consume. Please indicate your
choice between option A and option B. Please make your choices in private
and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
We first look at only participants who chose not to use the pass token in the
2nd period when you are not robbed by a thief.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 3 - not used pass token in t1 – thief in t2
Now, we consider the situation where you have been robbed by a thief in the
2nd term that is you cannot repay your loan and you cannot consume. You can
decide whether you want to use the pass token or not.
[USE DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 3 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET IL 3/ 4]
The pass token reduces your repayment amount due in the 2nd term to 0, but
you have to make-up this repayment now in the 3rd term and pay 2 install-
ments, that is your repayment amount due increases to two tokens. When you
are not robbed by the thief in the 3rd term, you have to decide whether to
repay or consume. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B.
Please make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
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If you do not use the pass token in the 2nd term and you are robbed by the
thief, you default in this term. In this case, you have the standard decision in
the 3rd term. Since you defaulted in the 2nd term, it is optimal for you to not
repay and consume two tokens because you have lost the option to receive the
voucher of P 100 in one month anyway and there are no other consequences
to default in this game. As before, there is the possibility that you are robbed
by a thief in which case you earn 0 income and you cannot repay your loan
and consume anything.
We first look at only participants who chose not to use the pass token in the
2nd period when you are not robbed by a thief.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 4 - robbed by the thief in t1
Now, let’s consider the situation in which you have been robbed by a thief in
the 1st term that is you cannot repay your loan and you cannot consume. You
can decide whether you want to use the pass token or not.
[USE DECISION SHEET IL-PASS 4 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET IL 4/ 4]
Do you want to use the pass token in the 1st term?
We first look at only participants who chose to use the pass token in the 1st
period when robbed by a thief.
You have decided to use the pass token in the 1st period. In the 2nd period,
you have to repay two tokens since you passed your repayment with the pass
token. When you are not robbed by the thief in the 2nd term, you have to de-
cide whether to repay or consume. Please indicate your choice between option
A and option B. Please make your choices in private and tell it only to the
instructor. [INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS
IN YOUR GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM
2]
In the 3rd term, you have to take your standard repayment and consumption
decision.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor. [INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE
DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR GROUP ON THEIR INDI-
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VIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
We now look at only participants who chose to not use the pass token in the
1st period when they are robbed by a thief.
You have decided not to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have
been robbed by the thief, you cannot repay your loan nor consume. Since you
default on your repayment, you will not get the voucher of P 100 in one month.
There are no other consequences to your default in this game. It is your best
option to default in the next 2 terms as well.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 5 - repayment decision after default
[USE DECISION SHEET IL- PASS DECISION AFTER DEFAULT 1/1, SHOW
THIS DECISION SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTIC-
IPANTS.]
Since you lose the voucher of P 100 as soon as you defaults in one term, and
there are no other consequences to not repaying your loan in this game, you
may want to change your decision in the 2nd term when you defaulted in the
1st term.
Repay one token and consume one token
Or
Not repay and consume two tokens.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR "AFTER THIEF"]
Now you have taken all the decisions in this variant of the game. I will take
this token and put it in this bag for the lucky draw at the end.
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b.7.5 Joint-Liability – with Pass token (FOR TYPE 2 ONLY)
b.7.5.1 Explanation - JL - Pass
description jl
In this variant of the game, you will again be paired with one other partici-
pant. Together, you will form a team. You both play the same game and you
and your partner will make the decisions at the same time. You do not know
who will be your partner; you only know it will be somebody from today’s
meeting. Your partner will also not know who you are; she just knows that her
partner is somebody from today’s meeting.
[USE POSTER JL- PASS – OVERVIEW JL]
You and your partner get a loan that gives you both a regular income of two
green tokens in all three terms. In each term, you, your partner or both of you
may get robbed by a thief who steals all your income.
If you are spared by the thief, you and your partner have to decide how you
want to split your two tokens of income: you can repay or consume as before.
[USE POSTER JL- PASS (See Figure B.13)]
Your team is jointly responsible for the two loans you have.
If one of the team partners does not repay her loan, the joint responsibility in
the group will be applied automatically.
As long as the team loan is repaid in every term, you both will get the voucher
of P 100 in one month after the game. As soon as your team loan is not repaid
in one term, you both will not receive the P 100. There are no other conse-
quences to team default in this game. This implies that if your team defaults
in one term, it is your best strategy to also not repay in the following terms.
If you or your partner or both of you are robbed by the thief, you cannot repay
your loan installment. In this case you default in this term. The bank cannot
observe this. Also, the bank does not know who repaid and who did not; she
can only observe the total repayment of the team.
You have to take this decision in every term. Your partner has to take the same
decision at the same time, so you do not know the decision of your partner.
You have the possibility to express your feelings about your partner’s decision
by giving a dislike to her decision. Your partner also can express that she does
not like your decision; you will only know that your partner dislikes your
decision but you do not know who your partner is.
description pass token
[USE POSTER IL- PASS – OVERVIEW JOKER]
In addition, in this variant of the game you are offered a pass token by the
bank presented by a yellow token. You have only one pass token and you can
use it to officially pass one repayment amount due to the next term. That is, if
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Figure B.13: JL-Pass Overview
you use the pass token in one term, your repayment amount due in this term
is reduced to zero, but you have to make-up this repayment installment in the
next term, that is you have to repay two tokens in the next term. In the term
in which you use the pass token, you do not default. If you are robbed by the
thief, your non repayment does not count as default. If you are not robbed by
the thief, you consume two tokens without defaulting.
You can only use the pass token in the 1st or the 2nd term, but not in the 3rd
term.
There are three options to use the pass token:
1. you do not use the pass token in any period. In this case, your repayment
amount due remains one token in each term
2. you use the pass token in the 1st term. In this case, your repayment
amount due in the first term is reduced to zero, but you have to repay
two tokens in the 2nd term. In the 3rd period you have to repay one
token.
3. you use the pass token in the 2nd term. In this case, your repayment
amount due in the 1st term is one token. In the 2nd term you pass your
repayment to the 3rd period. That is you have a repayment amount due
of zero in the 2nd term and a repayment amount due of two tokens in
the 3rd period.
Both your partner and you have a pass token that you can use to pass repay-
ment from one term to the next term. This allows you to consume earlier or
to deal with the thief yourself without relying on your partner to repay your
loan.
If you use the pass token in one term, you have to repay two tokens in the
next term. This implies, that when you have to repay your pass token in the
next period, you cannot repay for your partner. The same holds true for your
partner. If she uses has used her pass token in one term and has to repay the
double installment in the next period, she can not cover your repayment. In
this case, your team defaults on the loan.
Do you have any questions?
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b.7.5.2 Examples JL - Pass
Let me give you four examples.
Example A: You use the pass token in term 1, your partner uses the pass
token in term 1 – no thief in T1, not thief in T2 & T3
Let’s consider the case where both you and your partner are not robbed by a
thief, but you both decide to use the pass token in the 1st term.
[INSTRUCTOR: USE THE POSTER AND THE LAMINATED GREEN AND
YELLOW TOKENS FOR YOU AND YOUR PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE
THE EXAMPLE. USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH
NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH
TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER (See Figure B.14)]
Your repayment amount due in the 1st term is zero and you can consume two
tokens.
Your repayment amount due in the 2nd term is two tokens, you have to pay
double because you passed the repayment from the 1st to the 2nd term.
Your repayment amount due in the 3rd term is one token.
The same holds true for your partner since she also used her pass token in the
1st term when she was not robbed by a thief.
If both you and your partner are not robbed by the thief in any term and both
of you repay in each term.
Your partner:
1. Repays zero token, and consumes two tokens in T1.
2. Repays two tokens, and consumes zero token in T2.
3. Repays one token, and consumes one token in T3.
You:
1. Repay zero token, and consume two tokens in T1. Your team does not
default.
2. Repay two tokens, and consume zero token in T2. Your team does not
default.
3. Repay one token, and consume one token in T3. Your team does not
default.
Since your team does not default in any term, you both get the voucher of
P 100 in one month.
You have the possibility to express your feelings about your partner’s decision
by giving a dislike to her decision. Your partner also can express that she does
not like your decision; you will only know that your partner dislikes your
decision but you do not know who your partner is.
Example B: You use the pass token in term 1, your partner uses the pass
token in term 1 – no thief in T1, thief for partner in T2, otherwise no thief
Let’s consider the case where both you and your partner are not robbed by a
thief, but you both decide to use the pass token in the 1st term.
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Figure B.14: JL-Pass - Example A
[INSTRUCTOR: USE THE POSTER AND THE LAMINATED GREEN AND
YELLOW TOKENS FOR YOU AND YOUR PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE
THE EXAMPLE USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH
NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH
TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER (See Figure B.15)]
Your repayment amount due in the 1st term is zero and you can consume two
tokens.
Your repayment amount due in the 2nd term is two tokens, you have to pay
double because you passed the repayment from the 1st to the 2nd term.
Your repayment amount due in the 3rd term is one token.
The same holds true for your partner since she also used her pass token in the
1st term when she was not robbed by a thief.
Now your partner is robbed by a thief in the 2nd term. If both of you repay in
each term.
Your partner:
1. Repays zero token, and consumes two tokens in T1.
2. Is robbed by the thief and cannot repay.
You:
1. Repay zero token, and consume two tokens in T1. Your team does not
default.
2. Repay two tokens, and consume zero token in T2. Your partner cannot
repay her loan.
You cannot repay for your partner since you have to make the double payment
for the pass token. Your team loan is not repaid and your team defaults.
Since your team defaults in Term 2, you both do not get the voucher of P 100 in
one month. Since the team defaults, both will only consume in the last period.
You have the possibility to express your feelings about your partner’s decision
by giving a dislike to her decision. Your partner also can express that she does
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Figure B.15: JL-Pass - Example B
not like your decision; you will only know that your partner dislikes your
decision but you do not know who your partner is.
Example C: You use the pass token in term 1, your partner does not use the
pass token in term 1 - thief in T1, no thief in T2 & T3
Let’s consider the case where you are robbed by the thief in the 1st term. You
use the pass token in the 1st term. Your partner does not use her pass token
and she is not robbed by a thief in any term. Both you and your partner repay
in any term.
[INSTRUCTOR: USE THE POSTER AND THE LAMINATED GREEN AND
YELLOW TOKENS FOR YOU AND YOUR PARTNER TO DEMONSTRATE
THE EXAMPLE USE TOKENS WITH NUMBER 1 FOR T1, TOKENS WITH
NUMBER 2 FOR T2 AND TOKENS WITH NUMBER 3 FOR T3 – USE SCOTCH
TO PUT THEM ON THE TARPAULIN POSTER (See Figure B.16)]
Your repayment amount due in the 1st term is zero since you use the pass
token. Although you were robbed by the thief, your partner does not have to
repay your loan since you used the pass token.
Your repayment amount due in the 2nd term is two tokens, you have to pay
double because you passed the repayment from the 1st to the 2nd term.
Your repayment amount due in the 3rd term is one token.
Your partner is not robbed by the thief and does not use the pass token.
If both of you repay in each term, you
Your partner:
1. Repays one token, and consumes one token in T1.
2. Repays one token, and consumes one token in T2.
3. Repays one token, and consumes one token in T3.
You:
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1. Are robbed by the thief in T1. Your partner does not repay for you since
you used the passed token. Your team does not default.
2. Repay two tokens, and consume zero token in T2 since you used the pass
token in T1. Your team does not default.
3. Repay one token, and consume one token in T3.
Since your team does not default in any term, you both get the voucher of
P 100 in one month.
You have the possibility to express your feelings about your partner’s decision
by giving a dislike to her decision. Your partner also can express that she does
not like your decision; you will only know that your partner dislikes your
decision but you do not know who your partner is.
Let’s summarize the game: You and your partner have one pass token each,
that you can use in the first or in the second term. Using the pass token saves
you from default, even if the thief came. In the term after using the pass token,
you have to decide between repaying two and consuming two, as you have
passed the repayment of one token to the next term.
If you use the pass token or your repayment due is who tokens you cannot
abono for your partner in that term.
Figure B.16: JL-Pass - Example C
b.7.5.3 Test Questions JL - Pass
Now, we will ask you a few test questions. It is very important that you un-
derstand the decision we have just presented, so we would like to test your
understanding in this quiz. Please do not talk to your neighbours now and
only tell the answer to the instructor or note it yourself on the sheet. Are you
ready to take the quiz?
1. You are robbed by the thief and you use the pass token: Does your part-
ner have to abonohan for you? - Yes/No [NO]
2. You are not robbed by the thief and you use the pass token: How many
items can you consume in this term? – Wala/1/2 [two tokens]
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3. Your partner uses the pass token: Can she abonohan for you in this term?
- Yes/No [NO]
4. You have used your pass token in term 1 and now in term 2 you have to
repay two tokens: Can you abonohan for your partner? - Yes/No [NO]
b.7.5.4 Decisions JL - Pass
Now we will play the game for real. All decisions will determine your payment
when this treatment variant is selected in the lucky draw.
In this variant of the game, you will again be paired with one other participant
in a team. You are jointly responsible for your team repayment and you have
to automatically repay for your partner if she does not repay and the other
way around. In addition, you have 1 yellow pass token that you can use to
officially pass one repayment amount due to the next term.
In this game you have 1 yellow pass token that you can use it to officially pass
one repayment amount due to the next term.
Since you and your partner take the decisions at the same time, you will not
know what your partner’s choices are. We will ask you for your choices, but
keep in mind that you are in a team with your partner.
decision sheet 1 - not robbed by the thief in t1
First, let’s consider the situation in which you have not been robbed by the
thief.
[USE DECISION SHEET JL-PASS 1 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET JL 1/ 4]
Remember that you can only repay for your partner when you have a repay-
ment obligation of one token, that is not in the term when you use the pass
token and not in the term afterwards. Also your partner can only repay for
you when she has a repayment obligation of one token.
Do you want to use the pass token in the 1st term if you are not robbed by the
thief?
Please take your decision now by placing the pass token on the respective field.
[INSTRUCTOR, NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PASS TO-
KEN USE IN TERM 1 WHEN PARTICIPANT HAS NOT BEEN ROBBED BY
THE THIEF.
INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 1.
PREPARE THE RIGHT DECISION SHEET TO FOLLOW.]
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We first look at only participants who chose to use the pass token in the 1st
period when they are not robbed by a thief.
You have decided to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have not
been robbed by the thief, you automatically consume two tokens in the 1st
period.
In the 2nd period, you have to repay two tokens since you passed your repay-
ment with the pass token. When you are not robbed by the thief in the 2nd
term, you have to decide whether to repay or consume. Please indicate your
choice between option A and option B. Please make your choices in private
and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
In the 3rd term, you have to take your standard repayment and consumption
decision. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please
make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 2 - not used pass token in t1 – no thief in t1
We now look at only participants who chose to not use the pass token in the
1st period when they are not robbed by a thief.
[USE DECISION SHEET JL-PASS 2 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET JL 2/ 4]
Remember that you can only repay for your partner when you have a repay-
ment obligation of one token, that is not in the term when you use the pass
token and not in the term afterwards. Also your partner can only repay for
you when she has a repayment obligation of one token.
You have decided not to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have not
been robbed by the thief, you have to take your repayment and consumption
decision. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please
make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 1]
Since you have not used the pass token in the 1st term, you can still use it in
the 2nd term. Let’s first consider the situation when you are not robbed by
a thief in the 2nd term. Do you want to use the pass token in the 2nd term?
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Please take your decision now by placing the pass token on the respective field.
[INSTRUCTOR, NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR THE PASS TO-
KEN USE IN TERM 1 WHEN PARTICIPANT HAS NOT BEEN ROBBED BY
THE THIEF.
INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2.
PREPARE THE RIGHT DECISION SHEET TO FOLLOW.]
We first look at only participants who chose to use the pass token in the 2nd
period when you are not robbed by a thief.
You have decided to use the pass token in the 2nd period. Since you have not
been robbed by the thief, you automatically consume two tokens in the 2nd
period. In the 3rd period, you have to repay two tokens since you passed your
repayment with the pass token. When you are not robbed by the thief in the
3rd term, you have to decide whether to repay or consume. Please indicate
your choice between option A and option B. Please make your choices in pri-
vate and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
We first look at only participants who chose not to use the pass token in the
2nd period when you are not robbed by a thief.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 3 - not used pass token in t1 – thief in t2
Now, we consider the situation where you have been robbed by a thief in the
2nd term that is you cannot repay your loan and you cannot consume. You can
decide whether you want to use the pass token or not.
[USE DECISION SHEET JL-PASS 3 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET JL 3/ 4]
Remember that you can only repay for your partner when you have a repay-
ment obligation of one token, that is not in the term when you use the pass
token and not in the term afterwards. Also your partner can only repay for
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you when she has a repayment obligation of one token.
The pass token reduces your repayment amount due in the 2nd term to 0, but
you have to make-up this repayment now in the 3rd term and pay 2 install-
ments, that is your repayment amount due increases to two tokens. When you
are not robbed by the thief in the 3rd term, you have to decide whether to
repay or consume. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B.
Please make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
If you do not use the pass token in the 2nd term and you are robbed by the
thief, you default in this term. In this case, you have the standard decision in
the 3rd term. Since you defaulted in the 2nd term, it is optimal for you to not
repay and consume two tokens because you have lost the option to receive the
voucher of P 100 in one month anyway and there are no other consequences
to default in this game.
As before, there is the possibility that you are robbed by a thief in which case
you earn 0 income and you cannot repay your loan and consume anything.
We first look at only participants who chose not to use the pass token in the
2nd period when you are not robbed by a thief.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
decision sheet 4 - robbed by the thief in t1
Now, let’s consider the situation in which you have been robbed by a thief in
the 1st term that is you cannot repay your loan and you cannot consume. You
can decide whether you want to use the pass token or not.
[USE DECISION SHEET JL-PASS 4 / 4, SHOW THIS DECISION SHEET IN
THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS. FOR EACH DECI-
SION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE DECISION SHEET.
LEAD INSTRUCTOR; CHECK WHETHER ALL INSTRUCTORS USE THE DE-
CISION SHEET JL 4/ 4]
Do you want to use the pass token in the 1st term?
We first look at only participants who chose to use the pass token in the 1st
period when robbed by a thief.
You have decided to use the pass token in the 1st period. In the 2nd period,
you have to repay two tokens since you passed your repayment with the pass
token. When you are not robbed by the thief in the 2nd term, you have to de-
cide whether to repay or consume. Please indicate your choice between option
A and option B. Please make your choices in private and tell it only to the
instructor.
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[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
In the 3rd term, you have to take your standard repayment and consumption
decision. Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please
make your choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
You have decided not to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have
been robbed by the thief, you cannot repay your loan nor consume. Since you
default on your repayment, you will not get the voucher of P 100 in one month.
There are no other consequences to your default in this game. It is your best
option to default in the next 2 terms as well.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
You have decided not to use the pass token in the 1st period. Since you have
been robbed by the thief, you cannot repay your loan nor consume. Since you
default on your repayment, you will not get the voucher of P 100 in one month.
There are no other consequences to your default in this game. It is your best
option to default in the next 2 terms as well.
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 2nd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 2]
You take your standard repayment and consumption decision for the 3rd term.
Please indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your
choices in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 3]
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decision sheet 5 - repayment after team default
[USE DECISION SHEET JL- pass decision After Default 1/1, SHOW THIS DE-
CISION SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.]
Since you lose the voucher of P 100 as soon as your team defaults in one term,
and there are no other consequences to not repaying your loan in this game,
you may want to change your decision in the 2nd term when your team has
defaulted in the 1st term. Please take your repayment and consumption deci-
sion for the 2nd term when your team has defaulted in the 1st period. Please
indicate your choice between option A and option B. Please make your choices
in private and tell it only to the instructor.
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN YOUR
GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR "AFTER DEFAULT"]
b.7.5.5 Beliefs About Partner’s Use of the Pass Token – JL
You are paired with somebody from today’s meeting but you do not know her
exact identity. What do you think will your partner chose?
Will she use the pass token in the 1st term when she is not robbed by a thief?
Will she use the pass token in the 2nd term when she is not robbed by a thief
and when she can still use the pass token?
Will she use the pass token in the 1st term when she is robbed by a thief?
Will she use the pass token in the 2nd term when she is robbed by a thief when
she can still use the pass token?
b.7.5.6 Dislike - JL PASS
You have the possibility to express your feelings about your partner’s decision
by choosing to tell her that you dislike her decision. Your partner can also
express that she does not like your decision. You both will only receive the
message, but you do not know who send it exactly.
Before you take your dislike decisions, remember that you do not know who
your partner is and she does not know who you are. You only know you are
paired with someone from today’s meeting. Please take your decision to tell
your partner you dislike her decisions for the following cases in term.
[USE DECISION SHEET JL- pass-dislike info 1/2 and 2/2, SHOW THIS DE-
CISION SHEET IN THE INSTRUCTORS’ CLEARBOOK TO PARTICIPANTS.
FOR EACH DECISION, POINT AT THE CORRESPONDING FIELD ON THE
DECISION SHEET]
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1. Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She does not use the pass token.
She has a repayment obligation of one token. She repays her loan and
earns one consumption token. How many dislike tokens do you assign?
2. Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She does not use the token. She
has a repayment obligation of one token. She does not repay her loan
and earns two consumption tokens. How many dislike tokens do you
assign?
3. Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She uses the pass token. She has
a repayment obligation of zero token. She consumes two tokens. How
many dislike tokens do you assign?
4. Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She has used the pass token in
the previous term. She has a repayment obligation of two tokens. She
repays two tokens. How many dislike tokens do you assign?
5. Your partner is not robbed by the thief. She has used the pass token in
the previous term. She has a repayment obligation of two tokens. She
consumes two tokens. How many dislike tokens do you assign?
6. Your partner is robbed by the thief. She has used the pass token in the
previous term. She has a repayment obligation of two token. She cannot
repay or consume. You cannot repay for her and the team defaults. How
many dislike tokens do you assign?
7. Your partner is robbed by the thief. She uses the pass token. She has a
repayment obligation of zero token and she cannot consume anything.
You do not have to repay for her and if you repay, the team will not
default. How many dislike tokens do you assign?
8. Your partner is robbed by the thief. She does not use the pass token. She
has a repayment obligation of one token and she cannot repay. You have
to repay for her and if you repay, the team will not default. How many
dislike tokens do you assign?
[INSTRUCTOR NOTE THE DISLIKE DECISIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN
YOUR GROUP ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL DECISION SHEETS FOR TERM 1]
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b.7.6 Discrete Choice Experiment
Now we would like to present you a different decision making game. We will
look at the characteristics of loan contracts for your general loan. There are
different attributes that characterize a loan. Some features may be good for
you but costly for the bank. So different features may determine how much
you have to pay in interest payments or fees for a loan.
In particular, we are interested in how we can improve the loan for you.We
have conducted interviews in a pre-study in November 2015. In these in-
terviews you told us about lengthy center meetings when you have to wait
for some members who cannot repay their loan installment in this week, the
abonohan-payments you make for each other and some difficulties with weekly
repayments especially when you have school activities for your children, some-
one from your family is sick or your business is not going well this week. In
these cases you can rely on your group for abonohan but may also be good to
have some possibilities to deal with small shocks and unexpected expenses on
your own. We will present you different loan contracts that may help you to
better deal with small unexpected expenses on your own.
The decisions you are going to make in this game are related to the question
which kind of loan contract you like and which you dislike. There is no right
or wrong answer. We are very interested in your opinion and we appreciate
your cooperation. Please remember, that we are an independent research team.
Your information is very valuable to us and we will not share your answers
with ASHI.
b.7.6.1 Explanation
general loan set up
Let me explain the general loan that we look at in this study. We look at one
specific type of loan: we will study a loan of P 10.000 that has to be repaid over
50 weeks in weekly installments.
[DEMONSTRATE WITH THE POSTER "LOAN SETUP". POINT TO EACH
ITEM WHEN YOU START DESCRIBING IT]
Each loan is characterized by:
1. The loan amount
2. The loan duration in weeks
3. The interest rate you are paying
4. The repayment schedule
5. An administration fee that is paid at the beginning of loan disbursement
These five attributes describe the most important characteristics of the credit
contract. The repayment schedule determines the number of repayments you
have to make. The interest rate and the number of repayments determine the
weekly repayment rate. For your convenience, we will state them with each
credit contract.
loan characteristics - repayment schedule
The main feature that we will study is the repayment schedule. We have three
different repayment schedules.
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• Regular repayment
• Pass token
• Repayment pause
[USE POSTER "CREDIT EXAMPLE A; B; C" TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING]
regular repayment
The regular repayment schedule means that you have to repay a weekly install-
ment every week.
Let’s look at Credit Example A:
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the regular repayment schedule you make 50 repayments, one every
week
• One weekly repayment is P 240 / week
The advantage of the regular repayment schedule is that you pay small amounts
every week. The disadvantage is that you may have problems paying your in-
stallment in some weeks in which someone in your family gets sick, your
children have school activities, or you had a bad business week.
pass token
The pass token schedule means that you have to repay a weekly installment
every week, but you get 2 pass tokens with which you can pass the repayment
amount due in this week to the next week. The following week, you have to
pay a double repayment installment.
Let’s look at Credit Example B:
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the pass token schedule you make 50 repayments, one every week.
• One weekly repayment is P 240 / week
• If you use the pass token, you do not have to repay anything in this week,
but you have to repay P 480 the next week.
The advantage of the pass token schedule is that it allows you to pass repay-
ment from one week to the next. That is, if you may have problems paying
your installment in some weeks in which someone in your family gets sick,
your children have school activities, or you had a bad business week, you can
pass your repayment amount due without defaulting to the bank. You have to
pay a double installment in the following week.
repayment pause
The repayment pause schedule means that you have to repay a weekly install-
ment every week, but you get 2 repayment pauses with which you can pause
the repayment amount due in one week. The two installments due in the repay-
ment pauses are split evenly across weeks so your weekly repayment amount
increases slightly.
Let’s look at Credit Example C:
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• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the repayment pause schedule you make 48 repayments, one every
week, except for two
• One weekly repayment is P 250 / week
• The repayment pause installments are split evenly across the remaining
weeks and you have a slightly increased weekly repayment
The advantage of the repayment pause schedule is that it allows you to pass
repayment from one week to the next. That is, if you may have problems pay-
ing your installment in some weeks in which someone in your family gets sick,
your children have school activities, or you had a bad business week, you can
pause your repayment amount due without defaulting to the bank. You have
to pay a slightly higher installment in every week. Do you have questions?
b.7.6.2 Test Choices & Questions
Before we proceed, we would like to test whether you have understood our
explanations. So we will ask you five questions of understanding:
1. How many repayments do you make with the regular repayment sched-
ule?
a. [POINT TO GENERAL LOAN SETUP POSTER; ANSWER: 50]
2. How many pass tokens do you have over your loan cycle?
a. [POINT TO GENERAL LOAN SETUP POSTER; ANSWER: 2]
3. If you use a pass token in one week, how much to you have to pay in the
next week?
a. [POINT TO GENERAL LOAN SETUP POSTER; ANSWER: P 480]
4. How many times can you pause your repayment in the repayment pause
schedule?
a. [POINT TO GENERAL LOAN SETUP POSTER; ANSWER: 2]
5. How many repayments do you make with the repayment pause sched-
ule?
a. [POINT TO GENERAL LOAN SETUP POSTER; ANSWER: 48]
[NOTE ANSWER ON TEST QUESTION DISCRETE CHOICE” DECISION SHEET]
[TEST QUESTIONS:
⇒ ONLY ASK TEST QUESTIONS ONCE!
⇒ CHECK WHETHER MOST PARTICIPANTS HAVE UNDERSTOOD
THE EXPLANATIONS AND ANSWERED THE TEST QUESTIONS COR-
RECTLY.
⇒ IF TOO MANY PARTICIPANTS DID NOT ANSWER THE TEST QUES-
TION CORRECTLY, EXPLAIN THE RESPECTIVE CREDIT ATTRIBUTE
AGAIN.
HOW TO IDENTIFY "TOO MANY":
⇒ LEAD INSTRUCTOR: ASK INSTRUCTORS IF WE NEED TO REPEAT
EXPLANATIONS.
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⇒ INSTRUCTORS; RAISE YOUR HAND IF MORE THAN 2 PEOPLE
IN YOUR GROUP ANSWERED 2 OR MORE QUESTIONS WRONGLY.
⇒ IF MORE THAN 2 INSTRUCTORS RAISE THEIR HANDS; REPEAT
THE EXPLANATION AS IN SECTION 3.1.2 "General loan setup"]
Test Comparison 1:
Now, let us look at two different loan contracts. One of these two schedules
is better than the other. Let us look at CREDIT EXAMPLE A and CREDIT EX-
AMPLE D
[SHOW POSTER "TEST COMPARISON 1"]
We have CREDIT EXAMPLE A, the loan contract to your left, with
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the regular repayment schedule you make 50 repayments, one every
week
• One weekly repayment is P 240 / week
We have CREDIT EXAMPLE D, the loan contract to your right, with
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 30 percent interest, that is P 3.000 in total amount
• With the regular repayment schedule you make 50 repayments, one every
week
• One weekly repayment is P 260 / week
So which loan contract is better, A or D?
[NOTE ANSWER ON "TEST QUESTION DISCRETE CHOICE" DECISION
SHEET – TEST COMPARISON A]
Test Comparison 2:
Let us look at another set of two different loan contracts. One of these two
schedules is better than the other.
[SHOW POSTER "TEST COMPARISON 2"]
We have CREDIT EXAMPLE B, the credit contract to your left, with
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the pass token schedule you make 50 repayments, one every week.
• One weekly repayment is P 240 / week
• If you use the pass token, you do not have to repay anything in this week,
but you have to repay P 480 the next week.
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• Administration fee of P 0
We have CREDIT EXAMPLE E, the loan contract to your right, with
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the pass token schedule you make 50 repayments, one every week.
• One weekly repayment is P 240 / week
• If you use the pass token, you do not have to repay anything in this week,
but you have to repay P 480 the next week.
• Administration fee of P 1.000
So which loan contract is better, B or E?
[NOTE ANSWER ON "TEST QUESTION DISCRETE CHOICE" DECISION
SHEET – TEST COMPARISON 2]
Test Comparison 3:
Let us look at another set of two different loan contracts. One of these two
schedules is better than the other.
[SHOW POSTER "TEST COMPARISON 3"]
We have CREDIT EXAMPLE C, the credit contract to your left, with
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 20 percent interest, that is P 2.000 in total amount
• With the repayment pause schedule you make 48 repayments, one every
week, except for two
• One weekly repayment is P 250 / week
• The repayment pause installments are split evenly across the remaining
weeks and you have a slightly increased weekly repayment.
• Administration fee of P 0
We have CREDIT EXAMPLE F, the loan contract to your right, with
• You have a loan of P 10.000
• You repay the loan over 50 weeks
• You pay 30 percent interest, that is P 3.000 in total amount
• With the repayment pause schedule you make 48 repayments, one every
week, except for two.
• One weekly repayment is P 271 / week
• The repayment pause installments are split evenly across the remaining
weeks and you have a slightly increased weekly repayment.
• Administration fee of P zero
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So which loan contract is better, C or F?
[NOTE ANSWER ON "TEST QUESTION DISCRETE CHOICE" DECISION
SHEET – TEST COMPARISON 3]
b.7.6.3 Preference Check
Before we proceed, we would like to know which of the repayment schedules
you like best?
Please remember lengthy center meetings when you have to wait for some
members who cannot repay their loan installment in this week, the abonohan-
payments you make for each other and some difficulties with weekly repay-
ments especially when you have school activities for your children, someone
from your family is sick or your business is not going well this week. In these
cases, it may also be good to have some possibilities to deal with small shocks
and unexpected expenses on your own.
The regular repayment schedule, the pass token schedule, or the repayment
pause schedule?
[USE EXAMPLE POSTER A; B; C]
[INSTRUCTOR: NOTE THE DECISIONS ON THE PARTICIPANTS ANSWER
SHEET]
b.7.6.4 Execution of the Experiments
Now we have practised the understanding of the loan contracts.
From now on, we will present you different sets of two distinct loan contracts.
In contrast to the test of understanding, there is no loan contract better than
the other. Each loan contract is better in some way but worse in some other
way.
We will ask you which loan contract you prefer. Your decision only depends
on what you like and what you don’t like. There is no right or wrong answer.
[SHOW COMPARISON 1 TO 11/12 NOTE DECISION OF PARTICIPANT ON
THE ANSWER SHEET]
Comparison 1
Here are two insurance contracts. Contract A on the left side and contract B
on the right side.
Contract A is characterized by
• Loan amount of P XXX
• Loan duration of 50 weeks
• Interest rate in XX percent , that is P XXX in total amount
• Repayment schedule of YYY
• Weekly repayment of P XXX / week
• Administration fee of P XXX
[DESCRIBE THE LOAN CONTRACT AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, PUT IN THE
CORRECT AMOUNTS FROM THE LOAN CONTRACT].
Contract B is characterized by
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• Loan amount of P XXXX
• Loan duration of 50 weeks
• Interest rate in XX percent , that is P XXX in total amount
• Repayment schedule of YYY
• Weekly repayment of P XXX / week
• Administration fee of P XXX
[DESCRIBE THE LOAN CONTRACT AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, PUT IN THE
CORRECT AMOUNTS FROM THE LOAN CONTRACT].
Comparison 2-11 (for Block 1 and 2), 2-12 for Block 3)
[REPEAT AS COMPARISION 1]
b.7.7 Short Survey
Participant ID:_________________  Session ID:__________________ 
1 
 
 Intake Survey 
 
Block A 
The following set of questions form part of a game. Approximately 5 out of 20 people will actually 
be paid for one these questions at the end of today’s meeting.  You don’t know whether you will 
be one of the lucky ones and which question you might be paid for. Therefore, you should make 
all of your choices as if you are going to get each reward. So please really think about which 
reward you prefer for each question. 
 
The following questions will ask you whether you want P100 now, or a different amount of 
money in 1 month. All amounts will be paid with mobile phone load. If you are paid, we 
will record your mobile phone number at the end of the experiment.  If you don’t have a 
mobile phone, you can give us the number of a family member or friend.  
If a question is selected where you choose P100 now, then we will transfer P100 of load 
today. If a question is selected where you choose an amount in one month, then we will 
transfer that amount in one month. This payment is guaranteed. We will send you a 
confirmation text before you leave today which confirms the amount. We will also give 
you a paper voucher (SHOW VOUCHER) which states your name, the amount, and the date 
when we send the load. We will also give you a number you can contact if your phone 
number changes. Do you have any questions on this before I start? 
INSTRUCTORS: 
- ASK EACH QUESTION SEPARATELY. LET THEM THINK ABOUT EACH ONE. 
- DO NOT SHORTEN OR ABBREVIATE THE QUESTIONS IN ANY WAY 
- AVOID SWITCHING BACK AND FORTH. IF RESPONDENT SWITCHES BACK AND FORTH; 
CHECK THEY UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTION. 
 
 A1 Do you prefer to get P100 guaranteed today, or to get 
P100 guaranteed 1 month from now? 
(1) P100 today 
 
(2) P100 in 1 month 
 A2 
 
Would you prefer to receive P100 guaranteed today, or 
P120 guaranteed in 1 month? 
(1) P100 today 
 
(2) P120 in 1 month 
 A3 What if it was P100 guaranteed today, or P150 
guaranteed in 1 month? 
 
(1) P100 today 
 
(2) P150 in 1 month 
 A4 Would you prefer to receive P100 guaranteed today, or 
P200 guaranteed in 1 month? 
 
(1) P100 today 
 
(2) P200 in 1 month 
 A5 Would you prefer to receive P100 guaranteed today, or 
P250 guaranteed in 1 month? 
 
(1) P100 today 
 
(2) P250 in 1 month 
0.1 Instructor 
 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
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Participant ID:_________________  Session ID:__________________ 
2 
 
 A6 What if it was P100 guaranteed today, or P300 
guaranteed in 1 month? 
 
(1) P100 today 
 
(2) P300 in 1 month 
A7 For this question, suppose we play a game where you flip 
a coin to win a prize of money. If this question is selected 
for payment, then we will actually flip a coin. If you get 
heads, you win a lower amount of cash, and if you get 
tails, you win a higher amount of cash. There are five 
different options for the amounts, and you can choose 
your favourite one. Which game do you prefer? SHOW 
LOTTERIES AND READ OPTIONS 
READ: Option A is to win 90 pesos if you get heads and 
190 pesos if you get tails.  (pause) 
CONTINUE READING OPTIONS B – E USING THE LOTTERY 
PICTURE 
 (1)  A.  (90,  190) 
 (2)  B.  (80, 240) 
 (3)  C.  (60, 300) 
 (4)  D.  (20, 380) 
 (5)  E.  (  0, 400) 
 
Block B 
Your answers will only be used for the research study and expect that we will treat them with 
full confidentiality. Trust us that we will not share them to your organization ASHI or any of 
your group mates. The only reference that will appear in this survey is your “participants ID”, 
your name will not be mentioned or appear in the report. 
For each question, please let me know whether, yes, the statement applies to you or no, the 
statement does not apply to you. [yes/no] 
B1 I would know immediately if someone in my group has a problem in her business 
activities. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B2 If a group member does not have the money to repay in one week, I would know 
the exact reasons. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B3 In my borrowing group, I actively try to gain information about the other members’ 
business activities. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B4 My group members would know immediately if I have a problem in my business 
activities.  
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B5 If I don’t have the money to repay, my group members would know the exact 
reasons.  
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B6 I am willing to share with others without expecting anything in return. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B7 I am willing to pay abonohan for other members, even if they never pay abonohan 
for me. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
6
 
 
7 
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Participant ID:_________________  Session ID:__________________ 
3 
 
B8 I will only pay abonohan for other members that have paid abonohan for me. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B9 Have you ever given abonohan to a fellow group member? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B10 Have you ever received abonohan from a fellow group member? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B11 Think about last month. In how many weeks did abonohan in your group happen? 
 
 
 _____times 
B12 In your group, is abonohan usually paid back? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B13 Do you feel pressure from your group members to pay abonohan for them? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B14 When in a group meeting, if my group members ask me to pay for them, it would be 
hard to say no. 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B15 Do you feel pressure from your group members when you cannot repay your loan? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
B16 Are you worried to discuss your repayment problems with your group members? 
 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) N/A 
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Participant ID:_________________  Session ID:__________________ 
4 
 
Block C 
The questions below ask you to choose between rewards 1 month from now, and rewards 2 
months from now. As before, you might get paid for one of these questions in load. The payment is 
guaranteed. So please really think about which reward you prefer for each question.  
 A8 
 
Do you prefer to get P100 guaranteed in one month, or 
to get P100 guaranteed in 2 months? 
 
(1) P100 in 1 month 
 
(2) P100 in 2 months 
 A9 Would you prefer to receive P100 guaranteed in one 
month, or P120 guaranteed in 2 months? 
(1)  P100 in 1 month 
(2)  P120 in 2 months 
 A10 
 
What if it was P100 guaranteed in one month, or P150 
guaranteed in 2 months? 
 
(1) P100 in 1 month 
 
(2) P150 in 2 months 
 A11 Would you prefer to receive P100 guaranteed in one 
month, or P200 guaranteed in 2 months? 
 
(1) P100 in 1 month 
 
(2) P200 in 2 months 
 A12 Would you prefer to receive P100 guaranteed in one 
month, or P250 guaranteed in 2 months? 
 
 (1)  P100 in 1 month 
(2)  P250 in 2 months 
 A13 What if it was P100 guaranteed in one month, or P300 
guaranteed in 2 months? 
 (1)  P100 in 1 month 
(2)  P300 in 2 months 
 
9
 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
8 
 
10 
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C
A P P E N D I X T O C H A P T E R 3
c.1 additional robustness tests
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SocialPreferences
Probit
(M
E)
M
isreporting
in
Part
2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
G
roupPC
0.209***
0.209***
0.207***
0.209***
0.209***
0.208***
0.208***
0.205***
0.206***
(0.0591)
(0.0595)
(0.0592)
(0.0595)
(0.0584)
(0.0595)
(0.0597)
(0.0590)
(0.0577)
G
roupN
oPC
0.170***
0.173***
0.173***
0.174***
0.174***
0.173***
0.173***
0.167***
0.163***
(0.0585)
(0.0585)
(0.0585)
(0.0586)
(0.0575)
(0.0587)
(0.0581)
(0.0583)
(0.0561)
M
achiavelli(self)
0.00350
0.00156
(0.00327)
(0.00324)
M
achiavelli(other)
0.00163
0.00157
(0.00316)
(0.00256)
C
onscientiousness
-0.00713
0.00282
(0.0113)
(0.0121)
N
euroticism
0.00214
0.000840
(0.0121)
(0.0123)
O
penness
-0.0206**
-0.0199*
(0.0105)
(0.0113)
Extraversion
-0.000513
0.00132
(0.0119)
(0.0120)
A
greeableness
0.00391
0.0171
(0.0153)
(0.0146)
SocialD
esirability
0.0202
0.0188
(0.0147)
(0.0166)
O
bservations
273
273
273
273
273
273
273
273
273
#
of
C
lusters
117
117
117
117
117
117
117
117
117
Pseudo-R
2
0.070
0.065
0.064
0.064
0.078
0.063
0.064
0.076
0.095
N
otes:R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
on
group
levelin
parentheses.***
p
<
0.01,**
p
<
0.05,*
p
<
0.1
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Table
C
.3:Lying
and
Socio-Econom
ic
Background
Probit
(M
E)
M
isreporting
in
Part
2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
G
roupPC
0.205***
0.208***
0.209***
0.208***
0.209***
0.204***
0.201***
(0.0585)
(0.0594)
(0.0590)
(0.0590)
(0.0595)
(0.0594)
(0.0574)
G
roupN
oPC
0.169***
0.169***
0.172***
0.166***
0.173***
0.169***
0.154**
(0.0576)
(0.0584)
(0.0581)
(0.0585)
(0.0588)
(0.0583)
(0.0565)
Fem
ale
-0.0824**
-0.0717**
(0.0366)
(0.0363)
Im
portance
of
religious
questions
-0.00870
-0.00662
(1
=
not
im
portant
at
all,7
=
very
im
portant)
(0.00933)
(0.00851)
PoliticalA
ttitude
0.0239
0.0222
(1
=
strongly
left,7
=
strongly
right
(0.0194)
(0.0199)
A
ge
0.00523
0.00461
(0.00451)
(0.00414)
N
um
ber
of
other
participants
know
n
-0.0285
-0.0167
(0.0650)
(0.0588)
N
um
ber
experim
ents
participated
in
0.00539*
0.00447
(0.00290)
(0.00284)
O
bservations
273
273
273
273
273
273
273
#
of
C
lusters
117
117
117
117
117
117
117
Pseudo-R
2
0.079
0.066
0.070
0.069
0.065
0.078
0.104
N
otes:R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
on
group
levelin
parentheses.***
p
<
0.01,**
p
<
0.05,*
p
<
0.1.
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c.2 additional analyses (group composition, decision times and
individual-deliberation)
c.2.1 Group Composition
In our main analysis, we have shown that for the full sample (78 groups), the
number of dishonest individuals in a group plays only a weak role for lying
behavior in Part 2. Here we provide an additional analysis by excluding those
participants who have seen a in Part 1 and thus had no incentive to lie
in Part 1. Focusing on this subsample (66 groups) we find some evidence for
differences in misreporting across group composition. In GroupPC, the corre-
lation between the number of honest individuals in a group and honest re-
porting is small and fails to be statistically significant (Rho: 0.148, p=0.41) and
Fisher’s exact test fails to reject the independence of lying behavior from group
composition at the 10-percent level (p=1). In GroupNoPC, for the subsample
(33 groups) the share of dishonest individuals in Part 2 correlates significantly
and positively with the number of group members who have reported dishon-
estly in Part 1 (Rho: 0.362, p=0.0382), but Fisher’s exact test again fails to reject
independence of group composition and lying behavior in Part 2 (p=0.147).
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Figure C.1: Dishonest Reporting by Group Composition and Treatment
Notes: Subsample of groups who have not seen a in Part 1, 66 groups in total
c.2.2 Decision Times
A recent debate surrounds the question of whether honesty or dishonesty is
the "natural state" or requires deliberation (Foerster et al., 2013; Shalvi et al.,
2012, 2013; Van’t Veer et al., 2014). In the context of group decision making, un-
certainty about the norm may result in longer decision times, whereas certainty
about a prevailing (dis)honesty norm may result in shorter decision times. We
find that in Part 1, misreporting individuals (on average 37 percent) take signif-
icantly longer in their decision to lie as compared to the individuals reporting
the die roll that was actually displayed (mean honest reporting time: 12.64 sec
(SD: 4.71); mean dishonest reporting time: 16.89 sec (SD: 9.20), Kolmogorov-
Smirnov exact test, p=0.012, Spearman’s ρ=0.296, p=0.001). In Part 2, however,
we find that chats that lead to honest reporting take longer: Mean chat time
before honest reporting: 227 sec (SD: 46.84); mean chat time before dishon-
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est reporting: 154.11 sec (SD: 86.14), (Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p=0.028,
Spearman’s ρ:=-0.251, p=0.027).1
Having communicated in a group makes decisions in the lying task signifi-
cantly faster in Part 3 (mean reporting time: Individual: 13.49 sec (SD: 6.24);
mean reporting time for GroupPC and GroupNoPC pooled: 10.40 sec (SD: 3.46),
Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p=0.001).2 Further, in Part 3, decision times
and dishonest behavior do not significantly relate to each other (mean hon-
est reporting time: 11.08 sec (SD: 3.79); mean dishonest reporting time: 11.52
sec (SD: 5.02), Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p=0.857, Spearman’s ρ=0.019,
p=0.838). Notably, conditional on dishonest reporting in Part 3, participants
who participated in the group chat report significantly faster non-truthfully
than participants from the Individual treatment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact
test, p=0.004; Spearman’s ρ=-0.27, p=0.008; mean reporting time with com-
munication: 10.48, SD: 3.71; without communication: 13.94, SD: 6.67). Having
participated in the chat also speeds up decisions in the belief elicitation task
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, p=0.003). This might be seen as additional
evidence that the chat has shifted beliefs about the honesty norm.
c.2.3 Content Analysis of IndividualDeliberation
As for the chats of the group treatments, coders analyzed the content of the
stream of thoughts in IndividualDeliberation according to the pre-defined code-
book in Appendix C.3. Our results show that many participants did indeed de-
liberate in this treatment. Participants took on average 234 seconds (SD=114.3)
to write down their thoughts and 67 percent of participants (26 out of 39)
in IndividualDeliberation explicitly mention arguments for dishonesty, whereas
only 9 participants write down arguments for honesty (see Table C.4). Only
one participant decided not to write anything. Interestingly, frequencies of dis-
honest and honest arguments are not statistically different from the group
treatments (χ2-test, GroupPC and GroupNoPC pooled, dishonest arguments:
1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
2 As GroupPC and GroupNoPC do not differ significantly in terms of decision times in Part 3
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov exact test, lying decision: p=0.467; belief elicitation time: p=0.862) and to
avoid multiple testing, we pool both group treatments and test them jointly against Individual.
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p=0.114; honest arguments: p=0.878). The average share of statements contain-
ing arguments for dishonest behavior amounts to 59.2 percent and - as in the
group treatments - is significantly higher than the share of honest messages
(15.1 percent, Wilcoxon signed-rank exact test, p<0.001).
Table C.4: Number of Individuals Using Honest and Dishonest Argu-
ments
Arguments for Dishonesty mentioned
Arguments for
Honesty mentioned Yes No Σ
Yes 6 3 9
No 20 10 30
Σ 26 13 39
To analyze the influence of arguments made on misreporting behavior, we
replicate Table 3.3 from the main text including the data from IndividualDelib-
eration in Table C.5. The results are qualitatively similar and most importantly,
when including a dummy for the group treatments in Model (2), we find that
groups lie significantly more, even when controlling for the arguments made
during the chat. This result is robust to controlling for misreporting in Part 1
(Model (3)). The analysis of IndividualDeliberation and its comparison with our
two group treatments suggests that individuals come up with dishonest and
honest argument to a similar extent as groups. Yet only the exchange and val-
idation of these arguments within a group can lead to a shift in beliefs about
the norm and corresponding changes in behavior.
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Table C.5: Lying Behavior and Arguments Used
Probit (ME)
Misreporting in Part 2
(1) (2) (3)
Money (Dishonest Use) 0.0485 0.0630 0.0537
(0.0480) (0.0474) (0.0455)
Money (Honest Use) -0.406*** -0.416*** -0.448***
(0.154) (0.160) (0.158)
Honesty (Dishonest Use) -0.00915 -0.00619 -0.0263
(0.111) (0.0879) (0.0827)
Honesty (Honest Use) -0.0709 -0.0785* -0.0438
(0.0475) (0.0450) (0.0403)
Insecurity (Dishonest Use) 0.0288 0.0111 -0.00664
(0.0663) (0.0666) (0.0533)
Insecurity (Honest Use) -0.354*** -0.277* -0.209
(0.144) (0.160) (0.155)
Rules (Dishonest Use)
Rules (Honest Use) -0.308* -0.316** -0.249*
(0.173) (0.155) (0.144)
Others’ Behavior (Dishonest Use) -0.0468 0.0839 0.0926
(0.109) (0.104) (0.104)
Others’ Behavior (Honest Use)
Group Treatments (Dummy) 0.330*** 0.351***
(0.103) (0.107)
Misreporting in Part 1 0.120***
(0.0370)
Observations 273 273 273
# of Clusters 117 117 117
Pseudo-R2 0.280 0.358 0.396
Notes: Arguments relating to others being honest and arguments referring to Rules to encour-
age dishonest reporting have been dropped due to multicollinearity. Robust standard errors
clustered on group level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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c.3 codebook : variables for the chat analysis
This section includes the codebook that was used by our coders.
• Chat in general
– Duration: Duration (# of seconds)
– Messages: # of messages
– Average length: Average length of a message (# of characters incl.
spaces)
• Content
Which arguments are being made to persuade other group members?
How often are they alluded to during the entire chat? ONLY COUNT
ARGUMENTS THAT ARE EXPLICITLY MENTIONED (e.g. if " " was
displayed and participant says "I think we should be honest and should
enter "→ honesty=1, "I think we should enter "→ honesty=0)
– Money (Dishonest Use): Money discussed in favor of lying
(# of times money/points/payoffs are mentioned as an argument)
Example: We should enter 5 because it will maximize our payoffs.
– Money (Honest Use): Money discussed in favor of honesty
(# of times money/points/payoffs are mentioned as an argument)
Example: We should enter 3, it will still give us 6 euros.
– Honesty (Dishonest Use): Honesty discussed in favor of lying
(# of times mentioned)
Example: There is no need to be honest.
– Honesty (Honest Use): Honesty discussed in favor of honesty
(# of times mentioned)
Example: Let’s be honest.
– Insecurity (Dishonest Use): Refer to misunderstanding/insecurity con-
cerning the task in favor of lying (# of times mentioned)
Example: I am uncertain about the task, I thought we can enter any
number we want to enter.
– Insecurity (Honest Use): Refer to misunderstanding/insecurity con-
cerning the task in favor of honesty (# of times mentioned)
Example: I am uncertain about the task, I thought we have to enter
the number we saw.
– Rules (Dishonest Use): Discuss that "we should stick to the rules"
(# of times mentioned)
– Rules (Honest Use): Discuss that "we do not have to stick to the rules"
(# of times mentioned)
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– Others’ Behavior (Dishonest Use): Reference to dishonesty of others
outside the group (e.g. experimenter, people in general, other
participants, . . . ) (# of times mentioned)
– Others’ Behavior (Honest Use): Reference to honesty of others outside
the group (e.g. experimenter, people in general, other
participants, . . . ) (# of times mentioned)
– Positive Consequences: Refer to positive consequences
(# of times mentioned)
– Negative Consequences: Refer to negative consequences
(# of times mentioned)
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c.4 translated instructions
Appendix C.4 includes the translated instructions (from German). Participants
received the general instructions for the experiment in print. All further in-
structions were displayed on the computer screen at the beginning of the re-
spective parts (see screenshots). We added comments in squared brackets [].
General Instructions [printed]
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not speak from now on with any other participant
General procedures
In this experiment we study economic decision making. You can earn money
by participating. The money you earn will be paid to you after the experiment
privately and in cash.
The experiment consists of three parts in which you will take independent
decisions. At the beginning of each part, you will receive detailed instructions.
If you have any questions about the instructions or during the experiment,
please raise your hand. An instructor will then come to you and answer your
questions privately.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions
and possibly you may interact with other participants. That is, both your own
decisions and the decisions of the other participants may determine your pay-
off. How your payoff is exactly determined will be explained in the on-screen
instructions.
Payment
In some parts of the experiment, we are not talking about euros but about
points. Your income for these parts is calculated in points. We will convert the
points into euros at the end of the experiment, with an exchange rate of:
1 point = 2 euros
We will randomly select one of the three parts to be payoff-relevant at the end
of the experiment. The participant at seat 21 will roll a die. If the die shows
a or , the first part of the experiment will be payoff-relevant. If the die
shows a or , the second part is payoff-relevant and if the die shows a or
, the third part will be payoff-relevant. As all parts are equally likely to be
payoff-relevant, it is optimal for you to decide according to your preferences.
In addition to the income that you earn during the experiment you will receive
4 euros for showing up on time. Your total income will be paid to you after the
end of the experiment in cash. We will call each participant based on her seat
number for individual payment. That is, no other participant will learn your
payoff and also you will not learn the other participants’ payoffs.
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Anonymity
The analysis of the experiment will be anonymous. That is, we will never link
your name with the data generated in the experiment. You will not learn the
identity of any other participant, neither before nor after the experiment. Also
the other participants will not learn your identity. At the end of the experiment,
you have to sign a receipt to confirm the payments you received. This receipt
will only be used for accounting purposes.
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On screen instructions: Instructions for Part 1
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Decision Screen Part 1 [displayed after subjects observed the video]
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Belief elicitation after Part 1 [displayed after subjects entered their decision]
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Post belief elicitation question [displayed on single screen after belief elicitation]
Instruction for Part 2: GroupNoPC
[For GroupPC, instructions were identical except for the fact that participants
were informed that all group members receive a payoff of zero, if they do not
enter the same number. For Individual, the instructions were identical to Part 1
with an additional sentence explaining that Part 2 is identical to Part 1.]
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Instruction for chat [displayed after instructions for Part 2]
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Decision Screen in Part 2 and 3
[Decision screens in Part 2 and Part 3 were structured as in Part 1.]
Instructions for Part 3 and Belief elicitation after Part 3
[Instructions for Part 3 were identical to instructions for Part 1, except that
answers to control questions were automatically selected and displayed. The
belief elicitation after Part 3 was identical to the belief elicitation after Part 1,
except for the color of the chip determining payoff-relevance, and it was ex-
plicitly mentioned that we are asking for the expected results for the same
reference experiment.]
Instructions for the additional control treatment IndividualDeliberation
[Instructions and decision screens for Part 1 and Part 3 of IndividualDeliberation
were identical to those from Individual. Instructions for Part 2 were identical
to Individual, except that we added a sentence informing subjects that they
have the option to write down their thoughts: "Part 2 is identical to Part 1,
except that you have now the possibility to write down your thoughts." and an
additional screen (see below) explaining how to write down one’s thoughts.]
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